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Abstract 
This introductory essay serves as a synthesis of the thesis "The Distributional Aspect of 
Scarcity: Essays on the Economics of Natural Resources, Institutions and Development." It 
accounts for the crucial role played by environmental and institutional conditions in economic 
development, motivates the research contribution of the thesis and discusses its 
methodological approach in a history of science perspective. The essay is organised around 
three fundamental concepts of economics; value, human behaviour and property rights. This 
makes it easier to reveal the basic underlying perspective on economics from which the thesis 
is conceived. Indeed, within this organising structure the essay identifies and accounts for the 
goveming idea of the entire thesis - the "distributional aspect ofscarcity." 
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1 Introduetion 
IndividuaIs do not choose between the altematives offered by nature - they choose between the 
altematives offered by owners (John R. Commons, 1934, p.199) 
The present thesis addresses issues concerning the exploitation of natural resources. The aim 
is to add theoretical insight to the field of natural resource and environmental economics, and 
to contribute some new thoughts to the current debate on environmental matters. In this 
debate, the impression is frequently conveyed that there is a fundamental conflict between 
economic development and environmental concerns. However, as all economic activity 
ultimately depends upon the environmental resource base, the conception of such a conflict 
seems to be a false trail, probably originating from the confusing of economic development 
with economic growth. Rather, the basic conflict is to be found among the multitude of 
individuals having opposing interests and preferences over the diversity of mutually exc1usive 
ways by which natural and environmental resources may be utilised. This is the perspective 
with which the present thesis enters the environmental debate. 
The choice of perspective governs how problems are defined and approached. The way 
by which economists conceptualise the economy, the kind of problems they are absorbed by 
and the methodological tools by which they are equipped all have a decisive inf1uence on 
their contribution to the policy debate and to the generation of knowledge in general. 
Although drawing heavily on the tools of neo-classical economics, the present thesis is 
inspired by institutional economics. Basically, this finds expression in the explicit focus on 
property rights in the analysis of natural resource and environmental management. As 
property is nothing but value, and a right to property is nothing but institutional behavior, the 
economics of property rights emerges out of the institutional understanding of value and 
behaviour. With this in mind, the thesis is organised around the three basic concepts - value, 
behaviour and property rights. 
The essay is supposed to give a broad account of the underlying perspective on 
economics from which the thesis is conceived. Section 2 otrers an argument for the crucial 
role played by environmental and institutional conditions in economic development. Turning 
to the economics of population, the important principle of scarcity is established in section 3. 
Section 4 identifies the underlying governing idea of the thesis, that is, the distributional 
aspect of scarcity, and together with sections 5 and 6, it otrers a broad perspective of the 
economic concepts ofvalue, behaviour and property rights. 
6 The Distributional Aspect ofScarcity 
2 The "UItimate and Proximate Causes" of Economic Development 
If superior creatures from space ever visit earth, the first question they will ask, in order to assess 
the leve! of our civilization, is: 'Have they discovered evolution yet?' (Richard Dawkins, 1989, p.l) 
"History fol1owed different courses for different peoples because of difTerences among 
peoples' environments, not because of biological differences among peoples themselves." In 
this way Jared Diamond (1998) sums up his book "Guns, Germs and Steel. A short history of 
everybody for the last 13,000 years." Diamond seeks to trace out the broad patterns of human 
history in terms of environmental geography and biogeography. To explain why wealth and 
power among the different regions of the world are so unequal1y distributed, he resorts to 
continental differences in the environmental conditions, as, for instance, in the starting 
materials for domestication. Before the rise of civilisation, same regions of the world 
happened to be rich on plant and animal species being highly suitable for domestication, 
while others were not. Thus, food production was more Iikely to emerge in those former 
regions. Moreover, some regions had a favourable geographical location with respect to the 
diffusion of domestication techniques, while others had not. Thus, by triggering domestication 
and enabling farmers to generate food surpluses, favourable environmental and geographical 
conditions gave some regions comparative advantages in terms of economic and military 
power. These conditions constitute the "uitimate causes" of the biased distribution of wealth 
and power among people of different regions (Diamond, 1998). 
Based on the prevailing environmental and geographical characteristics, the 
domestication of plant and animal species has, throughout history, been triggered by effort­
allocation decisions of human foragers. By seeking the highest return, for example in terms of 
calories and proteins, for the least effort used, people of some regions rationally remained 
hunter-gatherers, white others adopted food production. The reason why food production 
suddenly gained a competitive advantage over hunting gathering in the first place, may be 
found in factors like an increasing scarcity of wild foods, improved technolagies for 
collecting, processing and storing food, or a rising population density. In any case, humans 
did not intentionally invent food production. Rather, it evolved as a by-product of many 
separate efTort-allocation decisions made without awareness of their accumulated 
consequences. When first known, however, food production became not only a serious 
competitor for hunting-gathering, but, eventually, also its downfall. lndeed, more than being 
the preferred choice, food production gained by the very fact that the "denser populations of 
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food producers enabled them to conquer and displace hunter-gatherers by their sheer 
numbers" (Diamond, 1998, p.112). 
The transition from hunting-gathering to food production constitutes a major turning 
point in human history, as it paved the way for the making of more advanced and complex 
technologies and institutions. The technological and institutional advantages constitute the 
"proximate causes" of the unequal distribution ofweaJth and power among people of different 
regions of the world. Those who got "a head start on food production" thereby gained a head 
start on technological and institutional development (Diamond, 1998, p.l 03). Moreover, the 
chain of causation between the two is expected to operate in both directions. That is, 
population densities increase with increased food availability, at the same time as higher 
population densities trigger technological and institutional innovation. Thus, "the adoption of 
food production exemplifies what is termed an autocatalytic process - one that catalyzes itself 
in a positive feedback cycle, going faster and faster once it has started" (Diamond, 1998, 
p.lll). 
Besides offering an interesting perspective on the evolution of human history, Diamonds 
work signifies the crucial role played by environmental and institutional conditions in 
economic development. The role he assigns to the notion of "uitimate causes" highlights the 
paramount importance of environmental conditions, while that of "proximate causes" 
ilIustrates, for better or worse, the immense power of institutions. In the terminology of 
resource economics, these refer to natural and man-made (physical and institutional) capital, 
respectively. The interaction between the two is the prime mover of economic development, 
and population growth constitutes a crucial connecting link between them. In the classical 
literature on resource economics, this brings us to the theory of Thomas Malthus (1798) and 
its alleged counter thesis, the work by Esther Boserup (1965). 
3 Population Growth and Economic Development 
[no urge man to further the gracious design of providence, by the full cuitivation of the earth, it has 
been ordained, that population should increase much faster than food. (Thomas Robert MaIthus, 
1798, p.361) 
ConventionaJ wisdom assigns the main divergence between the theories of Malthus (1798) 
and Boserup (1965) to the direction of causality, that is, whether the means by which food is 
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obtained determine population growth, or the other way around. A conventionaJ reading of 
Malthus suggests the former, that is, population growth is determined by the fixity of means 
available for obtaining food. As people basically are not able to adapt their reproduction 
behaviour to a limited resource base, rapid population growth is gener~ted through increased 
fertility and reduced mortality whenever productivity is high and times are good. Given 
Malthus' assumption of scarcity and diminishing returns to scale, that is, a negative 
relationship between population growth and labour productivity, the resulting increase in the 
population necessarily reduces per capita consumption. As the living conditions deteriorates, 
"positive checks" slow down population growth until it settles down at the levet of 
subsistence in the long term, that is, the wel1 known "poverty trap." Hence, when a higher 
population density does not make people adopt more efficient methods of obtaining food, the 
scarcity of resources, in combination with the absence of voluntary restraint on birth control 
("preventive checks"), inevitably resuIts in poor liv ing conditions for the great mass of 
people. 
In contrast, Boserup (1965) treats population growth as given, and as the main factor 
determining the means by which food is obtained. Her argument basically hinges on the 
assumption that an increase in population pressure induces a shift to more labour-intensive 
production techniques. This opens new innovation possibilities, that is, the making ofnew and 
better technologies. Hence, even in a world of scarcity, there may be a positive relationship 
between population growth and labour productivity. In Boserup's (1965, p.75) own words, "a 
growing population will be faced with the need to improve the land and perform other 
investments in agriculture. It is nevertheless Iikely to experience diminishing returns to labour 
at least in the short run, and it may have to do longer and harder hours of agricultural work in 
order to avoid a fall in nutritional standards." This rather dismal conclusion is relaxed by 
Boserup's belief in the more positive long term effects of a gradually increasing population: 
"The gradual adaptation to harder and more regular work is Iikely to raise the efficiency of 
labour in both agricultural and non-agricultural activities; the increasing density ofpopulation 
opens up opportunities for a more intricate division of labour and - in some cases - a higher 
degree of urbanization results in improvements in agricultural productivity through the 
delivery to agriculture of better makes of tool, the provision of better administration, 
education, etc." 
Boserup's (1965) work belongs to the tradition of population-induced innovation 
models. Firmly placed within the same tradition, Hayami and Ruttan (1985) explain invention 
and adoption of new technologies partiy as a product of population growth through its effect 
The Distributional Aspect ofScarcity - a Synthesis 9 
on relative prices. As population increases, land becomes scarcer and its price increases 
relatively to the prices of other factors, as for instance labour and land yield-increasing inputs 
(e.g. fertilizers). Hence, as pointed out by Cuffaro, "Technological change therefore moves in 
a land saving, labor using direction" (Cuffaro 1997, p. 1154). Another perspective within the 
same tradition, the "evolutionary theory of land rights," as named by Platteau (1996, p.31), 
emphasises innovations in property rights. Its theoretical framework is rooted in various 
works by theorists associated with the so-called "property rights school" (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1973; Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1967; Johnson, 1972; Posner, 1992). Their focus is on 
the evolution from poorly defined (e.g. "open access") to weU defined property rights 
regimes. I As population grows, scarcity induces increased competition and a higher price of 
land. Thus, the extemalities associated with poorly defined property rights, or no property 
rights at all as in "apen access," become more significant, and "property rights develop to 
intemalize extema/ities when the gains of intemaJization become larger than the cost of 
intemalization" (Demsetz, 1967, p.3S0). In this way, population growth induces a transition to 
more "efficient" land right structures (see section 6 be/ow, for a fuller account of the 
economics ofthe "property rights school"). 
As noted, conventional wisdom categorises the theories of Boserup and those sharing 
her views, as counter-Malthusian theories. However, although Malthus, quite contrary to 
Boserup, treats population growth endogenously, the basic feature of his theory is more in 
resemblance with that of the "population-induced innovation models" than is usually 
recognised. Traditionally, attention is directed solely towards Malthus' "gloomy prediction ... 
that population growth wou/d run up against the fixity of the earth's resources and condemn 
most of humankind to poverty and recurring high death rates" (Birdsall, 1988, pA78. See also 
Cuffaro, 1997; Nerlove and Raut, 1997; Robinson and Srinivasan, 1997). According to 
Commons (1934, p.246), however, this is "only the materialistie basis of overpopulation 
developed in the first half of his book, whereas Malthus himself considered that his great 
contribution was his theory of Moral Evolution in the latter half." Just like innovations in 
technology, knowledge and property rights, Malthus' major concem, innovations in morality, 
emerges out of population pressure and scarcity. As in his own words, "Had population and 
food increased in the same ratio, it is probable that man might never have emerged from the 
savage state" (Malthus, 1798, p.364). 
I Demsetz (1967) and Alchian and Demsetz (1973) are specifically referring to the transition from communal- to 
private property rights when formulating their theory of the evolution of "efficient" property rights. See e.g. 
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With this in mind, the conventional understanding of the work of Malthus and the 
population-induced innovation models as opposites is somewhat misleading. Indeed, from his 
principle of population, which Commons (1934, p.246) considers as none other than the "the 
biological foundation of the principle of Scarcity," springs Malthus' vision of "moral 
excelJence" and the awakening of"social sympathy." Likewise, from the principJe ofscarcity, 
spri ngs Boserup's (1965) belief in technological, educational and administrative progress, 
Hayami and Ruttan's (1985) faith in the market as a means to achieve "efficient" innovation, 
Demsetz's (1967) highly esteemed transition to private property rights, as weU as Hobbes' 
(1651) call for Leviathan and Hume's (1739) notion of justice and property. They all con fess 
to the principle of scarcity - the subject matter of economics. 
4 Scarcity, Conflict and the Concept ofValue 
[W]e must renounce the theory, which accounts for every moral sentiment by the principle of self· 
love. We must adopt a more public affection, and allow that the interests of society are not, even on 
their own account, entirely indifferent to us. (David Hume, 1751, p.207) 
Most problems of relevance to economics start with scarcity, unfold in cont1ict of interest, and 
must be evaluated with reference to some concept of value. Scarcity generates a multitude of 
trade-offs among a diversity of conflicting and, frequently, mutualJy exc\usive objects of 
value. Basically, we are faced with two aspects ofscarcity. Firstly, resources have a muJtitude 
of mutually exc!usive altematives of use. A parcel of virgin land may, for instance, either be 
preserved as habitat for wildlife and plants, or converted to agricultural land for food 
production. This points to the "allocative aspect of scareity," and is attached to the mutual 
exclusiveness of alternative uses of resources in a Robinson Crusoe economy. The different 
altematives may be exposed to some unified standard of value, and on that basis, the 
"optimal" a!location of resources - the one generating the largest amount of value - may in 
principle be found. Broadly, this is the approach of mainstrearn welfare economics. 
However, in the absence of a unified standard of value it is more problematic to 
identify the optimal allocation of resources. This brings us over to the second aspect of 
scarcity - that of distribution. The "distributional aspect of scarcity" concems contlicting 
Bromley (1991), Platleau (1996), Quiggin (1988), Runge (1981), Swaney (1990) and Wade (1987) for critical 
reviews oftheir line ofreasoning. • 
II The Distributional Aspect ofScarcity - a Synthesis 
interests among individuals in their utilisation of resources. This is the more fundamental 
aspect as it constitutes the raison d'etre of institutions. As in the words of Commons (1934, 
p.6), drawing on Hume and Malthus, "out of scarcity derives not only conflict, but also the 
collective action that sets up order on account of mutual dependence." That is, property rights 
and institutions in general are social constructs invented for dealing with problems of scarcity 
and conflict of interest. After all, scarcity is the origin to the notion of property, and the idea 
of property is the basis of all institutions (Biddle, 1990; Commons, 1934). This points to the 
institutional perspective of environmental management, requiring a concept of value that 
pertains as much to the properties and qualities of institutions, as to material goods and 
environmental services per se. 
The two aspects of scarcity are separable only in thought - not in reality. In any 
economic transaction they operate together and give meaning to the concepts of price, 
opportunity cost, extemality and value. Still, conceptually they are very different. This finds 
its expression in the diverging methodological approaches of neo-classical welfare economics 
and institutional economics, the fonner from which mainstream natural resource and 
environmental economics draws heavily. The nonnative branch of natural resource and 
environmental economics, as represented by the extensive use of cost-beneflt analysis, 
abstracts from distribution and concentrates on "allocative efficiency" (as defined by the 
potential Pareto improvement-criterion). Based on the compensation principle (Hicks 1939; 
Kaldor, 1939), any policy capable of generating a net benefit, that is, an increase in aggregate 
production, is ascribed a welfare improvement by this approach. However, the market- and 
estimated non-market prices used as inputs in the calculation of the aggregate production 
value inevitably reflect the existing institutional structure and the state of distribution. That is, 
un less the distribution of the status quo is unifonnly accepted as the "appropriate" one by 
society at large, optimisation based on market prices will not be ethically neutral but biased in 
favour of the status quo. lndeed, "there is no meaning to total output independent of 
distribution" (Arrow, 1963, pAO). In general, it is difficult to make value comparisons 
between activities without resorting to specific distributional standards (Bergson, 1938; 
Samuelson, 1950). Moreover, by abstracting from problems of institutions, distribution and 
seale, the approach may not only be ethically biased, but also ignorant of many of the 
potential remedies for the most pressing social and environmental problems oftoday. 
BasicaIly, institutions are formed by individuals living in an environment ofscarcity and 
conflict of interests. In their own best interest, people choose to subordinate themselves to 
common rules in order to obtain the mutual benefits of cooperation. That is, institutions are 
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the accumulated effect of a multitude of purposeful, institutional transactions among self­
interested individuals. However, just as with the evolution of food production, institutions 
evolve as a by-product of many institutional transactions made without awareness of their full 
and accumulated consequences (see section 2 above). As in the words of Deblonde (200 l, 
p.37; 38), inspired by the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt, "a societal organization ­
which is a manifestation of politics - is never 'made'." That is, the emergence of institutions 
are not "entirely determined by the categories of means and end." Political events do not 
emerge from single political actions. Rather, they are formed in a '''web' of human 
relationships," and cannot be traced back to any individual action (Arendt, 1958, p.18J). 
Indeed, "one cannot think of political processes as a means to realize a particular end, since 
the end, Le. the realization of human freedom, is reveaJed in the processes themselves 
(Deblonde, 200 I, p.37). 
Thus, disconnected from the preferences of any particular individual, institutions are 
carriers of values having their sole basis at the social level, as exemplified by the universal 
values of freedom and justice. Indeed, freedom and justice are nothing but institutions 
themselves. More than three centuries ago, Locke (1690) reminded us, that far from the 
liberty to do as one pleases, without being tied by any laws, "freedom of men under 
government is to have a stand ing rule to live by, common to every one of that society, and 
made by the legislative power erected in it" (Locke, 1690, p.17). Likewise, some decades 
later, Hume (1739, pA98) emphasised the institutional nature of justice, holding that "justice 
establishes itself by a kind of convention or agreement; that is, by a sense of interest, suppos'd 
to be common to all, and where every single act is perforrn'd in expectation that others are to 
perform the like." Thus, freedom and justice both coincide with Commons (1934, p.73) 
definition of an institution, that is, with "collective action in restraint, liberation and 
expansion of individual action.,,2 Accordingly, it is by adding security, ability and force, to 
the group of individuals, that institutions become advantageous and carriers of social value 
(Hurne, 1739, pA85). In any normative economic analysis, then, not only individual 
preferences over goods and services within a given institutional and distributional context, but 
the institutions themselves should be made subject to evaluation. 
This is the underlying perspective of chapter 2, the paper "The Spatial Distribution of 
Benefits and Costs of Wildlife Management. Moose versus wolf in Norway." The joint 
management of moose and wolf is evaluated both by efficiency criteria in terms of cost­
2 Italics added. 
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benefit analysis, as weU as by institutional criteria in tenns of distributional conditions and the 
property rights structure. Although widely supported at the national levet, the recolonisation 
of the Scandinavian wolf in Norway is in conflict with the interests of local fanners due to 
wolf predation on domestic Iivestock. To mitigate the Iivestock losses, the State grants 
compensatory awards. Thus, the presence of Iivestock in, or ciose to, wolf territories 
represents a cost for "society at large." Another conflict of interest is attached to wolf 
predation on moose, as this may considerably lower the hunting income of local landowners. 
On the other hand, an abundant rnoose population causes large social costs in tenns of moose­
vehicle accidents. The spatial distribution and the institutional structure of the joint moose and 
wolf management are explored when all these benefits and costs are accounted for. 
The paper concludes that today's management of moose and wolf seems to serve local 
interests more than those of "society at large." Moreover, the establishment of compensatory 
awards for Iivestock killed by wolf does not enhance social efticiency, but widens the 
distributional bias in favour oflocal interests. Furthermore, it is argued that property rights are 
not weU specified or clearly defined, and that the mutual interference of various legal claims ­
as the prescriptive pasture rights of sheep fanners, the hunting rights of land owners, the 
public rights according to the Wildlife Act and biodiversity preservation, and the international 
rights according to various international conventions - constitutes a basic conflict within 
wildlife management. Hence, to reduce the conflict, the legal assignment of property rights 
should be changed. For instance, the State may buy out the pasture rights of local farmers, so 
that compensation is given for lost pasture rights rather than lost livestock. Future conflicts in 
terms of poorly defined property rights would then be reduced. 
The "distributional aspect of scarcity" is not important only for our understanding of 
value. It matters much also for our understanding of human behaviour. Indeed, distributional 
scarcity triggers institutional behaviour. The next section proceeds with discussing the role of 
distributional scarcity in the shaping of individual behaviour. 
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5 Scarcity, Conflict and Institutional Behaviour 
According to the historical analysis by Malthus, reason and moral character are a slowevolution out 
of overpopulation, conflict of interests, and the resulting necessity of having a government of law 
and order to regulate the contlict. (Commons, 1934, p.682) 
Following Commons (1934, p.73), an institution is "collective action in restraint, liberation 
and expansion of individual action." Institutional behaviour, then, is the performance of 
collective action, that is, individuals confonning to patterns of behaviour which prornote the 
interests of the collective. Within mainstream resource and environmental economics, 
however, distributional scarcity often takes the form of strategical interaction among 
individuals having nothing but conflicting interests in their common exploitation ofresources. 
Accordingly, conventional wisdom puts the problem of distributional scarcity on a par with 
the so-called "tragedy of the commons," or, in game theoretic tenns, the one-shot "prisoner's 
dilemma" (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968; Mesterton-Gibbons; 1993). Thus, the essence of the 
problem is represented by the failure of rational, self-interested individuals to act collectively 
and reach the most preferred, or "efficient," outcome. Apparently, individual rationality is to 
blame for this rather disrnal conclusion. 
However, when time, communication and features of group cohes ion in general are 
abstracted from, as in the static "prisoner's dilemma" game, self-interested, rational 
individuals are actually deprived the opportunity to behave institutionally. Thus, the 
"prisoner's dilemma" is to natural resource and environmental economics what the Hobbesian 
"state of nature" is to political philosophy: In the absence of a sovereign there is only 
destructive competition and no form of cohesion among individuals (Hobbes, J651). As 
pointed out by Hume (1739, p.493), although "we may conc1ude, that 'tis utterly impossible 
for men to remain any considerable time in that savage condition, which precedes society; but 
that his very first state and situation may justly be esteem 'd social, [this does not prevent] that 
philosophers may, if they please, extend their reasoning to the suppos'd state of nature; 
provided they allow it to be a mere philosophical fiction." That is to say, by ignoring the 
presence and influence of the "institutionalized mind" (Commons, 1934), the "prisoner's 
dilemma" has Iimited descriptive relevance to the problem of the commons. Rather, it is a 
theoretical polar case corresponding with the notion of "open access," that is, unregulated 
access in the widest possible sense: absenee of institutions both in the form of fonna I and 
infonnal property rights, social norms, or any other feature of group cohesion and identity. 
• 
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Recalling that "out of scarcity derives not only confliet, but also the collective action 
that sets up order on account of mutual dependence" (Commons, 1934, p.6.), the institutional 
framework should be made more realistie. As a minimum requirement, the institutional 
setting must be sufficiently advanced to give meaning to terms like cooperation and 
coordination. When this is in place, it can be demonstrated in severai ways that collective 
action may be based on individually rational behaviour. Firstly, we may stick to the basic 
assumptions of the "prisoner's dilemma" game, but abandon the statie approach. In 
accordance with the "folk theorem," it can then be shown that the dilemma may be eliminated 
by introducing dynamics to the game: If the "prisoner's dilemma" is repeated an infinite or 
indefinite number of times, self-interested rational players may be guided towards 
"efficiency" if costs and benefits are not discounted toa heavily (Fudenberg and Maskin, 
1986). When time is considered explicitly, communication takes place in the form of mutual 
expectations of individual rationality. What is actually communicated is the expected 
response of a player to the different choices of another. As long as everyone acts according to 
individual rationality and expects the others to do the same, players may avoid the disrnal 
outcome by coordinating their activities. 
Secondly, we may modify the simplified institutional assumptions of the prisoner's 
dilemma game. This approach is applied in chapter 3, the paper "Collective Action, Individual 
Rationality and Common Property Regimes." The paper shows how cooperative incentives 
are generated among self-interested agents, even in the context of a "non-repeated" game 
adhering to the orthodoxy of individual rationality. By introducing the concept of a "unified 
purpose" which forms group cohesion and identity among individuals, the analysis shows 
how the problem of overexploitation is neutralised as cooperative incentives are generated ­
not by the aid of the "Hobbesian Sword" - but by individually rational choices of self­
interested individuals. 
The "unified purpose" is represented by the opportunity of the exploiters of a renewable 
resource to contribute a share of the resource yield towards a public good. The model is 
formulated as a two-stage sequential game, were the harvesting decisions are made at the first 
stage. After observing the resource yield, the choice of how much to provide for the public 
good is then made at the second stage of the game. The individual dec is ion to refrain from 
opportunistic harvesting behaviour is interpreted as a form of strategic move in the paper. 
Thirdly, we may resort to alternative concepts of rationality. This is the approach of 
contractarian theory. The typical point of departure of contractarians is the "state of nature, in 
which there are no institutions for defining and enforcing rights" (Sugden, 1993, p.17). Their 
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aim is to explain how rational and self interested individuals within a "state of nature" come 
to make bargains, and why they comply with them once they are made. Major contributions 
within this tradition are the works of Hobbes (1651), Locke (1690), Hume (1739), Rousseau 
(1762), Rawls (1971) and Gauthier (1986). Common to all is that they apply a concept of 
rationality quite at odds with that of orthodox game theory (Binmore, 1993; 1994). 
Institutional behaviour, however, does not necessarily flow from outcome-oriented 
maxims of co lIective action. As pointed out by Basu (1996, p.739), "It is now more and more 
accepted that while a human being does choose and optimize, the feasible set from which she 
does so is determined not only by her budget constraint but also by social norms and custom." 
Social norms and custom are integral parts of the institutional environment in which 
individuals find themselves. Hence, to give a fuller account of institutional behaviour in the 
utilisation ofnatural resources, the influence ofsocial norms and custom should be considered 
(Bardhan, 1993; Commons, 1934; astrom, 1990; astrom and Gardner, 1993; Rabin, 1998). 
Following Elster (1989, p.99), "ane of the most persistent c1eavages in the social sciences is 
the opposition between two lines of thought conveniently associated with Adam Smith and 
Emile Durkheim, between homo economicus and homo sociologicus." These are polar cases, 
the former in which individuals are guided by orthodox, instrumental rationality; and the latter 
in which individuals are dictated by social norms and behave like custom prescribes (Binmore 
and Samuelson, 1994; Elster, 1989). 
There is no consensus on the "precise nature of homo sociologicus" (Binmore and 
Samuelson, 1994, p.46). Economists, however, typically "reduce norm-oriented action to 
some type of optimizing behavior" (Elster, 1989, p.99). Basically, they address the issue of 
social norms analytically, either by treating norms as "binding constraints limiting the choices 
of a maximizing self-interested individual" or by letting norms "play an important role in 
shaping individual preferences" (Baland and Platteau, 1996, p. 116). In chapter 4, the paper 
"Exploiting a Local Common: Egoistic vs. Altruistic Behavior," the latter approach is applied. 
The role played by social norms is analysed by introducing altruistic preferences in the 
standard Gordon-Schlifer model of a fishery. Among other things, it is shown that altruism 
rooted in social norms reduces economic overexploitation as it neutralises the adverse effect 
of stock extemalities. 
The above discussion illustrates the crucial importance played by institutional and 
behavioural assumptions in the economic modelling of natural resource exploitation. This 
brings us to the final topic; the economics of property rights. 
• 
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Scareity, Conflict and Property Rights 
Nothing is property that is not expected to be scarce, and everything expected to be scarce is quickly 
brought by collective action within the meaning of property rights. (Commons, 1934, p.522) 
According to Locke (1690, p.19), although God gave the world and its naturaI resources to 
mankind in common, "there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or 
other before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial, to any particular men." Indeed, Locke 
derives a principle of individual property rights as vested in the claimant's inviolable rights to 
the securing of own sustenance and the produce of own labour (Locke, 1690). Thus, Locke's 
theory of property rights, justifies private ownership based on physical or empirical 
possession. That is, the existence of a "natural" right to property prior to any notion of 
coilective consent (Bromley, 1991; Williams, 1977).3 On this point, Locke was followed by 
succeeding generations of mainstream economists. As maintained by Randall (1978, p. I), 
both for ciassicai, neo-classical and new-institutional economists "individual ownership and 
control of resources were essential in order to permit the decentralization of allocative 
decisions." Moreover, as exemplified by modern welfare economics, relying extensively on 
the cost-benefit approach, the distribution of private property rights is treated as given, and 
receives minor attention from the "mainstream" economist. Indeed, a normative foundation 
for such a position is offered by "the property rights school." 
While Locke finds justification for his theory of private property in the "divine right of 
Labor" (Commons, 1934, p.2S), his successors from "the property rights school" find it in the 
concept of "efficiency" (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973; Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1967; Johnson, 
1972; Posner, 1992). These theorists focus on the evolution of land rights as an "efficient" 
transition from communal- to private property rights. Based on an "open access" conception 
of communal ownership, the theoretical basis of the "property rights school" is neo-classical 
microeconomics exposed to the concepts of externalities and transaction costs. In broad terms, 
an externality occurs when an individual's action affects the welfare of another individual, the 
latter having no influence over the actions of the former, and the former having no particular 
attention to the effect on the welfare of the latter (see Baumol and Oates, 1988, p.17). That is, 
due to atomistic decision making among self-interested individuals, there are negative 
extemalities associated with the utilisation of scarce resources. A relevant example is the 
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stock externalities in the traditiona1 Gordon-Schafer harvesting model: One individual's 
harvesting increases the harvesting costs of another through the stock effect. 
In general, externalities may be "institutionalised" (internalised) to eliminate the socia1 
costs associated with them. However, the establishment and enforcement of institutions are 
also subject to costs. These are named transaction costs. Whenever the value of externalities is 
low, as for instance when population pressure is low and scarcity is not severe, transaction 
costs tend to dominate the benefits arising from eliminating the externalities. In such cases of 
non-significant externa1ities, there will be no institutional change, that is, no transition from 
communal- to private property rights. However, when population pressure and scarcity of 
land increases, the gains of establishing institutions in order to eliminate significant 
extemalities may come to dominate transaction costs. Thus, when resources subject to "non­
institutionalised" utilisation (absence of private property rights) become scarce, and the gains 
arising from "institutionalising" the externalities become dominant over costs, voluntary 
negotiations among individuaJs will take place and induce an "efficient" transition from 
communal- to private property rights. Accordingly, the government's role in the evolutionary 
process is Jimited to enforcing the agreed upon property rights structure. 
Thus, in sharp contrast to the Pigovian externality theory which allows for government 
intervention, the problem of externalities should be solved by the aid of the market 
mechanism. As in the words of Coase (1960, p.2), the problem of externalities is of a 
"reciprocal nature," that is, it is not a straightforward matter to identify who is responsiblc for 
causing the extemality.4 In other words, it is not straightforward to identify the "appropriate" 
distribution of property rights. However, following Coase, the identification of the responsible 
party is actually superfluous, as, indeed, the "problem is to avoid the more serious harm." As 
argued by Coase (1960), in the absence of transaction costs, resources will be allocated 
"efficiently" whatever is the initial distribution of property rights. 5 If only property rights are 
clearly defined, distribution does not matter, as v01untary bargaining betwccn opposing 
parties wiIl, cither way, lead to the abandoning of the activity of lower value to give room for 
3 As pointed out by Commons (1934, p.32), Locke's "natural right ofproperty does not arise from scarcity, but 
from abundance." That is, Locke's concept of property rights is of minor relevance to a world of distributional 
scarcity. 
4 The identification of the responsible party is a prerequisite for the Pigovian approach. 
5 In a survey of the critics of the Coasean line of reasoning, Dick (1976) points out that even in a world of zero 
transaction costs, optimal resource allocation will be independent of the initial distribution ofproperty rights 
only in the absenee of income effects and no~separab1e cost and damage functions. 
19 The Distributional Aspect ofScarcity - a Synthesis 
that of higher value.6 In the literature, this is referred to as the "Coase theorem." The 
resemblance of the argument with the compensation principle of mainstream welfare 
economics (see section 4 above) is striking: The economist does not need to take distribution 
into account - his only concern should be to maximise the value of aggregate production. 
Under the assumption of increasing scarcity, then, the transition from communal- to 
private property rights are justified by the aid of economic "efficiency." Once again we 
recognise the "allocative aspect of scarcity" as a guiding principle: The quest for "efficiency" 
is simply blind to distributional issues. Accordingly, the "property rights school" is subject to 
the same criticism as the compensation principle and cost-benefit analyses (see section 4 
above). Moreover, whenever "efficient" institutional change is to take place, the abstraction 
from distributional concerns implies that those whose interests are not protected by the 
existing property rights will always be expected to compensate those whose interests are 
protected. That is, those without property rights must always compensate those with property 
rights in order to induce "efficient" institutional change. As in the words of Quiggin (1988, p. 
1076), "The more severe ethical objections relate to the initial 'constitutional' stage. In the 
absence of universal consent for the initial allocation of rights, a consensual process for 
subsequent changes has no special moral status. Moreover, as one generation dies and another 
is bom, the validity of any prior arrangement comes into question. In practice, it is difficult to 
see how the constitutional stage can be anything more than a fiction to justify the status quo." 
It seems we need some alternative guiding principle for institutional change. As a first step on 
the way, the basic concepts ofproperty and property rights should be elaborated. 
"The first essential of ownership is scarcity" (Commons, 1934, p.253). Scarcity of 
resources induces conflict of interest, and the notion of property is the institutional response 
to this conflict. More specifically, property refers to a benefit stream and a property right to 
the capacity to control current and future appropriation of a benefit stream (Bromley, 1991; 
Demsetz, 1967). Thus, the essential feature of property rights points to the future rather than 
the past. As with materials in general, natural resources "do not exist as ownership or value 
for human beings until, from the present point of time, futurity is attributed to them" 
(Commons, 1934, p.406). Corresponding1y, to have a right to property means to be in the 
position to call upon the collective to secure current and future appropriation of a benefit 
stream from extemal interference (Bromley, 1991). Thus, in accordance with Kant's 
6 It should be noted, however, that in a world of zero transaction costs, there can really be no externalities as they 
will all be eliminated by "efficient" bargaining solutions (BromJey, 1991; Dahlman, 1979; Dick, 1976). As 
maintained by Dick (1976, p.194), "Assume away transaction costs and you assurne away the problem." 
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understanding of property, property rights are social constructs vested in nothing but the 
consent of the collective (Bromley, 1991; Williams, 1977). Hence, "property ... involves 
three separable concepts, namely scarcity, futurity, and the rights, duties, liberties and 
exposures created by collective action" (Commons, 1934, p.522). 
"While the engineer is the specialist in efficiency, and the business man is the specialist 
in scarcity, the banker is the specialist in futurity" (Commons, 1934, p.512). That is to say, to 
grasp the essential features of property, futurity also inc!uded, we should turn to the 
investment perspective of natural resource and environmenta! management. In the context of 
renewable resources, this may be achieved by applying the capita I theoretic approach to 
natural resource and environmental exploitation. Within this approach, bioeconomic 
modell ing is a powerful tool. With the aid of optimal control theory and the combining of 
biological growth models with those of standard neo-classical optimisation, bioeconomics 
maximises present values of net benefits arising from resource utilisation (Clark, 1990). 
Considering natura I resources as biological assets, the "optimal" leveI of investment is 
determined by the capacity of naturaI resources to generate yields competitive with those of 
other assets (Clark, 1973a; 1973b; 1990; Hotelling, 1931; Swanson, 1993). 
The yields of natural resources comprise net harvesting value (consumptive utilisation) 
and net stock value (non-consumptive utilisation).7 For a given return of alternative assets, as 
represented by a fixed rate of discount, the leveI of investment in a renewable resource thus 
depends on expectations of future net consumptive- and non-consumptive benefits. In the 
traditional sole-owner model of Clark (1990), where prices are fixed, the competitiveness of a 
natural resource is determined by the relation between the natural growth rate, (consumptive 
yield), the stock size (non-consumptive yield), and the rate of discount (yield of alternative 
assets). In 50 far as the harvesting value of aresource may be transferred into alternative 
investment opportunities, a relative ly high rate of discount will discourage resource 
investment. As explained by Clark (1990, pA7), in the context of the fishery, "the 'capital' 
that the sole owner has invested in the fish stock itself possesses an opportunity cost in terms 
of the revenue foregone by not transferring its value to the most profitable alternative 
investment opportunity." Indeed, when the discount rate approaches infinity, Clark (1990) 
shows that the sole owner's optimal investment in the resource coincides with the 
overexploitation scherne of the statie "open access" model of Gordon (1954). Thus, biological 
overexploitation is not only a "problem of the commons" - it may just as well occur under 
7 The stock value is analogous to the "wealth effect" in capital theoretic models of optimal growth (Kurz, 1968). 
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sole ownership (Clark, 1973a; 1973b; 1990).8 With this in mind, the discount rate may be 
given an alternative interpretation: A high rate of discount may simply indicate that property 
rights are not properly secured and protected.9 That is, because of insecurity and imperfect 
protection of property rights, the "owner's" expectations of future benefits from current 
investment are low. This, of course, applies to any property regime. 
Indeed, more than a problem of identifying the most "efficient" property rights regime, 
the basic problem of disinvestment may be traced back to the distribution of de jure and de 
facto property rights. In a world of scarcity and conflicts of interests, environmenta1 problems 
are typical1y characterized by various stakeholders having incompatible opinions about the 
declining resources. That is, benefits and costs of environmental management will be 
unevenly distributed among various stakeholders. For a given property rights structure, there 
will a1ways be those who find a certain utilisation of aresource valuable without having the 
requisite property rights to realise its value. Inevitably, some individuals must be deprived of 
rights to property in order for others to have rights. 
The uneven distribution of costs and benefits gives rise to quite distinct investment 
incentives among various stakeholders. Accordingly, the level of investment in naturaI and 
environmental resources relies extensivelyon who is, de jure or de facto, in the position to 
control the level of investment in naturaI resources. That is, the distribution of property rights 
is of paramount importance in the management of natural resources. Irrespective of the 
objectives for environmental policy, then, a main challenge for natural resource and 
environmental eeonomics is to analyse and reveal the incentive structure among various 
interested parties in environmental conflicts. Moreover, due to the insecurity and imperfect 
protection of property rights, the economist must look beyond the de jure property rights to 
reveal the de facto property rights structure. Not until the incentives of those de facto in 
control of the resource are surveyed, a thorough analysis of environmental policy can be 
offered. This is one of the aims of chapter 5, the paper "The Political Economy of Wildlife 
Exploitation." 
The institutional setting of the paper is a conflict over property rights to wildlife 
between a wildlife agency and a group of Iocal peasants praeticing agricultural produetion 
outside the area. The agency has the legal rights to exploit the wildlife, while the loeal people 
8 From the individual owner's point of view, however, the sole ownership situation is one ofeconomic 
optimality, while that ofopen access is one of economic overexploitation 
9 Hotte (2001, p.9), for instance, makes use of such an interpretation. In his model, the insecurity of a settler's 
property rights to land is accounted for by introducing a probability of eviction. In his own words, "The effect of 
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have no legal rights to the wildlife, or its habitat, but are inclined to hunt illegally within a 
setting of imperfect law enforcement. The incentives of the local people to hunt illegally is 
analysed and modelled explicitly in the paper, and takes the fonn of a reduced illegal 
harvesting function. The crucial variables of the illegal harvesting function are related to the 
economic conditions in the alternative agricultural production, the law enforcement activity of 
the agency, the population pressure, and to the ecological conditions. The incentives of the 
agency to hunt and to use effort in the enforcement activity are modelled as a problem of 
optimal control, where the illegal harvesting function of the local peasants is included. Having 
accounted for the incentives of the stakeholders, it is then shown how the existing de jure 
property rights structure appears in different fonns of de facto property rights structures, 
depending on the prevailing economic and ecological conditions. Measured against the 
objective of having a viable wildlife stock, it is shown in a next step how the different forms 
of de jure and de facto property rights structures affect the expediency of various policy 
alternatives (see chapter 5). 
Recalling that property is a benefit stream, and a property right is the capacity to control 
and appropriate the benefit stream, it also becomes apparent that environmental policy is 
nothing but a redistribution of property rights. This is exemplified in chapter 6, the paper 
"Investing in Wildlife: Can Wildlife Pay its Way?" The main purpose of the paper is to 
analyse mechanisms detennining investment in wildlife. The context is pastoral exploitation 
of semi-arid African rangeland. A group of pastoralists practice cattle herding and wildlife 
harvesting within a fixity of land. As there is competition for grazing land, livestock and 
wildlife interact with each other. Moreover, the biological interaction between the livestock 
and the wildlife trans lates into an economic interdependency. Thus, to analyse the economics 
of the system, a bioeconomic model is formulated, and the incentives of the pastoralists to 
invest in wildlife are traced out. Based on these, various policies aimed at securing the 
wildlife are analysed. In particular, the policy recommendation of the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) is addressed. 
The CITES recommendation consists in restricting trade with wildlife products in order 
to reduce the profitability of wildlife harvesting by lowering net off-take prices. Thus, the 
CITES policy implies a restriction of the property rights to wildlife of local hunters in order to 
grant property rights to wildlife to the international community. However, although their de 
jure property rights are restricted, the local hunters may still be de facto in the position to 
introducing a probability of eviction which follows an exponential distribution amounts to increasing the 
effective discount rate of the settler by the value of the exponent." 
• 
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control the stock of wildlife due to imperfect law enforcement. Hence, the elTES policy may 
work counterproductively as the investment incentives of the local hunters are still the 
decisive factor in determining the fate of wildlife. As future benefits from wildlife 
exploitation is reduced due to lower off-take prices, the competitiveness of wildlife, as 
compared to that of livestock, is reduced. Thus, as a response the local hunters may increase 
current wildlife harvesting, in order to convert wildlife "assets" into the now more profitable 
alternative assets. The consequences for wildlife may be devastating (see chapter 6). 
In spite of differences in context, the two papers of chapter 5 and 6 both identify 
disinvestment and institutional failure as crucial factors determining the fate of wildlife. 
lndeed, a broad review of the economics of resource and environmental degradation in 
general, will demonstrate "that there are numerous avenues to resource degradation but only 
one underlying source" - the insufficiency of investment in appropriate institutional structures 
(Swanson, 1996, p.25). 
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Abstract 
The recent recolonisation of the Scandinavian wolf in Norway is widely supported at the 
national leve I, but is in conflict with the interests of local farmers due to wolf predation on 
domestic Iivestock. To mitigate the Iivestock losses, the State grants compensatory awards. 
Hence, the presence of Iivestock in, or close to, wolf territories also represents a cost for 
"society at large." A less recognised but potentially more significant conflict of interest is 
attached to wolf predation on moose. This may considerably lower the hunting income of 
local landowners. On the other hand, an abundant moose population causes large soeial costs 
in terms of moose-vehicle accidents. The spatial distribution and the institutional structure of 
the joint moose and wotf management are explored when all these benefits and eosts are 
aeeounted for. It is eoncluded that today's management of moose and wolf seems to serve 
loeal interests more than those of "society at large." Moreover, the establishment of 
compensatory awards for Iivestoek killed by wolf does not seem to enhance soeial effieieney, 
but widens the distributional bias in favour of loeal interests. Alternatively, the State could 
buy out the pasture rights of loeal farmers, giving eompensation for lost pasture rights rather 
than lost Iivestock. 
Thanks to Anders Skonhofi, Jon Olaf Olaussen, Anne Borge Johannesen, Jos Milner, Carl-Erik Schulz and 
Erlend Nilsen for valuable comments. The paper was presented at the Sixth Annua! BioEcon Workshop at Kings 
College Cambridge, and benefited from discussions there. 
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l. Introduetion 
Global experienee indieates that wildlife eonservation is sueeessful on1y when wildlife 
resourees generate enough revenue to cover the expenses of their own eonservation (du Toit 
1995). When wildlife generates revenues for people, e.g. in terms of subsistenee hunting, 
trophy hunting or wildlife tourism, there will be ineentives to invest in wildlife. 
Correspondingly, when wildlife resourees generate net eosts for people, e.g. in terms of erop 
damages or predation on domestic Iivestoek, there will be ineentives to exterminate wildlife, 
typieal1y by means of habitat conversion or hunting (Eltringham, 1994; Swanson, 1993). 
Moreover, in a world of scarcity and eonfliet of interest, environmental problems 
typieal1y stem "from the asymmetry in perspeetives on the declining resources, between the 
loeal and global eommunities" (Swanson, 1994, p.147). In the context of biodiversity 
eonservation, Wefls (1992) highlights the asymmetrieal spatial distribution of benefits and 
eosts of a resouree management based on proteeted areas, like national parks. 1 Broadly 
speaking, eeonomic benefits of proteeted areas "are Iimited on a loeal scale, increase 
somewhat on a regional/national levet and then beeome potential1y substantial on a 
transnational/global seale. The eeonomie eosts fol1ow an opposite trend, from being 10ealfy 
signifieant, regionaUy and nationally moderate, and globally small" (WelIs, 1992, p.237). 
When loeal and national ineentives to invest in wildlife are diverging, which is the 
appropriate spatiaIlevel of wildlife management? The Malawi principles of the UN 
Convention on Biologieal Diversity (CBD) establish that the management objeetives are a 
matter of soeietal ehoice, and that management should be decentralised to the lowest 
appropriate level (Jaren et al., 2003). When deciding which is the lowest appropriate level, the 
Malawi prineiples suggest we should "move away from viewing resources in isolation from 
eaeh other. The dominant paradigm is now to foeus on whole ecosysterns, not only from the 
point of view of a wider range of eeologieal proeesses, but also from that of a far wider range 
of stakeholders and interest groups" (LineIl , 2005, p.7). Indeed, interaction among species 
transforms into eeonomic interdependeneies among various stakeholders both within and 
across spatial scales. This must be aeeounted for. 
The case of wildlife management in Norway may serve as an iIIustration. Although 
generating signifieant benefits at the national/global seale in terms of existenee value, there is 
a genuine loeal fear that the reeent recolonisation of the gray wolf will undermine the 
l Typically, the protected areas approach deprives loeal communities their traditional rights to utilise loeal 
resources, frequently without compensation, white the interests of agents at the national and globallevel are 
protected (Marks, 1984; Wel1s, 1992). 
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economic basis of communities Iying in or close to wolf territories. It is often asserted that 
local communities are overruled by "society at large," and that local people alone have to bear 
the costs of wolf conservation (Skogen and Krange, 2003). The same applies to other large 
predators like bear, wolverine, Iynx and eagle. However, does the same picture emerge when 
a wider range of wildlife and human stakeholders are considered? Taking the large 
herbivores, like the deer species, quite the contrary may be the case. The moose, for instance, 
is a highly valued game species in Norway which generate significant benefits to local 
landowners in terms of hunting. Moreover, the moose represent significant costs for "society 
at large" in terms of moose-vehicle accidents. 
When a wider range of wildlife speeies and human stakeholders are included, it seems 
the above asymmetrical spatial distribution of costs and benefits of wildlife is not so evident. 
Moreover, the predator-prey relationship between some speeies makes the picture even more 
complex. To have a balanced analysis, then, both types of wildlife and their interaction must 
be aeeounted for, and all relevant human stakeholders must be included. 
The choice of objectives and the appropriate spatiailevel of wildlife management is 
ultimately a political decision. The present paper seeks to improve the grounds for decision­
making by analysing the political eeonomy of wildlife management in Norway. The conflict 
of scale involved will be explored explicitly, and the most relevant benefits and costs of 
wildlife - as appropriated by and imposed on various stakeholders - are identified. Based on 
eonventional welfare economics, optimising rules (effieiency eriteria) for wildlife 
management is derived and diseussed. Moreover, conflicts with wildlife are soeial conflicts. 
More than being eonfliets between people and wildlife, they are eonflicts between various 
human stakeholders (Skogen and Krange, 2003). Thus, the problem of wildlife management 
is institutional in nature and caIls for an explicit foeus on distribution and property rights. 
As the wolf (Canis lupus) is by far the most eontroversial and debated of the large 
predators, and the moose (Akes akes) by far the most important game in terms of hunting, 
their joint management is chosen as a case. As the moose is the major prey for the wolf, this 
choice allows for an explicit focus on the challenges associated with interaeting speeies. The 
next section reviews the institutional structure, the spatial distribution and the historical 
records and eurrent status of moose and wolf management in Norway. In seetion 3 the 
ecological system and today's management practice is modelled. Section 4 describes the 
benefit and cost functions of moose and wolf, and identifies local and social optim ising rules 
for the joint management. Applying a real world example from the county of Hedmark, the 
model is illustrated by numerical simulations. Specific functions and data are accounted for in 
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section 5, while results and discussions are offered in section 6. Finally, some conclusions are 
drawn in section 7. 
2.	 The Institutional Strueture, Spatial Distribution, Historieal Reeords and Current 
Status ofMoose and WolfManagement 
In Mid- and Southern Norway, where the whole of the wolf population is located and about 
90% of moose hunting takes place, more than 90% of the outlying land is privately owned 
(Arnesen, 2000). Nonetheless, there are a manifold of other interests and property rights 
attached to this land. Local farmers have gained prescriptive pasture rights for livestock, and 
these rights are extended by the establishment of full scale compensatory awards for livestock 
killed by predators, like wolf. Moreover, the Wildlife Act establishes that wildlife and wildlife 
habitats are to be managed in away so that the productivity and biodiversity of nature is 
preserved. Thus, there are also public rights attached to privately owned outlying land. 
Furthermore, through various international conventions, as for instance the Bern-convention, 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) and the CBD, there are international rights vested in Norwegian outlying fields as 
well.2 Finally, the Norwegian Wildlife Act establishes that all wildlife in Norway belong to 
the State. Indeed, the location of wildlife habitats, wildlife stock sizes, and time, place, 
method and quotas of harvesting of game species are all under control of the State as affirmed 
by the Wildlife Act. Where hunting is allowed, however, local landowners have the sole 
hunting rights on their own land. 
The above is the de jure property rights to wildlife and wildlife habitats. The de facto 
property rights, however, may differ from these due to imperfect law enforcement, to 
diverging practices, or to existing legal claims being in conflict with each other. In the 
Norwegian context, the latter two factors are most relevant. Indeed, in contrast to the 
directives of the Wildlife Act, today's moose management is in practice based on local 
administration at the municipality level as the hunting quotas are decided by locally elected 
boards (Olaussen, 2000; Storaas et.al 2001). Moreover, some of the legal claims to wildlife 
and wildlife habitats are surely in conflict with each other. Thinking of property as a benefit 
stream and a property right as the capacity to control current and future appropriation of the 
benefit stream (Bromley, 1991; Demsetz, 1967) - while keeping the duality of rights in mind, 
saying that what is a property right (benefit) for some, is a duty (cost) for others - we see. for 
2 The wolfis included in Appendix Il both of the Bem-convention, which lists strietly protected speeies, and of 
en"ES, which lists species in which trade may be permitted but must be strietly regulated. 
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instance, that the prescriptive pasture rights of farmers and the moose hunting rights of 
landowners both may be severely restricted by the legal claims of the public to have wolf in 
the same areas. Moreover, the public rights associated with the legal protection of the wolf are 
restricted by the establishment of compensatory awards to farmers for wolf predation on 
livestock. 
When property rights are looked upon as the capacity to control the appropriation of 
benefit streams, the spatial distribution of benefits and costs and the trends and current levels 
of moose and wolf populations may together give us some information about the de facto 
institutional structure. The moose represents considerable local benefits in terms of hunting 
value accruing to local landowners.3 Indeed, the potential meat value of the moose is 
estimated to be above NOK 370 million annually in Norway (Storaas et.al, 2001).4 On the 
other hand, the moose generates significant social costs in terms of moose-vehicle accidents. 
These have been estimated to range somewhere between NOK 200-300 million annually 
(Kastdalen, 1996). 
The benefits of the wolf are distributed widely throughout the country. In a national 
survey, close to 80% express that they are in favour of having a viable wolf population in 
Norway as long as wolves are no closer than 10 km's from where they live. The same study 
also concludes that people's willingness to pay for having a viable wolf population in Norway 
far exceeds the known costs (Dahle et.al, 1987). A more recent survey reports that a majority 
of all Norwegians agreed (59%) or partly agreed (19%) that the wolf has a right to exist in the 
country (LinneIl and Bjerke, 2002).5 Together with the international conventions, this 
suggests that the recovery of the wolf has significant support both at the national and 
intemationallevel. This is the non-use or existence value of the wolf.6 
The costs are imposed on local farmers by wolf killing domestie livestock, primarily 
sheep, grazing in outlying fields. Moreover, having moose as the main prey, wolves may 
intlict significant costs on loeal landowners in terms of reduced hunting income. In addition, 
wolves kili hunting dogs. Furthermore, although the risk of being attacked by wolf is very low 
in Scandinavia (Linne Il and Bjerke, 2002), it is maintained that the fear of living close to 
3 Hunting is the main source of income obtained from moose in Norway, and the landowner both holds the right
 
to hunt and to the net income of hunting (Gundersen, 2003; Storaas et.al, 2001).
 
4 NOK I - USD 0.15 in 2006.
 
5 Only 23%, however, would accept that wolves live within a distance of 10 km from where they livc (Linnel!
 
and Bjerke, 2002).
 
6 Here, existence value is understood as the value of natural resources that generates utility other than personal
 
use, thus including bequest value (Bishop and Welsh, 1992). Krutilla (1967) was the first to address the not ion of
 
existence value in economics. An overview and discussion of valuation methods is offered by Larsson (1993)
 
and Nunes and van den Bergh (2001).
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wolves represents a reduetion of loeal people's quality of life. Indeed, among people living in 
or close to wolf territories, 31 % express a elear eoneem about the safety of being outdoors 
(Bjerke and Kaltenbom, 2000). 
Broadly speaking, then, the moose generates net benefits loeally and net eosts nationally, 
while the wolf generates net costs locally and net benefits nationally and globally. 
Interestingly, harvesting statisties indicate a quite contrasting picture also when it comes to 
the trends and current leveIs of moose and wolf populations (see Figure l). 
Figure 1	 Hunting statistics (number of harvested animals per year). 
Source: Statistic Norway, 2007. 
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In the 19th century the moose stock was kept relatively low, and in some areas actually 
driven to extinction.7 Primarily, this was due to excessive human harvesting along with a 
relative abundanee of large camivores. However, mainly as a result of the decline of large 
camivores, changes in forestry regimes, and new harvesting strategies, the moose population 
increased rapidly from the Second World War on (Andersen and Sæther, 1996). In the past 
few years, the Norwegian summer population ofmoose has been around 120000, providing a 
basis for an annual harvesting close to 40000 animals (Statisties Norway, 2007). 
In contrast, the first half of the 19th century is considered the last great wolf period in 
Norway (Pedersen et al. 2003).8 By the end of the century the population declined. The 
relatively low number of wolves continues through the first half of the 20th century and 
shrinks ·even more in the 1950s and 60s. The same pattem is seen in Sweden. In the period 
1964-1978 no wolf reproduction was registered and the species was functionally extinet both 
in Norway and in Sweden (Pedersen et al., 2003; Persson and Sand, 1998; Wabakken et.al, 
200 1).9 Eventually the negative trend changed, and 1978 is regarded as the starting year of 
7 The moose was protected by law in large parts ofNorway in the 1920s (Andersen and Sæther, 1996).
 
8 Wolves in Norway belong to ajoint Scandinavian wolfpopulation.
 
9 As a response, the wolf was protected by law in Sweden in 1966 and in Norway in 1972.
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wolf recovery in Scandinavia. Since 1983 there has been successful breeding almost every 
year in the Scandinavian Peninsula and in 1991 the Scandinavian wolf population started 
increasing and expanding (Pedersen et.al, 2003; Wabakken et.al, 2001). The estimation of the 
Scandinavian wolf population in the winter 2006 is 141-160 animals, of which 15-17 are in 
Norway. Moreover, 24 wolves were located using both sides of the national border between 
Norway and Sweden (Wabakken et.al, 2006). 
During the past ISO years, then, Norway has experienced a dramatically increasing 
popuJation of moose and a dramatically declining population of wolf. Thus, in a broad 
historical sense it seems hard to say that wildlife is managed more in accordance with 
"society at large" than with local interests. In any case, Norwegian authorities have carried 
out policy measures in order to mitigate the negative impacts the recolonisation of the wolf 
has on local interests. First of all, the State grants full scale compensatory awards supposed to 
cover the monetary costs associated with wolf predation on domestic Iivestock. lo With respect 
to wolf killing of sheep, such compensatory awards amounted to an annual average of NOK 
2.1 million over the period from 2004-2006 (Directorate for Nature Management Norway, 
2007). Moreover, in Decemher 2004 the Norwegian Government legalised licensed hunting 
of wolves. This means that local hunters with a license are permitted to participate in the 
hunt. 11 In January 2005 the law was applied for the first time when the Norwegian 
Government decided to have five wolves killed in Hedmark County. The outtake represented 
42% of potentially breeding resident wolves in Norway (Wabakken et al. 2005). 
3. Ecology and a Mode' of Today's Management Practice 
As the Norwegian wolf population is so low, so strongly influenced by immigrants from 
Sweden, and under such a strict regulation of the Norwegian wildlife authorities, it does not 
make much sense to forrnulate a natural growth function for the wolf stoCk. 12 This means that 
the moose-wolf interaction is assumed to be one sided. There is a functional response, 
meaning that the wolf stock affects the population dynamics of the moose, but the effect of 
the moose on the wolf population dynamics is ignored. In ecological terms, the wolf stock is 
thus exogenously given. 
10 Compensatory awards are also granted for bear-, wolverine-, Iynx-, and eagle predation on domestic Iivestock 
in Norway. 
Il The central wildlife authorities deterrnine hunting quotas and the specific area and time period for which the 
hunting may take place 
12 Due to the strict regulation, the wolf is not able to respond numerically to variations in the moose population 
(Nilsen et.al, 2005). To account for this, the regulation of the wolfstock will be treated without explicit reference 
to harvesting and a harvesting function. Thus, the modelling of the maose and wolfpopulation is asymmetrical. 
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Corresponding with today's management practice, the harvesting quota and the stock of 
moose are decided locally. The harvesting is assumed to be determined as a fixed fraction of 
the moose stock (proportional harvesting).13 The wolf population, however, is regulated 
directly by the central wildlife authorities, as affirmed by the Wildlife Act. In biological 
equilibrium, then, today's actual moose and wolfmanagement in Norway is described by: 
dX (1) -:it =F(X)-G(Y,X)-M(X)-aX =O 
(2) Y= y{), 
where X and Y are the size of the moose and wolf stocks (as measured in the number of 
'normalised' animals), respectively, at time I (the time index is omitted). dX is the rate of 
dl 
change, F(X) the natural growth function in the absence of wolf predation, G(Y,X) the 
predation term, M(X) the mortaJity caused by moose-vehic1e accidents, and a is the locally 
chosen harvesting rate of moose. The natural growth function is supposed to be density 
dependent following a humped curve increasing to a peak value for an intermediary value of 
the own stock size. That is,	 dF =Fx(X) > O for X less than xmsy, and dF =Fx(X)::;; O for 
dX dX 
2 
X equal to or above X msy , while d ~ =Fxx (X) < O for all X. 14 The wolf predation on moose 
dX 
increases with the number	 of wolves, aG =Gy(Y, X) > O, and is non-decreasing with the 
ay 
aG
number of moose, - =Gx(Y,X);~ O. Moreover,
ax 
and 
a2G 
--=Gxy (Y, X) ~ O is assumed to hold. The number of moose killed in moose vehicle 
ayaX 
2 
accidents increases with the population size, dM =M x(X) > O. The sign of d ~ =M xx(X)
dX	 dX 
is in general ambiguous, but is assumed to be zero in the numerical analysis. Finally, ~ is the 
number of wolves as decided by the central wildlife authorities. 
13 See Skonhoft (2006) for a discussion ofvarious moose harvesting schemes. 
14 X""" represents the maximum sustainable yield stock. 
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Equation (l) defines the isoeline of the moose stock, and is assumed to be downward 
sloping. 15 This implies that G(Y, X) + M(X) + aX interseets with F(X) from below, and 
thus ensures dynamie stability. In biological equilibrium, an inerease of the wolfstoek and the 
human harvesting rate will both unambiguously reduee the stoek of moose, 
dX Gy < O and dX =:: X < O.
 
dYo Fx -Gx -Mx -a da F.r -Gx -Mx-a
 
4. Benefits, Costs and Optimising Rules 
4. l The loeal and social net benejitlunetions 
The benefit and eost terms of moose and wolf hit various stakeholders in various ways. Here, 
it is distinguished between the loeal and the social per household benefit and eost of moose 
and wolf management. 16 Some benefits and eosts are shared evenly between loeal and non­
loeal people, while some aecrue to loeal people alone. The hunting ineome of moose, ph, 
where h is the steady-state harvesting and p> O the eorresponding fixed net harvesting price 
of moose, acerue to loeal people alone. 17 So do the eost of moose in terms of forest damage, 
CMI (X), and the eost of wolf predation on domestic Iivestock, CW(Y) .18 Moreover, by 
redueing the hunting ineome of moose, wolf predation on moose is also a eost solely imposed 
on local people. Stock benefits in terms of existenee value of moose and wolf, BM(X) and 
BW(Y) ,19 and the cost ofmoose-vehicle aecidents, CMa (M(X)) ,20 aeerue, however, to both 
groups. Thus, letting s represent the loeal proportion of the total human population, equation 
(3) gives the loeal net benefit for 0< S < I and the social net benefit for s = I. 
(3) U= ph-CMI (X)-CW(Y)+s(BM(X)-CM a (M(X»)+BW(Y»). 
15 This means that	 dX ~ C, < o =:> F, - G, _ M. - a < O must hold in equilibrium. 
dY F, -Gx -M,-a 
16 Social benefits and costs pertain to the aggregation over all inhabitants in Norway (both locals and non-Iocals).
 
Moreover, both loeal and social net benefits, as measured in monetary terms, are weighted equally over all
 
households. The distinetion between locals and non-Ioeals is very broad. In the real world, benefits and eosts of
 
moose and wolf are unevenly distributed among various loeal as well as non·local sub-groups. For example, due
 
to seasonal migration ofmoose, it is often the case that those landowners appropriating most of the hunting
 
income ofmoose are not the same ones as those paying most of the eosts in terms of forest damage (Skonhoft
 
and Olaussen, 2005; Storaas et al., 2001). Such distributional coneerns are ignored in the present paper.
 
17 Secondary incomc for the loeal community as generated by the hunting activity is ignored (for a discussion,
 
see for instanee Storaas et.al, 200 l).
 
IS The granting of compensatory awards to local farmers by the State is not accounted for here.
 
19 The ineome from non·consumptive use, for instanee in the form ofwildlife viewing. are typically quite low in
 
Norway and is left out of the analysis (8toraas et.al, 2001).
 
20 Only accidents in whieh the moose is killed are accounted for in the present analysis.
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Although the existence value pertains to the mere existence of a species - and thus could be 
treated as a binary variable reflecting either existence or non-existence - it is assumed to be 
continuous here. For an endangered species the existence value is assumed to increase 
gradually - at a decreasing rate - with the size of the stock (Bishop and Welsh, 1992). This is 
so because the existence value is assumed to be positively related to the probability of 
survival (viability), and that the probability of survival is supposed to increase with the size of 
the stock. For a viable species, however, a further increase in the stock will have a negligible 
effect on the probability of survival and thus no effect on the existence value. In the general 
case it follows that BMx ~ O, BWy ~ O, BMxx ~ O and BWYr ~ O. The cost of moose in 
terms of forest damage and of wolf in tenns of predation on domestic livestock are both 
assumed to increase with the respective stocks, CM I x > O and CWy > O, while the sign of 
CMI xx and CWYr is in general ambiguous (but assumed to be zero in the numerical analysis 
below). Moreover, the cost of moose-vehicle accidents is assumed to increase at a constant 
rate with the number of accidents, so that CMaM >O and CM aMM =O. 
4.2 Local and social optimal management 
Based on the above benefit and cost functions, the optimal management from both the local 
and the social perspective is identified by the aid of optimal control theory. The harvesting 
quota of moose, and the moose and wolf stocks are then endogenous variables being 
determined by dynamic optimisation of the net benefits. Here, 0< S < l and s =l defme the 
case of local and social optimisation, respectively. In both cases, the optimal stocks of moose 
and wolf are found by maximising the present value of the net benefit of equation (4), subject 
to the ecological constraint of equation (l). o is the rate of discount. All benefits and costs 
are measured in monetary units. 
(4) PV =}(ph-CMI(X)-CW(Y)+S(BM(X)-CMa (M(X») + BW(Y»))e-5Idt. 
o 
The current value Hamiltonian of the problem IS 
H =ph-CMI(X)-CW(Y) +s(BM(X)-CMa (M(X»)+ BW(Y»)+
 
.u(F(X) -G(Y,X) - M(X)-h), with h and Yas the control variables, X as the state variable
 
and.u as the shadow price (costate variable) of the moose. An interior solution implies strictly 
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positive stock sizes and a positive moose offtake at the steady-state. Assuming an interior 
solution, the first order conditions in terms of the reduced form steady-state equilibrium are 
given by: 21 
(6) sBWy = CWy +pGy. 
In general, equations (5) and (6) determine simultaneously the equilibrium moose and 
wolf stocks X' and y' (superscript ' denotes the case of an interior solution). The steady­
state equilibrium moose offtake then follows as h' = F(X')-G(Y·,X')-M(X') when 
X = O. As the Hamiltonian is linear in the control variable h, the dynamics will typically be 
of the Most Rapid Approach Path (Clark, 1990). This means that when the moose stock is 
above the steady-state optimum, one should harvest as much as possible in order to attain 
optimality as fast as possible. By the same reasoning, harvesting should stop when below the 
steady-state optimum. 
For a relatively low moose stock, where the internal rate of return of the stock is above 
the extemal rate ofreturn (F -Gx -Mx > .1), the left hand side of(5) is the marginal cost ofx 
taking one additional moose out of the stock. The first term, where the expression within the 
bracket represents the marginal growth rate of moose net of wolf predation and mortality 
caused by moose-vehicle accidents, is the negative effect on the steady-state offtake of moose 
evaluated at the net harvesting price, p.22 The second term represents the loss in existence 
value associated with reducing the stock, and is given less weight in the local as compared to 
the social optimum. The right hand side of (5) is the marginal benefit of taking one additional 
moose out of the stock. The first term is the opportunity cost of capital (Clark, 1990), that is, 
the gain obtained by transferring the resource's value to the most profitable alternative 
investment opportunity, here as represented by the discount rate, .1. The second and third term 
represent the gain obtained by removing a potential1y noxious animal, that is, moose 
21 Ifthe population dynamics and harvesting of the wolfwere formulated explicitly, the reduced form steady­

state equilibrium would coincide with that ofequations (5) and (6) in the case ofa wolfshadow price (costate
 
variable) ofzero. In other words, equation (5) and (6) may be interpreted as the optimising rule under the
 
assumption ofa zero net harvesting price ofwolf.
 
22 This term represents a benefit when the initial stock is higher and Fx - Gx - M x < o.
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responsible for forest damage or involved in vehicle accidents. The benefit from reduced 
moose-vehicle accidents is given less weight in the local as compared to the social optimum. 
The left hand side of (6) is the marginal cost of reducing the wolf stock. This loss 
reflects a reduction in the existence value of the wolf, and is given less weight by the local as 
compared to the social planner. The right hand side of (6) is the marginal benefits of reducing 
the wolf stock. The first term is the benefit of removing noxious animals, that is, wolves 
killing domestie livestock. The second term is the interaction effect. Evaluated at the net 
harvesting price of moose, this term represents an additional benefit as a lower wolf stock 
increases the steady-state harvesting of moose. 
The second order conditions and the comparative statics of the model when there is an 
interior solution are outlined in Appendix 1. These give the local and social optimal response 
to various changes in the external environment. An increase in the rate of discount, for 
instance, unambiguously reduces the optimal stock of moose and increases the optimal stock 
of wolf in both of the optimising modeIs. Hence, the familiar result of a single-species 
harvesting model with a positive net harvesting price applies to the moose (Clark 1990). As 
the higher discount rate reduces the optimal moose stock, the marginal benefit of reducing the 
wolf stock in terms of less predation on moose, decreases. That is, for the initial wolf stock, 
the marginal benefit of increasing the wolf stock will now be higher than the marginal cost. 
Accordingly, it is optimal to increase the stock ofwolfwhen the discount rate increases. 
An increase in the harvesting price of moose has an ambiguous effect on the optimal 
stock of moose in both of the optimising modeIs. First of all, we have the direct effect 
associated with the first order condition of equation (5), which is similar to the familiar 
mechanism of a single-species harvesting mode\. When the harvesting price increases, the 
relative importance of the net stock value is reduced as the profitability of harvesting 
increases. Thus, ifthe marginal net stock value is negative initially, meaning that the internal 
rate of retum of the stock is larger than the extemal, Fx - Gx - M x > 8 , the optimal stock of 
moose increases with a higher harvesting price. Moreover, the marginal cost of wolf preying 
on the moose increases relatively with the harvesting price of moose. Thus, the direct effect 
on the moose is strengthened by the interaction effect: To account for the higher marginal cost 
of wolf, the optimal stock of wolf is reduced. As with the direct effect, this increases the 
profitability of harvesting - but now through a higher marginal net growth rate of moose - and 
thus works in the direction of a higher optimal stock of moose. When, however, the marginal 
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net stoek value is positive, Fx -Gx -Mx <6, the effeet on the optimal stoeks ofmoose and 
wolf is ambiguous. 
The effeet of a ehange in s is derived to tind how loea! as eompared to socia! 
optimisation affeets the optimal management of the species. The result is ambiguous, 
however, and depends on the relative sizes of the marginal eost of the moose in terms of 
moose-vehicle aeeidents (CMaMMx) and the marginal benetit in terms of the existenee vaJue 
(BMx)' This part of the moose eeonomy is shared equally between loeal and non-Ioeal 
households, while the rest is entirely a loeal matter. Thus, if CMaMMx > BMx the loeal 
planner will - in social terms - underestimate a net cost eomponent of the moose stoek, and 
ehoose a stoek of moose that is toa large. In the opposite ease, the loeal planner will 
underestimate a net benejit eomponent of the moose stoek, and ehoose a stoek of moose that 
is toa small. As the marginal existenee value of moose presurnably will be low for an 
abundant population, the marginal eost in terms of moose-vehicle aeeidents will dominate 
when the number of moose is relatively large. In aeeordanee with externality theory, loeal 
optimisation then implies a larger stoek of moose and a lower stoek of wolf as eompared to 
soeial optimisation. 
5. Specific Functions and Data 
The model is applied to the ease of Hedmark County. Hedmark is loeated in the south-east of 
Norway. It has a human population of about 190 000, eonstituting 4% of the total number of 
people in Norway. Covering a total of 27 388 km2, Hedmark has roughly 25 000 km2 of 
outlying land after subtraeting densely populated areas (0.4%) and fannland (7.6%). Parts of 
this outlying land serve as habitat for moose and wolf populations, and as Hedmark borders 
on Sweden, the recovery of the wolf in Norway has in the main taken place here. 
Consequently, Hedmark is also encumbered with the bulk of the livestoek damage caused by 
wolves in Norway. lndeed, during the period 2004-2006 about 65% of the total number of 
sheep killed by wolf in Norway was killed in Hedmark (Directorate for Nature Management, 
2007).23 Moreover, Hedmark is the leading forest and moose county in Norway (about 20% of 
the total Norwegian harvest ofmoose takes place here) and has the highest number ofmoose­
vehicle aeeidents (Statistics Norway, 2007). 
23 The Norwegian Parliament agreed on a new wolf management zone in Norway in 2004. Of a total of 22 
municipalities in Hedmark, 9 are ineluded in the current wolfmanagement zoile. The zone also includes the 
Counties of Akershus, Oslo and Østfold. 
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5.1 Specijic Functions 
The numerical model is represented by a specific natural growth function for moose without 
wolf predation, a wolf functional response, and a function of moose mortality caused by 
moose-vehicle accidents as by: 
for X <X(8) G(Y,X) ={PX:
PXY for X~X 
(9) M(X)=yX 
The naturaI growth function for moose without wolf predation obeys the law of logistic 
growth, where r> O is the intrinsic growth rate and K> O the carrying capacity. With wolf 
predation, and for relatively low moose densities where X < X for a given habitat area, the 
functional response is represented by a positive linear function of the moose stock, {3XY .24 
Empirical evidence suggests, however, that although the wolf kili rate (the number of moose 
killed per wolf per year, PX) increases with moose density, it flattens out at relatively low 
densities (Hayes and Harestad, 2000; Pedersen et.al, 2005; Solberg et.al, 2003). Thus, the 
functional response is independent of the moose stock and given as pn for X~X. Finally, 
the number of moose killed by vehicles is assumed to increase proportionally with the 
popu lation size at the rate y > O. 
Applying the specific functions of equations (7) - (9) in the general moose population 
dynamics of equation (l), the equilibrium solution of the model will be stable when 
- K 2 - ­
r>pY+y+a for O<X<X,andwhen -(r-y-a) >4PXY for X~X. 
r 
The marginal probability of extinction is assumed to decrease with the size of the stock. 
When the minimum viable population is reached, however, a further increase has no effect on 
24 Except from the term representing the mortality caused by moose-vehicle accidents, the model complies with 
the generalized predator-prey model ofTu and Wilman (1992). 
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the probability of extinction.25 Thus, the functional forms of the stock benefits of moose and 
wolf of equations (10) and (lI) are chosen to ref1ect that the existence value increases - at a 
decreasing rate - with the size of the stock, and reaches its maximum at the minimum viable 
population leve!. At or above this leve!, the marginal existence value is zero. 26 
xm.'P and ymvp are the minimum viable population of moose and wolf, and PI > O, P2 > O, 
0"1 > O and 0"2 > O are parameter values ref1ecting the decreasing marginal existence value 
and the maximum existence value of the moose and wolf. The maximum existence values of 
moose and wolf are attained at or above the minimum viable population, and are given by 
P12/4P2 and 0"12/40"2' respectively. 
Cost functions are given by equations (12)-(14). Linear cost functions are applied for 
both species (Boman, 1997). (12) gives the cost of forest damage as a function of the moose 
stock, (13) the cost of moose-vehicJe accidents as a function of the number of accidents where 
moose are killed and (14) the cost of wolves preying on domestic Jivestock as a function of 
the wolf stock, where r > O, v > O and rp > O are the respective average costs. 
(13) CM a (M(X)) =vyX 
(14) CW(Y) = rpy . 
2\ The minimum viable population denotes "the population size below which the probability of extinction is 
unacceptably high, but at or above which the probability of extinction is reduccd to an acceptable leve! over a 
~iven period of time" (Snaith and Beazley, 2002, p.193-94). 
6 This assumption is supported by a Swedish contingent valuation study which concludes there is no marginal 
willingness to pay for stocks beyond the minimum viable population (Soman, 1997). The same study concludes 
that the wilfingness to pay for a minimum viable population is independent of the number of wolves for which 
the minimum viable population is defined. 
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5.2 Data 
Most of the parameter values are based on empirical studies. However, the carrying capacity 
is fixed in order to fit the harvesting in Today's management with that of the 2006 moose 
harvesting statistics of Hedmark, while the interaction parameter is fixed to get the wolf kili 
rate in accordance with empirical findings for the Scandinavian wolf population as a whole. 
The notion of viability is usually applied to the Scandinavian wolf population as a 
whole. However, by signing the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, both Norway and 
Sweden have agreed to prornote the maintenance of viable wolf populations in their natural 
surroundings (Nilsson, 2003). A mining of the wolf population in Norway thus violates the 
agreement and undermines the joint responsibilities in the conservation of the Scandinavian 
wolf. Together with the fact that a relatively large proportion of Norwegians is of the opinion 
that the wolf has a right to exist in the country, and that their willingness to pay for having a 
viable wolf population in Norway is relatively large, this substantiates the application of a 
minimum viable population for the Norwegian wolf alone. As a first approach, the minimum 
viable population of the wolf is put on a par with the prevailing management goal for wolf in 
Norway. This means that government failure is assumed away in the baseline case. In section 
6.3 below, this assumption is modified. Based on empirical findings and genetie analysis of 
the Scandinavian wolf population as a whole, a higher minimum viable population is 
suggested there. 
SeveraI studies conclude there are significant differences in the attitudes towards and the 
willingness to pay for the large predators between people living inside and outside predator 
areas (Bjerke and Kaltenborn, 2000; Broberg and Brannlund, 2006; Chambers and 
Whitehead, 2003). Based on these studies, the existence value ofwolffor a local household is 
assumed to be 1,4 of that of a non-Iocal. The lower value among locals may capture the fear of 
living close to wolves and the culturalIy based lacal resistance to wolf preservation in general 
(Bjerke and KaItenborn, 2000; Skogen and Krange, 2003). To my knowledge, there are no 
available data on the existence value of moose. In the present analysis, the per household 
existence value ofmoose is assumed to be the same among locals and non-locals, and equal to 
the non-Iocal per household willingness-to-pay for wolf. 
A zero discount rate is applied. Thus, the opportunity cost effects are ignored and the 
extemality mechanisms are cultivated. In this case it also makes sense to compare the net 
benefits of the optimisation models with that of today's management model. If a positive 
discount rate were used, the equilibrium number of moose would be (equally) reduced in the 
two optimisation models. 
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The baseline parameter values are applied to solve the optimising modeIs. The 
differenee between loeal and social optimal management depends sole ly on the loeal 
(Hedmark) proportion of the total (Norway) number of households. All baseline parameter 
values are given and aeeounted for in Appendix 2. 
ResuIts and Discussion 
Table l gives the numerieal steady-state equilibrium solutions of today's management 
model and the loea) (Hedmark) and soeial (Norway) optimisation modeIs. The table shows 
solutions for the stoek sizes (X and Y), the harvest of moose (aX in today's management 
model, h in the optimisation modeis), the number of moose kiIled by woJf (PTI), and the 
number of moose killed in moose-vehicle aeeidents (rX). Today's management has a wolf 
population of 21 anima)s, whieh is also supposed to represent the minimum viable population 
of the wolf(see Appendix 2). The numberof moose is 20811, whieh implies a moose density 
slightly above 1 per km2.27 The annual human harvest of moose is equal to the aetual harvest 
in Hedmark in 2006, that is, 7284 animals (Statisties Norway, 2007). Moreover, wolves and 
moose-vehiele aceidents kili respeetively 420 and 520 moose annually. In equilibrium, the 
above mortality faetors imply an annual moose population growth of about 40%.28 
The moose stoek equilibrium solutions of the optimisation models are in both eases 
above the level of the flattening out of the wolf kili rate and the minimum viable population. 
This implies a fixed wolf kili rate of 20 and a zero marginal existenee value of moose.29 
Table 1. Steady-state equilibrium solutions when y"" = ZI 
Today's Management Loeal Optimisation Social Optimisation 
y 21 10 21 
X 20811 42765 16596 
aX ,h '" 7284 (0.35) 10908 (0.26) 6078 (0.37) 
PTI 420 200 420 
rX 520 1069 415 
• Numbers in parenlheses are the corresponding equilibrium harvesting rates. 
The steady-state equilibrium solutions of Table 1 serve as a basis for estimating various 
loeal, non-Ioeal and social benefit and eost terms of moose and wo If. In seetion 6.1, the ease 
of today's management is analysed and diseussed. Here, the hypothetieal absenee of the wolf 
21 The average moose density is estimated to be about 0.9 per km2 in Hedmark (Solberg et.al, 2003). 
28 The mean population growth rate ofmoose is estimated to be about 40% in Hedmark (Pedersen et al., 2005). 
29 Technically, this means that BM and Gr are both zero (see section 4.2, equation (5».x 
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and wolf predation (Y = O) is also considered. Seetion 6.2 addresses the eases of Iocal and 
social optimisation, and diseusses the management problem in light of extemalitytheory.ln 
seetion 6.3 the case of government failure is introduced, and the analysis is earried out under 
the assurnption of a higher minimum viable population of the wolf lndeed, the minimum 
viable population of the wolf plays a key role in the analysis, and it works solely through the 
existenee value of the wolf. Some notes on the existenee value are therefore offered in seetion 
6.4. FinalJy, the rale of property rights is addressed in seetion 6.5. The State's granting of full 
seale compensatory awards to loeal landowners to cover the monetary eosts associated with 
wolfpredation on domestic Iivestoek is not aeeounted for in any of the tables below. 
6.1 The Distributional Bias and Conjlict: Today 's Management Model 
Table 2 shows the local, non-Ioeal and social benefit and eost estimates of the steady-state 
solutions of the today's management model. Today's joint moose and wolf management 
generates a net annual social benefit of about NOK 992 million. Distinguishing between 
spatialieveis, the net annual per household benefit of wolf and moose is NOK 954 loeally and 
NOK 467 non-Ioeally. Thus, we have a ratio of 2 between loeal and non-loeal households.30 
The distributional bias in favour of loeal households is first of all due to the landowners' 
ineome from moose hunting, amounting to about NOK 64 million annually. By aeeounting 
for the establishment of compensatory awards to loeal farmers for wolf predation on 
Iivestoek, sharing the costs of NOK 1.7 million equally among loeal and non-Ioeal 
households, the distributional ratio is slightly inereased. 
Table2. Today's Management Model. Local, non-Ioeal and social net benefits. 
Loeal Non-Ioeal Soeial 
Mil/ion NOKper Million NOKper Million NOKper 
NOK household NOK household NOK household 
Moose 76.7 914 431.0 221 507.7 249 
hunting income 64.2 765 0.0 O 64.2 32 
existence value 20.6 245 479.4 245 500.0 245 
vehicle accidents -2.1 -25 -48.4 -25 -50.5 -25 
forest damage -6.0 -72 0.0 O -6.0 -3 
Wolf 3.3 40 481.0 246 484.3 238 
existence value 5.0 60 481.0 246 486.0 239 
livestock killing -1.7 -20 0.0 O -1.7 -1 
Total 80.1 954 912.0 467 992.1 487 
30 Ifthe costs (in terms ofkilled sheep) ofbear, wolverine, Iynx and eagle are also included, constituting an 
average of about NOK 11.5 million annually in Hedmark in 2004·2006 (Directorate for Nature Management 
Norway, 2007), the net per household benefit locally is reduced to NOK 817, giving a ratio of 1.7. 
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Under the present assumption of a fixed annual harvesting rate, wolf predation implies 
both a lower stoek and harvesting of moose. If the wolf is exterminated and wolf predation 
eomes to an end (Y = O), it ean be shown that the moose population and the annual moose 
harvest inerease by 4008 and 1402, respeetively. The eorresponding ehanges in loeal and 
social net benefits are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3.	 Today's Management Model. Changes in loeal, non-Ioeal and social net benefits if the 
wolf is exterminated. 
Local Non-Iocal	 Social 
Million NOK per Mil/ion NOK per Mil/IOn NOK per 
NOK hOllsehold NOK hou.<e!wld NOK huusehold 
Moose	 10.8 129 -9.3 -5 l.S I 
hunting income 12.4 147 0.0 O 12.4 6 
existence valtle 0.0 O 0.0 O 0.0 O 
vehicle accidents -0.4 -5 -9.3 -5 -9.7 -5 
forest damage -1.2 -14 0.0 O -1.2 -1 
Wolf	 -3.3 -40 -481.0 -246 -484.3 -238 
existence value -5.0 -60 -481.0 -246 -486.0 -239 
livestock killing 1.7 20 0.0 O 1.7 1 
Total	 7.5 89 .490.3 -251 -482.8 -237 
Wolf extermination will inerease the annual hunting ineome by NOK 12.4 million and 
reduce the annual cost of wolf killing sheep by NOK 1.7 million. The loss in moose hunting 
ineome as eaused by the presenee of wolves is thus more than 7 times the eost in terms of lost 
sheep. As the size of the moose population will increase if the wolf is exterminated, social 
eosts will inerease in terms of more moose-vehicle aeeidents, amounting to NOK 9.7 million 
annually. Moreover, the annual eost of forest damage is inereased by NOK 1.2 million. 
Henee, for the moose eeonomy alone, the social net benefit associated with exterminating the 
wolf is only NOK 1.5 million. This means that it would take a wolf existenee value of only 
NOK 3.2 million to make wolf extermination sociaI1y unprofitable. In any ease, wolf 
extermination would generate an inerease in the loeal net benefit of NOK 7.5 million, a 
deerease in the non-Ioeal net benefit of NOK 490.3 million, and thus an inerease in the 
distributional ratio from 2 to 4.8. 
6.2 Efficiency and Conflict: The Optimisation Model 
Table I iIIustrates the severe eonfliet between loeal and social interests with respeet to moose 
and wolf management. Loeal optimality implies a moose stoek of about 2.5 times higher than 
what is optimal from the social perspective. Moreover, social optimality implies a wolf 
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population more than 2 times that of loeal optimality. The eorresponding annual net benefit 
terms of the loeal and soeial optimal solutions are reported in Table 4 and 5. 
Table 4. The Local Optimisation Model. Local, non-Iocal and social net benefits. 
Loeal Non-Ioeal Social 
Million NOKper Million NOKper Million NOK per 
NOK household NOK household NOK household 
Moose 100.1 1193 380.0 195 480.1 236 
hunting income 96.2 1146 0.0 O 96.2 47 
existence value 20.6 245 479.4 245 500.0 245 
vehicle accidents -4.3 -51 -99.4 -51 -103.7 -51 
/orest damage -12.4 -148 0.0 O -12.4 -6 
Wolf 2.8 34 349.0 179 351.9 173 
existence value 3.6 43 349.0 179 352.7 173 
livestock killing -0.8 -10 0.0 O -0.8 O 
Total 103.0 1227 729.0 373 832.0 408 
Table 5. The Social Optimisation Mode'. Local, non-'oca' and socia' net benefits. 
Loeal Non-Ioeal Social 
Million NOKper Million NOKper Million NOKper 
NOK household NOK household NOK hOlJSehold 
Moose 67.7 807 440.8 226 508.5 250 
hunting income 53.6 639 0.0 O 53.6 26 
existence value 20.6 245 479.4 245 500.0 245 
vehicle accidents -1.7 -20 ·38.6 -20 -40.2 -20 
forest damage -4.8 -57 0.0 O -4.8 -2 
Wolf 3.3 40 481.0 246 484.3 238 
existence value 5.0 60 481.0 246 486.0 239 
livestock killing -1.7 -20 0.0 O -1.7 -l 
Total 71.1 847 921.8 472 992.9 487 
In monetary terms, a ehange from a hypothetical loeal planner to a hypothetieal social 
planner implies an annual loss ofabout NOK 32 million loeally, an annuaI gain of about NOK 
193 million non-loeaIly, and a net annual gain of about NOK 161 million nationwide.31 Under 
the loeal planner, the loeallandowners' hunting ineome net of forest damage is almost NOK 
43 million higher than under the soeial planner. Moreover, under the social planner, the non­
loeal eosts in terms of moose-vehicle aecidents is almost NOK 61 million lower and the non­
Ioeal existenee value ofwolves almost NOK 132 million higher than under the loeal pianoer. 
3\ It is assumed that locallandowners retain the right to the income from moose hunting when the resources are 
under the control of the social planner. 
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Modern welfare eeonomies identifies ejficient management with the solution of the 
soeial planner, that is, the maximisation of net value, where the net benefits are weighted 
equally for all inhabitants. Table I indieates that today's moose management represents a 
moose stoek whieh is about 25% higher than what is optimal from the soeial point of view, 
and heads in the direetion of loeal optimality.32 This is not surprising sinee the moose in 
practice is under Iocal management in Norway. Given a zero discount rate, contlict is first of 
all associated with the concept of externalities as applied to local moose management. The 
hunting income from moose devolves solelyon loeal landowners. However, being spread 
over the entire population, a large fraction of the costs is external to loeal managers. Thus, 
local management generates a stock of moose that is toa large in terms of soeial optimality.33 
However, although differing significantly in terms of the number of moose, the soeial 
net benefit of today's management model is not much lower than that of soeial optimality. 
Indeed, only NOK 0.8 million can be gained in equilibrium by realising the soeial optimal 
solution.34 In effieiency terms, then, there seems to be no strong reason to alter the status quo. 
In tenns of spatial distribution, however, a realisation of the soeial optimal solution will 
reduee the loeal net benefit by NOK 9 million and inerease the non-Ioeal net benefit by NOK 
9.8 million. This illustrates that the concept of "efficiency" is blind to distributional issues. 
As the wolf stock is assumed to be under direct regulation and control of the State, and 
as any fonn of government failure and illegal activity is assumed away, there are obviously no 
externalities to internalise with respect to the wolf stock. This follows directly from the model 
formulation. In this setting, compensatory awards for lost livestock have only distributional 
effeets, which widen the net benefit gap between locals and non-Iocals. In the next section, 
the assumption of no government failure is modified. 
6.3 The Role ofthe Minimum Viable Population 
The approach of putting the minimum viable population on a par with the current number of 
wolves may be questioned. Indeed, the current goals for the Scandinavian wolf population are 
preliminary and only stages on the way to a viable population (Nilsson, 2003). By signing the 
Bern Convention and the CBD, Sweden and Norway have agreed to prornote the maintenance 
32 The conc!usion is sensitive to the choice of the harvesting rate and the carrying capacit)' (see appendix 3).
 
33 A positive discount rate, representing an opportunity cost of moose, would make it optimal to keep a lower
 
stock of moose. The gap between today' s management and the social optimal solution would lhus increase. For
 
instance, a discount rate of 0.04 would give a social optimal moose stock of aboul 12600 animals.
 
34 This is because the marginal net benefit ofmoose is relatively small over a relative!y large inlerval. This
 
indicates that the model is quile sensitive to some of the parameter estimates. Indeed, an increase ofabout 16%
 
in the harvesting price, or a decreasc of about 15% in the unit cost of moose-vehicle accidents. would imply that
 
today's management of moose is socially efticient.
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of viable populations of species in their natural surroundings. Hence, the estimation of the 
minimum viable population plays a key role in wolf management. A lower bound for the 
minimum viable population of wolves is estimated to be 400 individuals by Nilsson (2003).35 
This is about 2.5 times higher than the current Scandinavian wolf population. Assuming a 
fixed geographical distribution of the wolf, the corresponding number of wolves in Hedmark 
will be about 50. The corresponding solutions of the optimising rules are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6. Steady-state equilibrium solutions when y .... = 50 
Today's Management LocalOptimisation Social Optimisation 
y 21 O 49 
X 20811 42765 16596 
aX,h '" 7284 (0.35) 11102 (0.26) 5509 (0.33) 
PXY 420 O 980 
yX 520 1069 415 
• Numbers in parentheses are the corresponding equilibrium harvesting raJes. 
The higher level of the minimum viable population implies a widening of the gap 
between local and social optimal leveJs of the wolf population. Indeed, while social 
optimisation will give a number of wolves close to the minimum viable population, 
extermination of the wolf wil\ be the optimal strategy from the local perspective in this case. 
This is because it now takes a lot more wolves to safeguard the population, so that the 
marginal existence value of wolves will everywhere be significantly lower than before. 
Indeed, the marginal local cost of wolf predation on moose and livestock now dominates the 
marginal local existence value for all stock sizes. Obviously, this implies a much higher level 
of conflict. Moreover, there is now a deviation of the actual and socially preferred size of the 
wolf population. In addition to the externality problem associated with the Iocal monitoring of 
the moose, we now have government fai/ure as an additional channel of inefficiency. 
According to this scenario, the Government's decision to hunt down the five wolves in 
Hedmark in February 2005 moved the number of wolves even farther away from the social 
optimal stock. Indeed, in terms of lost existence value, the annual social cost of the wolf hunt 
was NOK 51.5 million.36 By way of comparison, only NOK 0.4 million was gained annually 
in terms of reduced wolf predation on sheep. Moreover, there are some distributional and 
efficiency effects working through the moose-wolf interaction. Under proportional harvesting, 
35 Arecent reporting of a severe inbreeding depression in the Scandinavian wolf population by Liberg et al. 
(2005), suggests that this number may be considerably higher. See also Wabakken et al. (2001). 
36 Calculated as BW(26)- BW(21) under the assumption of y.... = 50. 
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the wolf hunt increased the equilibrium stock of moose, thus carrying local moose 
management even farther away from the social optimum. It can be shown that when the 
economic effects of the increase in the moose stock are all accounted for (increased hunting 
income and increased costs in terms of more moose-vehicle accidents and forest damage) the 
social annual net benefit loss of the wolf hunt was about NOK 50.6 million, while the 
distributional ratio increased from 2.2 to 2.4. Both in efficiency and distributional terms, then, 
the wolf hunt may have increased rather than reduced the level of conflict of Norwegian 
wildlife management. 
Obviously, the assumption of the minimum viable population plays an important rale in 
the present analysis, and its relevance originates solely from the existence value of the wolf. 
6.4 The Role ofthe Existence Value 
Existence values are less tangible than direct use values. Moreover, when aggregated over the 
entire number of households in a country, they may often be quite large. Among other things, 
this makes the measuring of existence values for use in public policy questions quite 
controversial. Tndeed, in 1986 the U.S. Department of the Interior issued regulations on the 
procedures for environmental damage assessment that prahibited the use of existence value 
un less for the specific cases where direct use values were notmeasurable (Portney, 1994). 
Still, existence values are just as real as any other values. Indeed, rather than asserting 
that the adding of all inhabitants' individual existence values generates toa large a number on 
the benefit side, it is just as reasonable to c1aim that, when compared to the existence value, 
the costs of wolf predation on livestock are almost negligible at the social level (see Table 2). 
In other words, there seems to be quite a potential for obtaining legitimacy for compensating 
local people (in some form or other) if only the net beneftt of the wolf is optimised at the 
social level. The social cost is simply so small compared to the willingness to pay for having a 
viable stock of wolves. If the minimum viable wolf population is 50, the total willingness to 
pay for securing the wolf stock is about NOK 163 million.37 By way of comparison, the 
corresponding extra costs imposed on local farmers would be NOK 2.2 million.38 Thus, in this 
case there should be a fair chance to solve the distributional conflict and obtain a less 
confrantational wildlife management. In the search for such a solution, however, the role of 
property rights must be addressed more thoroughly. 
37 Calculated as BW(49) - BW(21) under the assumption of yM.' =50. See equation (Il) and Table 6. 
38 Calculated as CW(49) - CW(21). See equation (14) and Table 6. 
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6.5 Property Rights andConflict: The Institutional Approach 
The praetiee of loeal monitoring of the moose population constitutes an extension of the de 
facto property rights to wildlife of loeal people. Thinking of property rights as the eapaeity to 
eontrol eurrent and future appropriation of benefit streams (see seetion 2 above), a net annual 
benefit of moose of about NOK 32 million may potentially be gained loeally by having loeal 
eontrol of the moose stoek (comparing Table 4 with Table 5), of whieh NOK 9 million are 
realised today (comparing Table 2 with Table 5). All the same, this benefit is negatively 
affeeted by the legal c1aims of others to have wolf in the same areas, thus limiting the de facto 
property rights of loeal people. Indeed, aeeording to Table 3, the hunting ineome of loeal 
landowners is redueed by NOK 12.4 million annually due to wolf predation. 
Also the preseriptive pasture rights of loeal farmers are affeeted negatively by the legal 
elaims of others to have wolf in the same areas. However, the pasture rights are eurrently 
proteeted by full seale compensatory awards. This means that non-Ioeals must pay NOK 1.7 
million annually for having wolves on outlying land (Table 2). Indeed, compensatory awards 
infliet eosts on "society at large" and reduee the benefits obtained from the legal proteetion of 
biodiversity and endangered speeies. This represents a shift of de facto property rights from 
non-Ioeal to loeal people. 
The most dramatic deviation of de facto from de jure property rights, however, pertains 
to the case of government failure. If the minimum viable wolf population is 50 rather than 21, 
the legal proteetion of the wolf as an endangered species is by no means fulfilled by today's 
management. Indeed, in this case, today's management praetiee reduces the benefits obtained 
from the legal protection of the wolf as an endangered speeies by NOK 163 million (cf. 
footnote 37). 
More than anything else, the above paragraphs point to the problem that property rights 
are not well specified or clearly defined. Indeed, the mutual interferenee of the various legal 
elaims constitutes a very basic eonfliet within wildlife management. This confliet is surely not 
reduced by compensatory awards for lost livestock, as the mutually exc1usive legal elaims are 
then still present. By this line of reasoning, conflict can be reduced only by making some 
ehanges in the legal assignment of property rights. As for the case of sheep versus wolf, a 
straightforward policy recommendation would be for the State to buy out the pasture rights of 
local farmers. Compensation, then, would pertain to lost pasture rights rather than lost 
Iivestoek. Of course, it would still be a question of distribution of benefits and costs between 
the opposing parties. However, when the leveI of eompensation is first agreed on, future 
conflicts in terms of poorly defined property rights would surely be redueed. 
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When it eomes to the hunting rights of loeallandowners as affirmed by the Wildlife Aet, 
these are not themselves in eonfliet with other legal rights. However, today's praetice of loeal 
moose management may generate externalities in terms of moose-vehiele aeeidents. If so, a 
restoration of a policy in compliance with the praperty rights strueture as speeified in the 
Wildlife Aet, saying that the contra l of deer species is to be vested at the level of the State, 
renders possible a reduetion of the moose stoek in order to reduee the social eosts of moose­
vehiele aecidents. In this way, the de jure property rights are restored and moose management 
is brought in compliance with social preferenees rather than the seetional interests of loeal 
landowners. That is, externalities are neutralised and conflict is reduced. 
7. Conelusion 
The paper analyses the asymmetrieal spatial distribution of benefits and costs of wildlife 
management in Norway along the loeal - social dimension. The analysis indicates that the net 
per household benefit of today's joint moose and wolf management are eonsiderably higher 
for the average local household as compared to the average non-Iocal household. First of all, 
this is due to the large income that loeal landowners appropriate from moose hunting. The 
conclusion is not changed when the loeal eosts in terms of predation by bear, Iynx, wolverine, 
and eagle are included in the aeeount. 
Moreover, an abundant stoek of moose is more in compliance with a management based 
on local rather than social optimisation. The explanation may be found with reference to the 
well known problem of externalities: As loeal people gain the entire benefits, but pay only a 
fraction of the costs, there will be local ineentives to have a larger stock ofmoose than what is 
desirable from a social point of view. As the moose in praetiee is under loeal management in 
Norway, it should come as no surprise that today's number of moose seems to be toa high as 
eompared to social optimality. The result is, however, quite sensitive to parameter estimates. 
Reeent researeh establishes that the eurrent Scandinavian woff population is vulnerable 
and threatened. It has been suggested that the minimum viable population of the Scandinavian 
wolf is at least 400 animals. Keeping the geographieal distribution of wolves fixed, viability 
thus requires about 50 wolves in Hedmark. If we aeeept this number, and keep in mind the 
signifieant support there is among Norwegians to have a viable wolf population in Norway, 
the current low number of wolves seems to be more in compliance with loeal rather than 
social interests. This may indieate that loeal stakeholders have a signifieant influenee on wolf 
management in Norway. 
• 
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The present paper identifies eonfliet in three dimensions. Firstly, eonfliet is associated 
with the distributional bias between loeal and non-Ioeal households. Secondly, eonfliet is 
associated with the extent of externalities and government failure, that is, the deviation 
between the social optimal management and today's aetual management. Thirdly, eonf1iet is 
associated with vaguely defined property rights, that is, the mutual interferenee of legal 
elaims among different groups of people, as represented by loea! landowners, loeal farmers, 
and "society at large." Compensatory awards to loeal farmers, the striet regu!ation of the wolf 
population and the praetiee of loeal moose management are polieies that do not reduee the 
distributional gap between loeal and non-Ioeal people, do not bring aetual management any 
closer to what is effieient from the social perspeetive and do not clarify the property rights 
strueture within wildlife management. On the contrary, these may be measures that may 
intensify eonf1iet rather than reduee it. 
An alternative path would be for the State to buy out the preseriptive pasture rights of 
loeal farmers in wolf territories. As the aggregated willingness to pay among Norwegians for 
having viable populations of earnivores seems to be high eompared to the loeal eost of wolf 
predation on livestoek, there should be seope for raising generous eompensation for loeal 
farmers' loss of pasture rights. This would reduee the eonfliet between loeal farmers and 
"society at large" for the future. Moreover, the State eould take more aetive eontrol of moose 
management and reduee the number of moose in order to limit social eosts in terms ofmoose­
vehicle aeeidents. This may bring the management closer to what is efficient from the social 
perspeetive, and reduee the distributional bias between loeal and non-Ioeal households. Loeal 
landowners would still have the sole hunting rights of moose, but the hunting quotas would be 
determined centrally. There should be no legitimaey problem of sueh a policy as it eomplies 
with the property rights strueture as approved by the Wildlife Aet. 
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Appendix l. Comparative Staties. 
In the following 0< s < l and s == i correspond with ioeal and social optimisation, 
respeetively. The seeond-order eonditions require that the Hamiltonian should be jointly 
eoneave in the state and control variables. Coneavity of the Hamiltonian means that the Hesse 
matrix should be negative semi-definite in optimum. This implies that 
p (Fxx -Gxx -Mxx )+sBMxx -CM!x\' -sCMoMMxl' ~O, 
(p(Fxx -Gxx -Mxx )+sBMxx -CM!xx -sCMoMM,rx ) (sBWry -CWyy + pGyy )-(pGXY / ~O 
and sBWyy - CWyy + pGyy ~ O. The eomparative staties are found by taking the total 
differential of (6) and (7); 
-pGxr ][dX] 
sB~.y - CWyr + pGyy dY 
==[p 5-(Fx -Gx -Mx ) 
O GI' 
The determinant of the matrix of the left hand side of (A i) 
D == (p(Fxx -Gxx -Mxx )+sBMxx -CM/.rx -sCMoMMxx )(sBWyy -CWyy + pGyy )-(pG.n·)2 
, will be positive in optimum due to the seeond order eonditions for maximum, that is, D> O. 
We then obtain; 
ax' = (sBWyy -CWyy + pGyy )p < O 
a5 D ' 
ax' == (sBWyy -CWyy +pGyy )(5 -(Fx -Gx -Mx ))+ pGxrGy {: ~ ~f Fx -Gx -Mx ~ 5, 
ap D -. If Fx -Gx -Mx < 5 
ay' (p(Fxx -Gxx -Mxx )+sBMxx -CM!xx -sCMoMMxx )Gy + pGyX (5 -(Fx -Gx -Mx )) 
~ ==
{:O ~f 
D 
Fx -Gx -Mx ~5,
 
-? I f Fx - Gx - M x < 5
 
ax' (sBWyy -CWyy + pGyy )(CMQMMx -BMx )- pGxrBWy 
as == D 
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Appendix 2. Data 
In the numerical simulations the intrinsic moose growth rate is given as r =0.5. This is 
slightly above the rate applied by Olaussen (2000) and Skonhoft and Olaussen (2005). 
Moreover, for the given harvesting rate (see below), the carrying capacity is set as K = 99270 
in order to get the number of moose harvested in today's management model equal to the 
actual harvest in 2006. Applying 19420 km2 as the total habitat area for moose in Hedmark 
(based on area set aside for hunting in the 2003 hunting quota assignment: Statistics Norway, 
2007), this represents a moose density of 5.1 animals per km2• Sæther et al. (1992) estimate 
the carrying capacity for moose in four Norwegian municipalities. The arithmetic mean of 
these was about 7.6 animals per km2• One of the municipalities, Åsnes, is located in the 
county of Hedmark, and may as such be more representative (e.g. in tenns ofvegetation) for 
the present analysis. As the Åsnes estimate was clearly the lowest (1.3 animals per km2), it 
makes sense to have a lower value for the carrying capacity here. Moreover, Skonhoft (2006) 
applies a carrying capacity occurring at a moose density of 5.8 animals per km2 for the 
Koppang area of Hedmark. However, as this area is much smaller (600 km2) and well suited 
for the moose, a lower carrying capacity for the total moose area of Hedmark is reasonable. 
X nnpThe minimum viable moose population is given by = 5000. Snaith and Beazley 
(2002) refer to empirical findings and genetic analysis which together indicate that 500-5000 
breeding individuals are required to ensure a viable moose population in the long tenn, and 
they maintain that 5000 individuals should be the minimum target population size for long 
term conservation efforts. For the wolf, however, the minimum viable population is put on a 
par with the prevailing management goal for the wolf in Norway. Agreed to by the Norwegian 
Parliament in May 2004, this goal says that Norway shall have at least three annual wolf 
breedings within its borders. While the goal was reached in 2004, counts indicate only 2 wolf 
breedings in 2005 and 2006, all taking place within the borders of Hedmark (Pedersen et al. 
2005; Wabakken et al. 2004; 2005; 2006). Since the wolf management zone extends 
Hedmark, the prevailing number of wolves in Hedmark may be in compliance with the 
prevailing national management goal. Hence, as a baseline, the wolf winter population of 
2006 is taken to represent the minimum viable population. Counts indicate a population of 13 
resident wolves in Hedmark by April 2006. Moreover, 16 resident wolves in Hedmark were 
located on both sides of national (Sweden) and county borders (Wabakken et al. 2006). 
Letting resident wolves located entirely within the county borders count as one, and the others 
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as a half, 21 is an approximation for the number ofwolves in Hedmark by April 2006. Thus, 
the minimum viable wolf population for Hedmark is given by Y'''P =21 . 
The annual growth rate of moose in Hedmark is about 40% (Pedersen et al., 2005). 
Assuming a stable moose population, the sum of the rates of harvesting, moose-vehicle 
accidents and wolf predation should equal the growth rate. Reports on moose hunting and 
registered non-harvested mortaljty of moose - over the hunting seasons from 2003/2004­
2005/2006 - are used to estimate the harvesting rate and the mortality caused by moose­
vehicle accidents for Hedmark (Statistics Norway, 2007). Together with information about 
the number of wolves and the wolf kili-rate (see below), these reports indicate harvesting and 
moose-vehicle collision rates of a = 0.35 and r = 0.025, respectively. 
The mortality of moose also depends on wolf predation. In Seandinavia, the wolf 
population is low and the moose density is high. Empirical data suggest that variations in the 
moose population size then do not have much effect on the wolf kill rate (Pedersen et.al, 
2005; Solberg et.al, 2003). The flattening out of the wolf kill rate seems to occur at a density 
of 0.2-0.4 moose per km2 (Solberg et.al, 2003). In a Yukon study the estimated number was 
0.26 moose per km2 (Hayes and Harestad, 2000). Applying the Yukon estimate, while 
keeping in mind that the total moose habitat area in Hedmark is 19420 km2, X = 5000 is 
taken to represent the moose population level at which the wolf kil1 rate tlattens out. The 
interaction parameter applied here is p =0.004. This implies a wolf kill rate of 20, whieh is 
equal to the estimation ofthe average wolf kili rate in Scandinavia (Solberg et.al, 2003). 
The unit net harvesting price reflects the first-hand purchase value (meat va lue) of the 
moose. This value may be appropriated by the landowner by either harvesting the moose 
him/herself or by hiring out hunting rights to others. The meat value may be seen as the 
opportunity eost of hiring out hunting rights.ln a work by Henriksen and Storaas (1999) the 
hunting fees are reported to be in the range NOK 30-50 per kg meat. In other works, the first­
hand purehase value of moose meat is set down as NOK 60 (Fremming, 2000; Solbraa, 1998) 
and NOK 70 (Grefsrud and Overvåg, 2004). Adjusting for inflation (Statistics of Norway, 
2007) and applying the arithmetic mean, we arrive at NOK 63 per kg (in 2006 prices). Using 
an average slaughter weight of 140 kg per animal (Fremming, 2000; Grefsrud and Overvåg, 
2004), we arrive at a unit net harvesting price of p = 8820 (NOK in 2006 priees). 
The lower bound estimates of the mean willingness-to-pay per household for a viable 
wolf population in Sweden (Boman, 1997), for the joint preservation of bear, wolf and 
wolverine in Norway (Dahle et aL, 1987) and for the bear, Iynx, wolf and wolverine in 
•
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Sweden (Broberg and Brannlund, 2006), are applied to estimate the existenee value of wolf. 
By adjusting for inf1ation and ealculating the arithmetie mean, we arrive at a mean 
willingness-to-pay for a wolf stoek equal to or above the minimum viable population of NOK 
238 per household per year in 2006 priees. As the loeal willingness-to-pay for wolf is 
assumed to be Y4 of the non-Ioeal, loeal willingness-to-pay per household is given as NOK 61. 
Based on the number ofhouseholds in Hedmark and Norway (see below), the aggregate laeal 
and social existenee value of a viable wolf population are given as a//4a2 = 5 and 
8/ /4a2 = 486 (both in million NOK in 2006 priees), respeetively. As we assurne no spatial 
differenee in the willingness-to-pay for moose, and that the per household existenee value of 
moose is identieal to the per household willingness-to-pay for wolf by non-Ioeals, amounting 
to NOK 245, we arrive at a social existenee value of a viable moose population of about 
p2J4P2 = 500 (million NOK in 2006 prices). 
of X mvpHenee, for a minimum viable population of moose = 5000 and of wolf of 
vpym =21, the parameters refleeting the deereasing marginal existenee value are given by: 
(fl =2Bw(ymvp)/ymvp :::::0.476 (million), (f2 =Bw(ymvP )/(ynnp)2 ::::: 0.011 (million), 
aJ =2Bw(ymvp)/ymvp :::::46.286 (million), a2 =BW(ymvP )/(ymvp)2 ::::: 1.102 (million), 
)/X mvpPI =2BM(Xmvp =200000 and P2 =BM(XmVP )/(xmVP )2 =20. 
Annual forest damage eaused by moose is estimated to be in the range of NOK 20-40 
million (Solbraa, 1998. See also Storaas et.al, 2001). Adjusting for inflation and calculating 
the arithmetie mean, while assuming a total Norwegian moose stoek of 120 000 (Andersen 
and Sæther, 1996; Gundersen, 2003), we arrive at an average annual eost in terms of forest 
damage of about T =290 (NOK in 2006 priees). 
Mysen (1996), Stikbakke and Gaasemyr (1997) and Wahlstrøm (1998) estimate the 
average east of moose-ear eollisions to be NOK 162600, 85000 and 110000, respectively. 
Moreover, in Jaren et al. (1991) the average eost estimate of moose-train collisions is about 
NOK 15000 when the meat and reereational value of hunting is subtracted.39 Adjusting for 
inflation and calculating the arithmetic mean, we arrive at average eosts of moose-car 
eollisions and moose-train eollisions of NOK 147000 and NOK 22000, respectively (both in 
2006 prices). Over the period from 2003/2004-2005/2006, about 60% of the moose-vehicle 
accidents were moose-car collisions (Statistics Norway, 2007). Thus, the weighted average 
cost of a moose-vehicle aceident is given as u =97000 (NOK in 2006 priees). 
39 Costs in terms of )osl meal- and recreational value of the moose are left out of all these estimates. 
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In 2004, 2005 and 2006, NOK 15.7, 10.9 and 12.4 million was paid in compensatory 
awards to farmers in Hedmark for sheep killed by camivores, respectively (Directorate for 
Nature Management, Norway, 2007). As wolves were responsible for 28.1,7.7 and 0.9% of 
these killings, about NOK 4.6, 0.9 and 0.1 million was paid in compensatory awards for wolf­
predation, respectively. Using the same counting method as above, the estimated number of 
wolves in Hedmark for 2004,2005 and 2006 is 24,21 and 21, respectively (Wabakken, P. 
et.al, 2004; 2005; 2006). This gives a cost per wolf of about NOK 192000, 43 000, and 5 000 
(all in 2006 prices) for 2004,2005 and 2006, respectively. By ca1culating the arithrnetic mean, 
we arrive at an annual cost per wolf in terms of compensatory awards for predation on sheep 
of about rp =80000 (NOK in 2006 prices). 
A zero discount rate is applied in the numerical analysis, 8 =O. This is done to be able 
to compare the equilibrium net benefit flows of the optimisation models with that of today's 
management model. Finally, based on population statisties of 2006, the number of 
households in Hedmark and Norway is given as 83 945 and 2 036 900, respectively (Statisties 
Norway, 2007). That is, s =0.0412 when representing the loeal eeonomy. 
Table AI. Baseline parameter values. 
Parameter Deseription Value 
r Intrinsie growth rate 
K Carrying eapaeity 
X The moose stoek size by whieh the wolf kili rate flattens out 
X mvp Minimum viable moose population 
pymv Minimum viable wolf population 
a Moose harvesting rate 
fl Interaction parameter 
r Rate of moose-vehiele aeeidents 
p Unit net harvesting priee of moose 
if Parameter I of the loeal wolf existenee value funetion 
l 
if Parameter 2 of the loeal wolf existenee value funetion 
2 
al Parameter 1 of the social wolf existenee value funetion 
a Parameter 2 of the social wolf existenee value funetion 
2 
Parameter I of the moose existenee value funetion 
Parameter 2 of the moose existenee value funetion 
Average eost of moose in terms of forest damage 
Average eost of moose-vehicle aecidents 
Average cost of wolf in terms of killing sheep 
Discount rate 
s Loeal share of the total human population 
0.5
 
99270 (animals)
 
5000
 
5000
 
21
 
0.35
 
0.004
 
0.025
 
8820 (NOK)
 
0.476 (million)
 
0.0 I1 (million)
 
46.286 (million)
 
1.102 (million)
 
200000
 
20
 
290 (NOK)
 
97000 (NOK)
 
80000 (NOK)
 
O
 
0.0412
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Appendix 3 Sensitivity Analysis 
Effects on the equilibrium solutions of a change in the harvesting rate. The value of the 
canying capacity is adjusted to have the annual harvest ofmoose equal to the baseline case. 
• A 5% inerease in the harvesting rate: a =0.3675 and K =114820: 
Table A2. Steady-state equilibrium solutions when Y·" = 21 
Today's Management Local Optimisation SocialOptimisation 
y 21 10 21 
X 19820 49464 19195 
aX ,h * 7284 (0.3675) 12647 (0.2557) 7095 (0.3696) 
f3XY 420 200 420 
yX 496 1237 480 
... Numbers in parentheses are the corresponding equilibrium harvesting rates. 
The corresponding moose density and moose density at the earrying capaeity in Today's 
management model are 1.0 and 5.9, respectively. 
• A 5% deerease in the harvesting rate: a =0.3325 and K =88820 : 
Table AJ. Steady-state equilibrium solutions when y." = 21 
Today's Management Local Optimisation SocialOptimisation 
y 21 10 21 
X 21908 38263 14849 
aX ,h * 7284 (0.3325) 9739 (0.2545) 5394 (0.3633) 
f3XY 420 200 420 
yX 548 957 371 
... Numbers in parentheses are the corresponding equilibrium harvesting rates. 
The corresponding moose density and moose density at the eanying capacity in Today's 
management are 1.1 and 4.6, respectively. 
With a 5% higher harvesting rate, today's management of the moose almost complies with 
soeial optimality. On the other hand, if the harvesting rate is 5% lower, today's management 
of the moose comes closer to what is optimal from the loeal point of view. Based on the 
diseussion of the estimates of the moose density at the eanying capaeity in Appendix 2, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the harvesting rate and the eanying eapacity lie between the 
two polar cases. 
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Abstract 
The problem of common property resource exploitation is traditionally associated with the 
dismal outcome of the static "prisoner's dilemma game." Having a one-sided focus on the 
conflict of interests among the co-owners, neglecting any form of group cohesion and 
identity, the institutional setting of this approach is severely simplified. The present paper 
adopts an institutional structure more in compliance with the nature of a common property 
regime. Appearing in the form of the joint provision of a public good, a unified purpose with 
which all co-owners act is introduced in the model. The model is formulated as a non­
repeated two-stage sequential game, where the co-owners choose their harvesting strategy at 
the first stage. Then, after observing the resource yield, they choose how much to contribute 
to the public good at the second stage of the game. Without resorting to the folk theorem or to 
altruistic preferences, the paper concludes there need be no antagonism between individual 
rationality and cooperative behaviour in common property resource exploitation when the co­
owners are given the opportunity and preferences to contribute some of the resource yield to a 
public good. 
Thanks to Kjell Arne Brekke and Anders Skonhoft for valuable comments and suggestions. The paper has also 
benefited from interesting and helpful discussions with Daniel W. Bromley in the early phase of the work. 
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1. Introduetion 
Under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority? This 
question has intrigued people for a long time. And for good reason. We all know that people are not 
angels, and that they tend to look after themselves and their own first. Vet we also know that 
cooperation does oceur and that our civilization is based upon it. But, in situations where each 
individual has an incentive to be selfish, how can cooperation ever develop? (Robert Axelrod, 1981, 
p.3) 
The economic literature on common property regimes has traditionally identified the potential 
for overexploitation of natural resources as the eonfliet between individual interests within the 
commons (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968). Scarcity and the ecological characteristics of the 
resources transform into economic interdependencies among individual exploiters. As these 
interdependencies are not taken into account, atomistic dec is ion making among self-interested 
individuals "brings ruin to all" (Hardin, 1968). Along these lines, a typical game theoretic 
view has been that ''the essenee of the problem of managing a commons is captured by the 
prisoner's dilemma" (Mesterton-Gibbons, 1993, p.l06). In other words, in the spirit of 
Hardin's (1968) "tragedy of the commons," the problem of the eommons has traditionally 
been represented by the failure of rational individuals to reach efficient outcomes (see also; 
Carpenter, 2000; Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; Larson and Bromley, 1990; Sen, 1967). 
However, as dynamic considerations are neglected, as communication between players 
are not allowed, and as no kind of group cohesion and identity among the players are paid 
attention to, the static prisoner's dilemma does not provide the players with an institutional 
setting that is appropriate for analysing rational decision-making in the context of common 
property regimes. Indeed, in a loeal common, individuals most often identify quite strongly 
with the groups in which they belong and do indeed communicate and interact with each other 
over time in specific, localized physical settings (Baland and Platteau, 1996; astrom, 1990; 
astrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994). Hence, in the real world the eoncept of individual 
rationality will be exposed to institutional settings of a far more complex nature. In fact, more 
complex institutional settings are needed to give meaning to terms like cooperation and 
coordination. 
Today it is widely recognized that the "tragedy of the commons" approach refers to an 
open access regime rather than a common property regime. Aceordingly, we are now more 
concemed with factors that may distinguish the commons from - rather than unite it with ­
open access. ane way to accommodate the shortcomings of the traditional model has been to 
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abandon the statie approach while stieking to the basic assumptions of the prisoner's dilemma 
game. By drawing on the dynamic concept of repeated non-cooperative garnes, the 
conventions on cooperation, like trust and patterns of reciprocity, can be integrated in the 
analysis. However, even in this case some rather strict assumptions have to be imposed on the 
model in order to establish that individual rationality complies with cooperative behaviour. 
For instance, in accordance with the "folk theorem" it is shown that individual rationality may 
guide players towards a Pareto efficient equilibrium only if the prisoner's dilemma game is 
repeated an infinite or indefinite number of times, and, then, only when the future benefits and 
costs are not toa heavily discounted (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). Hence, even though 
individually rational players are given the opportunity to coordinate their strategies over time, 
thcy are able to overcome the dilemma only under some very strict assumptions. 
Another approach is to emphasize the influence of social nonns and custom on the 
utilisation of natural resources (Bardhan, 1993; Basu, 1996; Commons, 1934; Ostrom, 1990; 
Ostrom and Gardner, 1993; Rabin, 1998). Following Elster (1989, p.99), economists typically 
"reduce nonn-oriented action to some type of optimizing behaviour." Sticking to the basic 
assumption of the maximising self-interested individual, economists often address the issue of 
social nonns analytically by letting norms "play an important role in shaping individual 
preferences" (Baland and Platteau, 1996, p.116). In this way, social nonns may be analysed 
by introducing altruistic preferences in a standard neo-classical utility function. Within such a 
context, it has been shown that individual rationality may generate an outcome which 
complies with the cooperative solution. Indeed, altruism rooted in social norms may reducc 
economic overexploitation of natural resources as it neutralises the adverse effect of stock 
externalities (Skonhoft and Solstad, 2001). 
A quite different approach is offered by the contractarian enterprise. Attempting to 
refine the concept of rationality itself, analysts in this tradition argue that cooperative 
strategies flow from individual rationality constrained by an ethic, of which, according to 
some contractarians, itself is grounded in non-moral, rational prernises (Sugden, 1993). 
Different authors have emphasized this aspect in different ways, as for instance Hobbes 
(1651), Hume (1739), Rousseau (1762), Rawls (1971) and Gauthier (1986), to mention some. 
Common to these is the application of a rationality concept quite at odds with that of orthodox 
game theory (Binmore, 1993; 1994). 
The present approach takes yet a different route. Adhering to the orthodoxy of individual 
rationality and to self-interested behaviour, I assert that the rationality of - that is, the 
explanation for - coopcrative strategies may be grounded in the presence of a unified purpose 
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with which individuals act (Larson and Bromley, 1990, p.23S). The unified purpose has the 
potential to form group cohesion among the members of the commons. The very nature of a 
common property regime calls for such an emphasis as its two main features are the existence 
of: (1) a well-defined group of co-owners having the right to exclude others from its territory 
and the associated income or benefit stream; and (2) an internal structure of rights and duties 
coordinating individual behaviour within the group (Bromley, 1991; Ciriacy-Wantrup and 
Bishop, 1975). Larson and Bromley (1990) refer to the first ofthese the "composition axiom" 
and the latter the "authority axiorn." By introducing a unified purpose with which the co­
owners act, I intend to show that the internal structure of rights and duties, coordinating 
individual behaviour within the commons, may in fact be the direct result of individually 
rational decision-making by self-interested co-owners. 
The unified purpose is represented by the opportunity to make voluntary contributions to 
a public good benefiting all members of the commons (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994, 
p.8-1S). It is assumed that the surplus the co-owners obtain from exploiting aresource may be 
used for appropriating private goods and/or for contributing to public goods. The decision 
problem of the individual co-owner then becomes to determine the optimal contribution to a 
public good as well as the optimal rate of resource exploitation. l The novelty of the present 
approach is that the two problems are treated together rather than separately. Moreover, the 
individuals are assurned to be utility maximising rather than maximisers of economic surplus. 
Within this setting, I will show that cooperative behaviour may be triggered under the 
assumption of individual rationality without resorting to the folk theorem or to altruistic 
preferences. 
The model will be formulated as a two-stage sequential game. At the first stage, the 
exploitation of the natural resource (harvesting activity) takes place. Then, after observing the 
resource yield (harvesting surplus), the yield is used for buying private goods and/or 
contributing towards public goods at the second stage of the game. Each individual takes the 
(second stage) strategic effects of their own (first-stage) harvesting into consideration. As far 
as the resulting harvesting decision deviates from that without strategic effects, a strategic 
move is carried out. Being irreversible and observable, the strategic move acts as a means to 
influence the behaviour of other players at the second stage of the game (Tirole, 2003). 
The standard model of common property resource exploitation is reviewed in the next 
section. Then, an extended harvesting model is formulated in section 3. Here, the presence of 
I In Ostrom, Gardner and Walker's (1994) terminology, this relates to the "problem ofprovision" and the 
"problem of appropriation," respectively. 
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a unified purpose, as represented by the provision of public goods, is introduced. The results 
are discussed in section 4. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered in section 5. 
2. The standard model and "restricted open access" 
Common property resource exploitation is traditionally modelled as a game in which each of 
the co-owners are individually rational players maximising own benefits from exploiting the 
resource without considering the stock externalities they impose on others (Gordon, 1954; 
Smith, 1968). The inclination to disregard the costs imposed on others is the dom inant 
strategy among identical players of the game. In the context of a Gordon-Schiifer model of a 
fishery, Mesterton-Gibbons (1993) shows that the payoffmatrix ofsuch a game is similar to 
that of the prisoner's dilemma game. Hence, the outcome, being Nash equilibrium, is 
inefficient as the co-owners do not capture the maximum economic surplus. 
In the above scherne, the whole of the economic surplus will necessarily be dissipated if 
there are an infinite number of exploiters. However, within a common property regime there 
is a Iimited number of exploiters and, although inefficient, the regime will always yield a 
strictly positive surplus. This is i1lustrated in Figure l (for the special case of two co-owners), 
in which the appropriaied economic surplus for co-owner l and 2 under biological 
equilibrium is measured along the coordinate axes. 
tre 
2 
Atr 2 
tr B 
2 
Dtr2 
Figure 1 Capturing of economic surplus 
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Point Brepresents the suboptimal prisoner's dilemma equilibrium (both players defect 
from cooperation). As the coordinate axes constitute the boundaries in which individual 
surplus is zero, outcome B is seen to be in accordance with the capturing of a positive surplus. 
TIms, point B may be labelled the "restricted open access" equilibrium of the game (see 
Skonhoft and Solstad, 2001).2 In this case we may say there are no internal structures ofrights 
and duties, so that the "authority axiom" is violated while the "composition axiom" is fulfilled 
(Larson and Bromley, 1990). 
The social optimaloutcome (the Pareto efficient solution) is represented by point A in 
the figure, Le., the case when both players choose to cooperate. In this case, we may say there 
is an internal structure of rights and duties over which the co-owners are in compliance. 
Hence, both features of a common property regime are fulfilled. Points C and D depict the 
case where one of the players defects while the other cooperates. Although yielding positive 
surplus for both in each case, point C represents the worst possible outcome for co-owner 1 
and the best possible for co-owner 2, and vice versa for point D. The three negatively sloped 
straight lines running through A, CD and B, representing iso-surplus curves, retlect different 
distributions of individual gains given particular levels of total surplus. The outward-most iso­
surplus curve represents the maximum leveI of total surplus, and the inward-most curve 
represents the minimum leveI of total surplus in the special case oftwo co-owners. 
Figure 1 ilIustrates that pure defection is a dominant strategy for both players. Player 2 
will improve his situation by defecting both when both players initially cooperate (going from 
A to C) and when player 1 initially defects and player 2 initially cooperates (going from D to 
B), and vice versa. Hence, neither A, C or D represent Nash-equilibrium outeornes. The only 
Nash-equilibrium is B, the suboptimal (Pareto-inefficient) outcome, in which both owners 
defect from cooperation and total economic surplus is at its lowest value. 
For the general case of n co-owners, the harvesting game may be formulated 
mathematically as: 
" 
(1.1)
 
where !lI and ei is the harvesting surplus and the harvesting effort of co-owner i, respectively 
(i=1,2, ... ,n). p is the fixed unit harvesting price, and hi(e"e_t)and ci(el)the harvesting 
2 The case of "restricted open aceess" is labelled "modified privatization" by Buchanan and Yoon (200 l, p.398). 
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function and the effort cost function of co-owner i, respectively. The shape of the individual 
harvesting function depends on the biological properties of the resource and the harvesting 
technology. When each co-owner maximises own economic surplus under biological 
equilibrium and treats the effort of all the (n-l) other co-owners as given so that the solution 
concept is of the Nash-Coumot type, we obtain the "restricted open-access" solution 
(corresponding to point B in the case of two co-owners in Figure 1). 
The socially optimal (Pareto efficient) effort for co-owner i, however, is obtained when 
the total economic surplus of all n co-owners is maximised (corresponding to point A in the 
case of two co-owners in Figure l): 
n n 
Max LJr; = L(ph;(epe_;)-c/(e;)). (1.2) 
el i=1 i-l 
3. The extended harvesting madel 
In the extended harvesting model co-owner i is supposed to allocate the harvesting surplus 
between the appropriation of a private good (y;) and the contribution to a public good (Zj)' In 
general, we may think of public goods in the form of e.g. defence and education here. As a 
special case, public good provision will be put on a par with the covering of the (transaction) 
costs of economic organisation. 
The model is forrnulated as a two-stage game of complete but imperfect information: All 
co-owners simultaneously choose harvesting effort and then, after observing each others 
harvesting surplus, they simuItaneously choose the amount to spend on the private and/or 
public good. Assuming that the whole harvesting surplus is spent, and letting prices equaJ 
one, the budget restriction of co-owner i becomes: 
Jr; = Y, + z" (2.1 ) 
While co-owner i's consumption of private goods amounts to his own spending on private 
goods, i's consumption of public goods equals the total provision of public goods by all of the 
co-owners. Suppose the n co-owners have identical non-separabel utility functions as given 
by3; 
J The co-owners need not be identical with respect to harvesting technology. That is, the harvesting surplus may 
vary among the co-owners. • 
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where Z =Ln Zj' A > O, a ~ O and p ~ O are parameters of the utility function. When 
;=\ 
a > Oand P> O, individual utility is increasing with both types of goods.4 
Using backward induction, the second.stage Nash-equilibrium is derived for each 
feasible outcome of the first-stage game. Given the second-stage optimising behaviour, the 
Nash-equilibrium of the first stage is derived. That is, the individual co-owner anticipates his 
own and others optimal contribution to the public good at the second stage, and applies this to 
find the optimal harvesting effort at the first stage. 
Given the budget restriction of equation (2.1), the individual utility of equation (2.2) is 
maximised with respect to the public good contribution, Z;' as in: 
_ ( )a pMax uj - A tri - Z; Z . (2.3) 
.. 
The first order condition for individual utility maximisation with respect to the public good 
contribution, given the harvesting surplus, is: 
(2.4) 
For a given harvesting surplus, then, the contribution to the public good resulting from 
individual optimisation at the second stage of the game reads: 
(2.5)
 
The Nash-equilibrium contribution to the public good of individual i then becomes: 
4 In this case, the provision of the public good is a prerequisite for obtaining utility from consuming the private 
good, and vice versaThis stems from the use ofa non-separabel uti litYfunction. However, the non-separable 
specification of the uti litYfunetion is not essential for the conc!usions of the analysis. Indeed, it ean be shown 
that the use ofan additive separable utility function, as for instanee u,(y, , z) = !n(I +ay,) + In(1 + j3z) , yields 
qualitatively the same results. 
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(2.6) 
Thus, co-owner i has incentives to contribute more to the public good if his own harvesting 
surplus increases, and less if the surplus and the publ ic good provision of others increase. This 
complies with standard public good theory. 
Given the Nash-equilibrium solution of equation (2.6), individual utility is now 
maximised with respect to harvesting effort at the first stage: 
Max uj =A(1l', -z,·r (/t· (2.7) 
r, 
Inserting Zj· gives: 
n nJa ( fJ Jf}Max u =A _a_L 1l'j L1l'j (2.8) 
t, 
j ( na + fJ i~1 na + fJ i~1 
Individual utility maximisation with respect to harvesting effort now complies with 
maximisation of the joint harvesting surplus as in equation (1.2). In other words, the Nash­
equilibrium harvesting effort of the first-stage game coincides with soeial optimal ity (the 
Pareto efficient solution). Indeed, as long as it is optimal for the co-owners to contribute a 
positive amount of the harvesting surplus to the public good, individual utility maximisation 
generates Pareto efficiency in the harvesting game.5 
The optimising rule says to allocate the surplus between private- and public good 
consumption so that the marginal utilities of consumption are equalised. Thus, the shape of 
the utility function determines the optimal contribution to the public good, Zj·' Although there 
is no inefficient harvesting, there is still a free-rider problem in the provision of the public 
good. 
5 It can be shown that this result also holds for the additive separable utility function in footnotc 4. 
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Social optimality, or the Pareto efficient contribution to the public good, is derived by 
maximising the sum of individual utility over all n co-owners subject to the individual public 
good provision: 
~ax t uj =: i (A (tri - Zjr zp). (2.9) 
• I~I ;=1 
Assuming that the co-owners are identical - both with respect to harvesting surplus and utility 
functions - the individual optimal public good provision of equation (2.5) and the solution of 
the social optimal public good provision derived from equation (2.9) are respectively: 
• fl 
Z = tr. (2.10) 
I lna + fl 
sO fl 
Zi =--tri , (2.11 ) 
a+fl 
The Nash-equilibrium public good provision (z/) is unambiguously positive for a definite 
number of identical co-owners as long as fl> O. That is, as long as the public good generate 
some minimum of utility for the individual co-owner, there will be no inefficiency gap in the 
harvesting activity. However, the Nash-equilibrium public good provision will be smaller 
than what is socially optimal (the Pareto efficient solution z;'O), and the inefficiency gap 
increases with the number of co-owners. 
When a > O and fl = O, the public good is neither utility generating nor a prerequisite 
for obtaining utility from private goods. Nothing will now be provided for the public good 
and the harvesting will be inefficient in the Pareto sense. In this case, the harvesting model 
comes down to the static prisoner's dilemma game. Hence, the traditional representation of 
the problem of the commons, as given by equation (1.1), is a special case of the extended 
harvesting mode!. In contrast, when a = O and fl > O, meaning that a market for 
appropriating utility generating private goods is absent, it is both individually and socially 
optimal to contribute all the surplus to the public good. When the consumption of private 
goods is no option, self-interested behaviour and individual optimisation generate Pareto­
efficiency in the provision of the public good as well as in the harvesting activity. In the 
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general case when a and f3 are both positive, and for a given n > I , the inefficiency gap in 
the provision of the public good is smaller the lower a is as compared to f3 . 
4. Discussion 
When the two decision problems are combined, the inefficiency gap in terms of drawing too 
heavily on naturaI resources disappears as long as individuals prefer to contribute a minimum 
to the public good. In the case of two co-owners, this corresponds to solution A in Figure I. 
The underlying mechanism is as follows: It is now in co-owner I 's best interest to act in a 
way so that the harvesting surplus of co-owner 2 increases. Firstly, this makes co-owner 2 
contribute more to the public good. Secondly, co-owner 2's increased contribution to the 
public good means that co-owner 1 can contribute less to the public good, and thus spend 
more on the private good. Both effects add utility to co-owner 1. Moreover, as a higher 
surplus of co-owner 1 Iikewise induces co-owner 2 to contribute less to the public good, co­
owner 1 should make some limitation on own surplus. Altogether, the maximisation of 
individual utility in the harvesting game requires that co-owner l put some weight on the 
harvesting surplus of co-owner 2 at the expense of own surplus. Indeed, individual incentives 
to increase the harvesting effort beyond what is socialJy optimal are completely removed. 
This result also holds for the general case of n co-owners. 
Thus, incentives to cooperate are generated among the co-owners as they have a 
common interest - or a "unified purpose" - in the provision of the public good. The self­
interested, rational individual executes forbearance in harvesting as their fellow co-owners 
appropriation of economic surplus matters in the provision of public goods.6 
The decision to restrict own harvesting effort to the level of Pareto efficiency may be 
given an interpretation within the framework of strategic moves. In a two-stage model, a 
strategic move is an irreversible and observable "investment" carried out at stage one in order 
to influence the action of the players at stage two (Tirole, 2003). Within the field of industrial 
organisation, it has been developed a taxonomy of such strategies. These are based on 
whether the "investment" makes the investor tough or soft, whether the "investment" is 
supposed to deter or accommodate entry of rivaIs, or whether the decision variables of period 
two are strategic substitutes or strategic complements (Tirole, 2003).7 
6 In Commons (1934, p.S8) terminology, forbearance is the exercise ofa limited degree ofan individual's 
potential physical or economic power. 
7 An investmentthat makes the investor toughJsoft is one that affects the profit of competitors 
negatively/positiveJy. Moreover, the decision ~ariables are strategic substitutes when the reaction functions are 
negatively sloped and strategic complements when the reaction functions are positively sloped (Tirole, 2003). 
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Conveyed to the present context and in the case of two co-owners, we may consider the 
strategic move as co-owner l "investing" in the harvesting surplus of co-owner 2. That is, in 
the harvesting game, co-owner l acts in order to increase co-owner 2's surplus at the expense 
of own surplus.8 This will increase the utility of co-owner 2. Hence, the "investment" makes 
co-owner l soft. Moreover, the decision variables at the second stage of the game, Zj' are 
strategic substitutes. This is so because co-owner l optimally reduces his own contribution to 
the public good when co-owner 2 increases his, and vice versa. That is, the reaction functions 
are negatively sloped. Finally, in the present context we must understand the strategic move 
as a strategy of accommodation. 
Compared to a situation where co-owner 2 does not observe the strategic move of co­
owner l, it is evident that co-owner l should "invest" more in the surplus of co-owner 2. 
According to the strategic taxonomy, then, the strategic move may be considered a "Lean and 
hungry look" strategy (Tirole, 2003, p.327). Hence, the socially optimaloutcome of the 
harvesting game is finnly based on the strategic considerations of self-interested and 
individually rational utility maximisers. There is no antagonism between collective and 
individual rationality. Indeed, the strategic move of a fully self-interested individual complies 
entirely with the harvesting behaviour of an individual with completely altruistic preferences 
(see Skonhoft and Solstad, 2001). 
In the general case of a > O and fl > O, a positive amount of each type of good is 
required in order to obtain utility from the other. This specification of the model may be given 
the following interpretation: To have an efficient market exchange of private ownership, a 
complex structure of rules and conventions are required to reduce the individual transaction 
costs. Being non-rivalous in consumption and non-excludable, such institutional arrangements 
have the characteristics of a public good (Bromley, 2006). Thus, to be at all able to make 
beneficial exchange of private goods at the market, a minimum of contributions to the 
institutional arrangements (the public good) is required. Indeed, "markets cannot possibly 
exist without an institutional structure in place" (Bromley, 2006, p.46). This is to say that the 
public good is essential for appropriating and enjoying any utility at all from private goods. 
Moreover, the public good itself generates utility only indirectly through the appropriation of 
private goods. 
8 How this may be done depends on the characteristics of the harvesting model. Ifwe assume a Gordon-Schlifer 
harvesting model in biological equilibrium, the choice of a harvesting effort of exploiter l below that of the 
Nash-equilibrium increases exploiter 2's harvesting surplus and reduces that of exploiter l. The net effect is, 
however, positive (see for instance Skonhoft and So[stad, 2001). 
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With this in mind, consider the standard neoclassical assumption of zero costs of 
operating competitive markets (Williamson, 1985). In the present model, this falls in line with 
the special case of a> O and f3 =O, where utility may be obtained from purchasing the 
private good without contributing anything to the public good. As shown above, the outcome 
of the harvesting game is then inefficient in the Pareto sense. This means that the neoclassical 
simplirying assumption of the institutional structure - as here in terms of the neglected costs 
ofeconomic organisation - has a serious impact on the behavioural predictions of the mode!. 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper I have emphasized the institutional perspective of common property 
management. I have argued that the institutional context of common property management 
has an impact on the nature of interaction within the regime. By introducing the presence of a 
unified purpose with which the members of the common property regime act, here as 
represented by the joint provision of a public good, the paper adds new theoretical insight to 
the conventional understanding of common property resource exploitation. One specific aim 
of the paper has been to question the conventional wisdom that there is an antagonism 
between individually rational behaviour and cooperative behaviour in the context of common 
property management. The arguments have been put forward within the framework of non­
cooperative game theory. 
The main conclusion is that self-interested, rational individuals become less inc!ined to 
mine jointly exploited resources when they are given the opportunity and preferences to 
contribute some of the resource yie Id to a public good. A cooperative structure emerges in the 
harvesting game in the form of individual execution of forbearance of harvesting 
opportunities. The unified purpose transforms into an interaction between the members of the 
commons in which the mutual benefits of cooperation are realized. The emergence of a 
cooperative structure reveals itself as a performance of collective action, that is, individually 
rational agents conforming to pattems of behaviour which prornote the interests of the 
collective. 
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Abstract The paper analyzes the exploitation of a local common where the be­
havior is steered by altruism rooted in social norms. The analysis is illustrated 
by using the Gordon-Schiifer model of a fishery. We start by reviewing the stan­
dard results when all exploiters are purely egoists; i.e., when own uti/ity 
depends only on own profit. Under the assumption of identical harvesting effi­
ciency for all owners. we then introduee social norms andfind the consequences 
for the resource utilization and welfare under various degrees of altruism. It is 
demonstrated that more altruism generally leads to less harvesting ejfort. less 
economic overexploitation of the resource stock, and increased resource rent. In 
a next step. we open up for dijferences in harvesting technology. It is shown that 
a high degree of altruism, in addition to a large efficiency gap among the own­
ers, restricts the possibility of an exploitation scheme where all owners 
participate in the harvesting activity. The possibility of a two-channel efficiency 
improvement as a result of more altruism is also demonstrated. 
Key words Bioeeonomie analysis, ioea! eommons, norms. 
Introduction 
Referring to the 'conventional wisdom' among economists about property rights, 
Bromley (1989, pp.186-87) notes that, "when resource destruction is observed in 
settings of joint ownership and control it is the institutional arrangements (joint re­
sponsibility) that is immediately said to be at fault." Much in line with Ostrom 
(1990) he c1aims that, "in practice, 'the tragedy of the commons' metaphor deflects 
analytical attention away from the actual soeial arrangements able to overcome re­
source degradation and make common property regimes viable" (Bromley 1991, pp. 
22-23). This flaw in the conventional economic analysis of common property re­
sources can be traced back to the use of very simplistic behavioral and institutional 
assumptions where, among others, people are supposed to be individual1y and in­
strumentally rational, entirely self-interested, and totally unaffected by soeial norms 
and the particular institutional arrangement in place. However, empirical and experi­
mental studies suggest that soeial norms and the prevailing institutional arrangement 
play a crucial role for individual motivation and behavior in Iocal resource management 
Anders Skonhoft is a professor in the Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology, N-749l Trondheim. Norway, email: anders.skonhoft@sv.ntnu.no. Jan Tore Solstad is an as­
sistant professor at Trondheim Business School, Sør-Trøndelag University College, N-7004 Trondheim. 
Norway, email: Jan.Solstad@aoa.hisl.no.AndersSkonhoftwascorrespondingauthor.This research was 
supported by grants from the Norwegian Research Council through the Biological Diversity Program 
and the Man and Biosphere Program. We are grateful for constructive comments from two referees. 
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(Bardhan \993; Ostrom and Gardner 1993; Ostrom 1990; Rabin 1998; Wade 1987). 
In the following analysis, we aim to correct for this misconception. Social 
norms are, therefore, assumed to influence individual behavior. Hence, common 
property resource management is distinguished from that of the open access. Con­
textually, the sort of resource management settings we have in mind fall within 
Ostrom 's (1990, p. 26) notion of small-scale, common-pool resources (CPRs), as for 
instance 'inshore fisheries, smaller grazing areas, groundwater basins, irrigation'sys­
tems, and communal forests.' These resources are particularly essential for people 
living in the poor regions of the world (Dasgupta and Maler 1995), and referring to 
FAO-statistics, Ostrom (1990, p. 27) maintains that about 90% of the world's fisher­
men and over half of the fish consumed each year are captured by the smaJl-scale, 
inshore fisheries. Accordingly, improper understanding and policy failures attached 
to the management of these resources may have far reaching effects. 
Two main features distinguish a local common property regime from open ac­
cess. Firstly, there is a specil'ied 'smal\' number of owners that, as a group, has the 
exclusive rights to appropriate the resource under consideration and, secondly, there 
is an institutional structure of individual rights and duties within the group of own­
ers in which individual behavior is in compliance (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop 
1975; Bromley 1991). Hence, a local common is more than an accidental collection 
of independent individuals; it is a group of people in which the individual members 
relate to each other according to specific conventions on cooperation and coexist­
ence, like social norrns, group identity, trust, and patterns of reciprocity. These are 
al\ part of the social and institutional capital that accumulates over time within well­
defined local commons (Baland and Platteau 1996; Ostrom 1990; Seabright 1993). 
In the same way, we hold that altruism, being rooted in these conventions, and in 
social norms in particular, is a result of the same historical process. Thus, by includ­
ing altruism in the analysis, we acknowledge the crucial role played by norms and 
institutions in the economy of local common property management. 
Social norms may trigger a variety of behavioral motivations. Our analysis is 
confined to those fitting along an egoism-altruism axis, on which complete egoism 
and complete altruism are the polar cases. Basically, there are two ways of address­
ing the issue of social norms analytically. Firstly, norms may be treated as 'binding 
constraints limiting the choices of a maximizing self-interested individual,' and sec­
ondly, they may 'play an important role in shaping individual preferences' (Baland 
and Platteau 1996, p. 116). We wil\ adopt the latter in our treatment of altruism 
rooted in social norms, and the egoism-altruism distinction will be integrated in the 
preference structure of the individual agents. Based on this concept, our aim is to 
explore how the level and distribution of altruism among individuals may inf1uence 
the economy of local common resource management. The various outcomes are 
evaluated in terms of effort use, resource utilization, and welfare, and the reasoning 
is ilJustrated by using the Gordon-Schiifer model of a fishery, where the solution 
concept all the time is of the Nash-Cournot one-shot game type.' We then analyze 
how the introduction of a1truistic preferences eliminates inefficiencies in the re­
source management of the most pessimistic of all institutional seuings, the one rep­
resented by static, non-cooperative garnes based on strict seIl' interests. 
As a background for the analysis, we start in the next section by reviewing the 
fairly standard results of the Gordon-Schlifer model when al\ exploiters are purely 
egoists, and we have what we will refer to as 'restricted open-access.' In the section 
that fol\ows, we introduce social norms and analyze the resource exploitation under 
Hence. although conventions on cooperation are indirectly accounted for lhrough the inc1usion of altruism 
in the preferences of the individuals. the game theoretie concept adopted is entirel.y noncooperative . 
• 
I 
87 
• 
Local Common Exploitation 41 
various degrees of altruism. In the next section, the special case when the co-owners 
practice the same degree of altruism and, therefore, have the same preferences, are 
analyzed. Finally, we study what happens when the exploiters use different harvest­
ing technologies and the harvesting efficiency is different. 
The Standard Gordon-Schåfer Model 
When the number of exploiters is explicitly considered, the basic relationships of 
the Gordon-Schiifer model (see, e.g., Mesterton-Gibbons 1993) are given by: 
dXldt = F(X) - Lhj (I) 
F(X) = rX(l - XI K) (2) 
and 
(3) 
Equation (1) is the population dynamics of the resource (the fish stock) with X 
as the stock size at time t (the time index is omiued), F(X) is the natural growth 
function and hj is the harvesting of exploiter j, j = l, ... , n and where n is fixed. The 
natural growth function [equation (2)] is of the logistic type, where r is the maxi­
mum specific growth rate, and K is the carrying capacity. Finally, equation (3) yields 
the Schli.fer harvesting function with ei as the effort and q as the catchability coeffi­
cient. Consequently, in the present setup, all owners are assumed to have identical 
catchability coefficients, thus being equally efficient in harvesting and homogeneous 
in endowment (see below). This assumption is relaxed later on. 
The current profit of exploiter i is now lt i = (ph; - ce;), where p is the gi ven mar­
ket price of the resource and c is the unit effort cost, also assumed to be given and 
fixed. Combining the above equations when dX/dt = 0, gives X = K[ 1 - (q/r)'I.e)]. 
When substituting into the harvesting function [equation (3)], we obtain hi = qK[1 ­
(q/r)'I.ej]e;. The profit, or the resource rent, of exploiter i under biological equilib­
rium is, therefore, lt; =pqK[ I - b - (q/r)I:ej]e i , where b =c/Kpq. b < l must hold to 
secure a positive profit and hence, a positive harves ting activity. 
When every fisherman maximizes profit under biological equilibrium and treats 
the effort of all the (n - I) other exploiters as gi ven so that the solution .concept is of 
the Nash-Cournot type, we obtain the open-access solution under the assumption of 
a fixed number of exploiters. The equilibrium effort of owner i is then given as: 
etla = rO - b)lq(n + I). (4) 
Equation (4) represents the restricted open-access effort (denoted by superscript 
'roa'), emphasizing that the property relations between the exploiters are the same 
as in the traditional notion of open access, except from the constraint imposed on 
the number of agents. The total effort of the n fishermen follows as Emu = nr(l - b)/ 
q(n + l). Substituted into the profit function, the profit of exploiter i reads ltron = 
Kpr(l - b)2/(n + 1)2, while the total profit is lt ro" =Kprn(l - b)2/(n + 1)2. Hence. con­
trary to the traditiona! concept of open access, there will always be a positive economic 
rent in the restricted open access case; i.e., the rent will never be entirely dissipated. 
The equilibrium stock will be xroCl = K(l + nb)/(n + l). For more details, see below. 
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The restricted open-access solution can be compared to the Pareto efficient so­
lution when the total resource rent 1t = k1t is maximized so that the stock externali­J 
ties are internalized. The effart use of exploiter i is then given by: 
et = r(i - b)j2qn (5) 
(superscript 's' denotes overall optimality). The total effort follows as ES =r(l - b)1 
2q, which is independent of n because the harvesting function is linear in the effort 
use. Moreover, we find that the total resource rent reads 1tS =Kpr(l - b)2/4, and the 
equilibrium stock is XS =K(I + b)l2. E' is below E"'a for all n > I, while xs is above 
xma, and the discrepancy increases when n shifts up because of more stock externali­
ties. All these results are well known (see Mesterton-Gibbons 1993). 
Exploitation Under Various Degree of Altruism 
The above solution was obtained when the behavior of every exploiter was steered 
by strict egoism; own uti litYdepends only on own profit. This is the restricted open­
access solution because there are no social norms governing the individual exploita­
tion of the resource. However, as discussed in the introduction, a local common 
property regime is characterized by hav ing a structure of individual rights and duties 
within the group of owners in which the individual members relate to each other ac­
cording to specific conventions on cooperation. These social norms are now embed­
ded in the model by changing the assumption of purely egoistic behavior with altru­
istie behavior.2 
The various degree of altruism will be reflected by the weight put on the well 
being of the others relative to own well being. The utility of owner i is, therefore, 
now a weighted sum of own profit and the profit of the other exploiters. We use the 
specific functional form Vi =(l -1l)1t i + [Il/(n - I)]k1tj , where i =l, ... , n andj = l, 
..., i - l, i + I, ... , n. The (exogenous) weight Ili is assumed to be in the domain [O, 
(n - l )/n] and a higher Ili means more altruism. Jf the weight is equal to (n - l )/n, 
we define owner i to be completely altruistic, and hence, Vi =(lln)k1tj , where i = l, 
... , n andj = l, ... , n. On the contrary, the model coincides with the standard Gor­
don-Sch1ifer model when Ili =O; i.e., when there is pure egoism and the preferences 
are gi ven by Vi =1t j • 3 
To obtain analytical results, we consider only two exploiters. The utility func­
tions are then: 
(6)
 
and 
(7) 
For owner l, the utility writes Ul = pqKrl - b - (qlr)(e l + e2)]((1 -Il,)e, + Ille2] 
when using equations (1)-(3), and U2 =pqK[l - b - (qlr)(ez + el)][(l -1l2)e2+ 1l2el] for 
, Becker (] 976; 1981) and Kurz (1978), arnong olhers, discuss the underlying individual motives to act
 
altruistically in other contexts (e.g., within the family).
 
J The possibility of 'overaitruism'; i.e .• the case when Il; is in the domain (Il - 1/11,1] is therefore ru]ed
 
oU[. Neither the case of masochism nor envy are considered (Stark 1995).
 
89 
Local Common Exploitation 43 
owner 2. It can easily be confirmed that the utility functions are strictly concave in 
own effort under the given restrictions on ~f' Under the assumption of utility maxi­
mization, oU/oef =: O(i =: 1,2), we obtain the best response functions as: 
(8) 
and 
(9) 
where equation (8) is for owner l and equation (9) is for owner 2. See figure 1. 
Solving, the Nash equilibrium comes out as: 
(lO) 
and 
(lI) 
Superscript •*' denotes the general case of altruism. The equilibrium will be unique 
except when both owners are completely altruistic and ~I =: 112 =: 0.5. The best re­
sponse functions will then coincide and it will be an infinite number of equilibria. It 
is also seen that the problem has no interior solution when one of the owners is com­
pletely altruistic. Hence, when ~I =: 0.5 (1l2 =: 0.5) and ~2 (~I) is in the domain [O, 
0.5), the best response functions will intersect at the e2-axis (el-axis) so the effort of 
owner 1 (2) is zero, e~ =: O (ei =: O). However, when ~; is in the domain [O, 0.5) and 
the problem has an unique interior solution, it can easily be confirmed that ae~ /all, 
r(l-b) 
2q 
e; 
e"l r(l-b) 
2q 
Figure 1. The Best Response Functions Under Various Degree of Altruism 
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< O and ae;/all , > O, and ae;/all~ < O and ae~/all~ > O hold (see figure I). In­
creased altruism works, as expected, in the direction of less own effart and more ef­
fort of the other owner. Combining the equilibrium conditions, it is also seen that 
c; /e; = (1 - 2fl,)(1 - fll)/( l - 2fl~)( I - fli) holds; i. e., the relati ve harvesti ng effort is 
only contingent upon the various degree of altruism. 
Having characterized the equilibrium, we proceed to show how altruism int1u­
ences the exploi tation of the local common resource. From equations (10) and (Il) it 
follows directly that the total effort will be E' = r(1 - b)[(l - 21l,)(1 - Ill) + (I .;.. 
2Ill)(l - fl,)]I[4(l - fl 1)(1 -Ill) - I]q, and E' will be reduced when altruism in­
creases, 8E'/Ofl; < O (i = 1,2). Less effort of one owner must, therefore, outweigh 
more effort of the other. Moreover, when there is some degree of a!truism among at least 
one of the exploiters, E" < En", must hold. Because the stock size of the resource is de­
creasing in the total effort use, X' = K(I - qE'/r), we will also have that OX/Ofli > O 
(i = 1,2). A strengthening of soeial norrns, leading to increased altruism, works un­
ambiguously in the direction of less effort and less overexploitation of the resource. 
The next question is, what happens to the resource rent when there is a move­
ment in the direction of more altruism? The profit of owner I will be 1t; = pqK[ I ­
b - (q/r)E'] e~, which after some rearrangements can be written as 1t; = Kpr( I ­
br(1 - fli - fll)(1 - 21l,)(I -1l2)/r4(1 -1l,)(1 -1l2) - lP. It can be confirmed that 
a1t; /aJl, < O will hold. Finding the corresponding equilibrium profit of owner 2 
and differentiating, we obtain a1t;/aJlI > O. The total profit is lt' = Kpr(l - br(l ­
fli - fl2)[(1 - 21l,)(I - Ill) + (I - 2fll)(l - 1l1)/[4(1 - Il 1)(1 - Jl~) - IF and hence, 
a1t'/all; > O. The total profit increases when one of the owners becomes more al­
truistic. The conc1usion is that when individuals become more a!truistic oriented, 
own effort and own profit will be reduced. At the same time, this ensures that total 
effort decreases and overall profit increases. 
The above resu1ts were obtained when it was an interior solution far effort use. 
When owner I is purely a!truistic and, therefore, indifferent to whether the resource 
rent is obtained through own harvesting activity or the activity of others, III = 0.5, 
while fl2 is in the domain [O, 0.5). Equations (lO) and (Il) reduce to <= Oand e; = 
r(l - b)l2q, respectively. In this case, the harvesting activity of owner 2 is indepen­
dent of the degree of own altruism, and the effort use coincides with the total effart 
under overall optimality; i.e., e; = E'. This result is obvious; when harvesting takes 
place by only one agent there will be no stock externalities. 4 We will also have 1t; = 
O and 1t; = lt' = lt", and the complete altruist renounces his personal profil. Hence, 
being indifferent about who obtains the profit, the complete altruist will keep away 
from own harvesting because the stock externalities are neutralized, and the total re­
source rent is maximized. 
A SpeciaJ Case: The Same Preferences of the Owners 
We now look at the special case when the degree of altruism rooted in soeial norms 
is the same among the owners so that fli =III =fl holds. The solution is then sym­
metric and the equilibrium effort will be: 
e: = rO - b)(l - Jl)(l - 2Jl)/[4(l - Jl)2 - 1] q; 1,2 (12) 
, This is. however. not a general resul!. When therc arc three or more owners and just one is completely 
a1truisl, harvesting will take place by the other two. Stock eXlcrnalities will, therefore. be present, and 
the total effort use wi Il be above that of the overall opti mum. 
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As above, the solution will obviously be as in the standard Gordon-Sehlifer 
model when ~ =O; ei' = e;oa and E' =pa-. It also follows that oe; /o~ < O; i.e., the 
effort of eaeh owner deereases when there is a general movement in the direetion of 
more altruism. Moreover, by using L'Hopitals rule, it can be demonstrated that e; 
approaches et(i = 1,2), and henee, E' approaehes P, when ~ approaehes 0.5. When 
we are c10se to the strict altruistic case, eaeh owner uses approximately the saple ef­
fort as under overall optimality. See figure 2. 
The equilibrium stock size can now be written as Jf = K{ I - 2(1 - b)(1 - ~)(1 ­
2~)/[4(l - ~)2 - Il), while the total profit is Tt' = 2Kpr(1 - b)2(1 - ~)(1 - 2~)2/[4(1 _ ~)2 
- IF. Henee, more altruism means less ecologieal and eeonomie overexploitation. In 
the limiting case when ~ approaehes 0.5, the stoek size will also approaeh the stoek 
size under overall optimality. This will also be so for profil. Being altruists, the 
owners maximize total resouree rent and thus internalize the stoek externalities; they 
reduee harvesting effort to avoid imposing high unit harvesting costs on their co­
owners. 
Differences in Efficiency 
We now study what happens when there are differences in harvesting effieiency 
among the owners. According to Baland and Platteau (1996), the foeus is then di­
rected to the twin issues of group size and homogeneity. The conventional argument 
is that social norms are more likely to appear in homogeneous groups of small num­
bers. Moreover, it is supposed that homogeneity is more likely to be present in small 
groups, indicating that the effeet of group size partly works through the homogene­
ity factor. Baland and Platteau (1996, p. 301), however, argue that, "too often, het­
erogeneity is blamed as a matter of principle without enough effort being devoted to 
speiling out the precise conditions under which it undermines collective action." To 
correct for this misconception, they separate between three main sources of hetero-
ERla 
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Figure 2. Overall Effort Use Under the Same Degree of Altruism 
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geneity; those of eulture, interests, and endowments. From their empirieal studies, 
they eonelude that heterogeneity of endowments, quite eontrary to those of eulture 
and interests, mayenhanee eo-operation and stimulate eolleetive aetion. As skills 
are included in their endowments eategory, our notion of differenees in effieieney 
falls within this eategory. 
Henee, to analyze the above issues within the present setting. the assumption 
that teehnieal skills or the efficieney in harvesting are identieal, is relaxed. We still 
eonsider only two owners and restriet the analysis to the situation where the agents 
have the same weights in their utility funetions, ~ I = ~2 = ~. The utility funetions 
under biologieal equilibrium when the eatehability eoeffieient q varies are then Ul = 
(1 - ~)pq,K[1 - bl - (lIr)(q,e, + q2e2)]el + ~pq2K[1 - b2 - (l/r)(q)e) + q2e2)]e2 for 
owner I, U2= (l - ~)pq2K[ I - b2 - (llr)(q,e) + q2e2)]e2 + ~pqlK[l - bl - (llr)(q1e) + 
q2e2)]e\ for owner 2, and wherc bi = clpqjK < l (i = 1,2). Under the assumption of 
utility maximization and an interior solution, au/ae; =O (i =1,2), the Nash-equilib­
rium will now be given by: 
(13) 
and 
To obtain an interior solution with positive harvesting efforts, more restrietions 
on the ecologieal and eeonomie parameters have to be imposed. e~ > O will hold 
when (I - b2)/(1 - bl) < 2(1 - ~), while e; > O holds when (1 - b2 )/(l - bl) > 1/2(1 
- ~). The feasible set for an interior solution is, therefore, determined by the relative 
effieieney together with the degree of altruism, and is represented by the shaded 
area in figure 3. The feasible set shrinks when the degree of altruism inereases. 
Henee, a 'high' degree of altruism aeeompanied by a 'small' effieieney gap means 
that ane of the owners will refrain from harvesting because of stock externalities, 
while the other one takes the total eatch; say, e~ =O and e; =r(l - b2)/2q2 =P. The 
same happens under a modest degree of altruism aecompanied by a large efficieney 
gap.~ 
The result that a large effieieney gap eauses the most efficient (or the most effi­
eient ones in a general setting with more agents) to take all the eatch is earlier dem­
onstrated by. among others, Mesterton-Gibbons (1993). What is new here, is that a 
similar outcome is generated under the assumption of a small efficiency gap if com­
bined with a high degree of altruism. Altruism rooted in social norms adds a new 
ehannel to a more efficient exploitation of the eommon as it realloeates harvesting 
effort from the least effieient to the most effieient by making the least efficient 
owner stop fishing altogether, thus leaving only one owner left in the fishery. Henee, 
total rent of the fishery is inereased, firstly, due to the elimination of stoek externali­
ties as only one owner will be left in the fishery and, seeondly, due to the faet that 
5 The present notion of relative efficiency should. however. be interpreted with care because the vertical 
axis on figure 3 refers to the ratio (I - b~l/( l - bIl, and not q,lq,. The simplest way to illustrate this 
point is when altruism is absent. When J.I = O. e; > O if (l - 20l + alq~ > O. and e; > O if q~ > 20( I + al. 
b, is here replaeed. and we have a =b,.q, =c1pK. In addition. the catchability coefficienl of owner lWO is 
normalized to one. q, = I. Accordingly. we must have o < I. Depending on lhe value of a, which can be 
interpreled as the cosl-price ratio. it can be easily shown lhat the conditions for obtaining an interior 
solution are fulfilled for a wide range of values of q~. Hence. when J.I = O. an interior solution can take pJace 
for small as well as large gaps in efficiency among the harvesters. This is also the case when J.I > O. 
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Figure 3. The Feasible Set for an interim Solution Under
 
Different Degree of Altruism and Efficiency.
 
Note: Both owners harvest (the shaded area) and only one harvest (the non-shaded area). Outside
 
the box. the leasl efficient is forced to leave harvesting regardless of the prevalenee of altruism.
 
the one remaining will be the most efficient. Notice also that altruism tfiggers a vol­
untary withdrawal from harvesting, compared to a coerced withdrawal in the con­
ventional model; that is, withdrawal and reduction in the number of exploiters take 
place because individual preferences are more in accordance with the interests of the 
collective. The co-owners of the local common can then reap the fruit of labour divi­
sion, where the most efficient flshermen harvest, while the least efficient flnd alter­
native work at the prevailing opportunity cost, c. Our theoretical reasoning on het­
erogeneity fostering cooperation is, therefore, in line with the above mentioned em­
pirical findings of Baland and Platteau (1996). 
When there are interim solutions and both owners harvest, a changing degree of 
a1truism yields: 
and 
We have the suspected result ae; /all < O when (I - b2)/(l - bl) > (1 - 1l)/[5/4 -1l(Z 
-Il)], and ae;/all < O when (l - b2)/(1 - bl) < [5/4 -1l(Z -1l)]/(1 -Il). This case is 
given in the middle of the shaded area in figure 3. Hence, as long as there is a small 
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initial degree of altruism and a small efficiency gap, we obtain the same result as in 
the previous section. On the other hand, if there is a large initial degree of altruism 
or a large efficiency gap, we obtain other results and only the least efficient owner 
will reduce harvesting, while the most efficient, in fact, will increase harvesting ef­
fort. These cases take place in the upper part of the shaded area when owner 2 is 
most efficient, ae; fall> o and ae~ fall < o, and in the lower part when I is the 
most efficient harvester, ae~ fall> oand ae; fall < O. 
A general movement in the direction toward more altruistic behavior when the 
efficiency gap is large (but small enough to secure an interior solution) so that the 
harvesting activity of the most efficient increases, while the activity of the other 
shrinks, leads to a major reallocation of effort use. However, for the outcomes tak­
ing placc in the upper and lower parts of the shaded area, we demonstrate that total 
effort will decrease. ensuring a reduction of the economic overexploitation of the re­
source stock and an inc rease in the total resource rent, aE'fal! < O. aX"fall > oand 
ore'foll > 0. 6 More a!Lruism promotes more effieient exploitation through a neutral­
ization of the stock externalities. However. under these regimes an additional chan­
neI for effieiency improvement is present as the harvesting activity of the most effi­
cient expands, while the activity of the least efficient shrinks. Efficiency improve­
ment is achieved through redistribution of the harvesting shares as weU. 
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have studied the exploitation of a local common naturaI resource 
with a structure of individual rights and duties within the group of co-owners in 
which individual behavior is in compliance. Sharply in contrast to conventional eco­
nomic analysis, the study is based on the assumption that the behavior of each 
owner is steered by altruism rooted in soeial norms. By introdueing altruistic prefer­
ences, the role played by soeial and institutional capital are acknowledged. We have 
also used the term 'restricted open access,' pertaining to the traditional notion of 
open access, except with the assumption of a limited number of agents. 
The analysis has been illustrated by using the Gordon-Schlifer model of a fish­
ery, and where the exploitation takes place through a one-shot game with an equilib­
rium concept of the Nash-type. The main results can be summarized as follows. 
More altruism leads to less harvesting effort, less economic overexploitation of the 
resource, and a higher rent. In the limiting case when all owners are completely al­
truistic, the exploitation of the common takes place as under overall optimality; i.e., 
as in a situation where the stock externalities are internalized. The present one-shot 
game model with altruistic behavior produces qualitatively the same results as the 
Nash equilibrium of an infinitely repeated game using trigger strategies and where 
individual utility is based strictly on self interests; i.e., own utility depends only on 
own profit (the so-called Folk-theorem, see Gibbons 1992). More importantly, we 
have demonstrated that when there are differences in harvesting efficiency among 
the exploiters, altruism combined with efficiency gaps restricts the possibility of ob­
taining an exploitation scherne where all owners participate in the harves ting activ­
ity. Altruism in combination with effieiency gaps adds a new channel for efficiency 
improvement as it reallocates effort from the less efficient to the more efficient har­
vesters. In the boundary solution where exploiters voluntarily withdraw from exploi­
tation due to altruistic preferences, our analysis also concludes that heterogeneity, 
, We have nOl been able lo show these resulls analytically. They are confirmed by numerical experi­
menls. 
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indeed, may stimulate collective action. This conc1usion challenges the conventional 
belief that group homogeneity is unambiguously positive for common property man­
agement, and it applies to the case of heterogeneity in technological skills. 
As long as the owners are not completely altruistic, the model presented in the 
paper joins conventional theory in concluding that economic inefficiencies are less 
severe when the group of owners is small. More importantly, however, the model in­
dicates that the presence of social and institutional capital may be more crucial for 
the weU functioning of common property regimes than the size of the group. In fact, 
it is shown that the adverse effects of large numbers may be partly or completely 
neutralized by social norms either through a coordinated internalization of stock ex­
ternalities or through a voluntary withdrawal from harvesting in the case of hetero­
geneity in efficiency and skills. 
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The Political Economy of Wildlife Exploitation 
Anders Skonhoft and Jan Tore Solstad 
ABSTRACf. In this paper we analyze the exploi­
tation ofwildlife in a Third World context. In the 
model there are two agents: an agency managing 
a habitat area offixed size and a group of peas­
ants. The agency managing the habitat area has 
the legal right to exploit the wildlife, while the 10­
cal people hunt illegally. Introducing the concept 
ofrelative harvesting dominance, we demonstrate 
that the stock utilization depends crucially on the 
prevailing economic and ecological conditions. It 
is also shown that the existing properry-rights re· 
gime appears in different forms depending on 
these conditions. (JEL Q26) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are three identified basic driving 
forces behind the threat of extinction of ani­
mal species. First of all, economic and bi0­
I<,>gical overexploitation has been empha­
slzed. The earliest analysis discussed open 
access harvesting (Gordon 1954). However, 
even when the harvesting is perfectly con­
trolled (exclusive ownership) by a long~tenn 
profit-maximizing resource owner, Clark 
(1973) showed that a high opportunity cost 
of the capital, a high price/cost ratio of the 
yield, and a low natural growth rate of the 
species could make extinction an optimal 
economic policy. See also the contribution 
by Spence (1975). As is weU known, Gor­
don, Clark, and Spence were analyzing ma­
rine resources. 
Secondly, disinvestment in the biological 
re~ources has been focused on. Typically, 
thls approach stresses the importance of 
competition for land, for example, conver­
sion of naturaI habitats to agricultural land 
(BroWn et al. 1993; Swanson 1994; Schulz 
and Skonhoft 1996). Thus, rather than being 
overexploited, species are undercut ac­
cording to this line of reasoning (Hanna and 
Munasinghe 1995). Analyses based on the 
disinvestment approach are usually formu­
lated in the context of terrestrial resources. 
Contrary to marine resources, terrestrial re­
sources are subject to competition for land­
based "niches"; that is lo say, their habitats 
may be converted to alternative uses. Thus, 
t~e opportunity cost of land is an important 
tactor determining the degree of exploitation 
of the speeies (Brown et al. 1993; Swanson 
1994; Skonhoft 1995). 
Thirdly. wc have the institutional dimen­
sion of resource management. This approach 
stresses the sped/kation and functioning of 
property rights as the bask faetor deterrnin­
ing to what extent biological resources can 
be exploited in a sustainable way. So, what 
matters is Ihe prcsence of . 'a well-specified 
property rights regime and a congruency of 
that regime with its ecological and social 
context" (Hanna and Munasinghe 1995, 4). 
This last view wil1 be the point of depar­
ture in the present study when analyzing fac­
tors affeeting the degree of exploitation of 
wildlife in a Third World perspective. When 
considering natural resources in the fonn of 
wildlife in developing countries, central is­
~ues are the behavior of the rural people Iiv­
mg close to the wildlife and the interaction 
between the rural people, the wildlife. and 
the agency managing and having the prop­
erty rights of the wildlife (Marks 1984; Kiss 
1990; Swanson and Barbier 1992; Kothari, 
Suri. and Singh 1995; Naughton-Treves and 
Sanderson 1995). Often, this interaction rep­
resents confticting interests; both the legal 
owner of the wildlife-the State or large pri­
vate landowners-and the rural people c1aim 
their rights to exploit and manage the wild­
life resources. As maintained by this type of 
"institutional approach," these confiicts, 
The authors are with, respectively. the Department 
of Economics and the Centre for Environment and De­
ve1opment, Norwegian University of Science and Tech­
nology, Dragvoll, Norway. This research was supported 
hy a grant from the Norwegian Research Council 
through the Biological Diversity Program. An earlier 
version of the paper was presented at the Annual Con­
ference of the European Association of Environmental 
and Resource Economists (EAERE) in Lisbon, lune 
1996. and benefited from discussions there. We are also 
grateful for comments from an anonymous referee. 
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rooted in the prevailing property structure 
and its functioning, have serious implications 
for the degree of resource exploitation and, 
thus, on the management of the wildlife in 
general. 
In what follows, property and property 
rights are therefore central issues. Bromley 
understands property as a benefit stream and 
a property right as "the capacity to call upon 
the collective to stand one's c1aim to a bene­
fit stream" (Bromley 1991, \5). Possession 
of inviolable property rights presupposes that 
the rights are authorized by law and that the 
law is effectively enforced by the state. Ef­
fective protection from the state is either at­
tributed to perfect physical or economical 
governmental protection, or to perfect ful­
filment of the duty on the part of all others 
not to interfere with the right holders' appro­
priation of the benefit stream (Bromley 
1991). Thus, a well-functioning property re­
gime is characterized by, firstly, legally well­
defined property rights and, secondly, effec­
tively protected property rights. 
The existence or nonexistence of these 
two factors defining the functioning of the 
property structure can be used to classify 
three different types of regimes. First of all, 
we have the situation where there is legally 
well-defined ownership and perfect state pro­
tection (exclusive rights, perfect law enforce­
ment). This setting is in accordanee with the 
above-mentioned Clark (1973) model. Sec­
ondly, we have the case where the ownership 
is legally well defined but not adequately en­
forced by the government. Under such a 
scheme, often due to lack of societal recogni­
tion of the property rights in place, the man­
agement is likely to be affected by confliet­
ing property rights claims. An important 
factor here is also obviously the peoples' re­
sponse to the formal legal system. In Africa, 
for instance, rural people often lack adequate 
knowledge of the legal system, and those 
who are familiar with it often disregard it 
(Martin 1992). Finally, we have the case 
where there is no legally defined ownership; 
that is, the open access regime (Gordon 
1954). 
The second type of these regimes will be 
the starting point in Dur modeling, but, as 
will be demonstrated, the two others can be 
considered as special cases of the general 
model. The focus will be on the conflicting 
interests between a private agency managing 
and owning both the wildlife and its habitat, 
and the loeal people living in the vicinity of 
the habitat. The habitat is of fixed size, and ' 
by law the local people are not allowed to 
hunt the wildlife or enter the park with their 
production activities. However, they harvest 
the wildlife population illegally inside the 
habitat area. Alternatively, or complementa­
rily, they hunt the wildlife when it roams out­
side the habitat area. In the bioeconomic 
model to be formulated, the main issue is 
therefore subsistence poaching and its influ­
ence on the degree of exploitation of the 
wildlife stoek when the legally defined 
owner also harvests. The present analysis ex­
tends those of Milner-Gulland and Leader­
Williams (1992) and Skonhoft and Solstad
(996).2 . 
In the model, there are therefore two 
agents, aresource owner and a group of local 
people. In Section Il we start by formulating 
the illegal harvesting function of the local 
people. Their harvesting strategy is based on 
short-tenn behavior because of the property 
rights scherne, and two basic motives behind 
the poaching are captured. In Section III the 
benefits of the resouree owner are outlined. 
The solution of the model is analyzed in Sec­
tion IV where an important underlying as­
sumption is that the resource owner, in con­
trast to the local people, has incentives to 
I Dur definition of a private owner also inc!udes 
state ownership if the govemmental agency managing 
the wildlife and its habitat area behaves just as a private 
agent, that is, maximizes profits from the wildlife and 
excludes others from utilizing the resources. 
l Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams analyze the 
interaction between law enforcement, the economic in­
centives to poach for a group of subsistence hunters, 
and the rate of hunting. The poachers are considered 
short-term utility maximizers and are the only agents in 
their model. The degree of law enforcement is therefore 
exogeneous. In what follows, the antipoaching activity 
is determined within the model. As in the present study_ 
Skonhoft and Solstad introduce aresource owner. How­
ever, the underlying motives behind the poaching activ­
ity are not analyzed explicitly in that study. Moreover, 
the Skonhoft and Solstad analysis deals basically with 
conservation issues. Consequently, in contrast to the 
present study. there is no harvesting by the resource 
owner. 
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invest in the stock of wildlife. In Section V 
we study special cases of the model. These 
are distinguished from the general model by 
introducing the concept of relative harvest­
ing dominance. 
n. THE POACHING ACTIVITY OF 
THE LOCAL PEOPLE 
As noted, we start by constructing a for­
mal model to explain how the local people 
harvest the wildlife stock under conditions 
where they have no legal rights to harvest but 
where enforcement of regulations is costly 
and imperfect. Throughout we will think of 
the local people as a homogeneous group of 
peasants living in the proximity of a wildlife 
habitat.3 They are involved in two different 
production activities: agricultural and illegal 
harvesting of the wildlife. All agricultural 
production takes place outside the wildlife 
habitat. There will be a constraint on the total 
effort used in these two activities; a trade-off 
between harvesting and agricultural produc­
tion is therefore present. In the model, as in 
reality, there are two basic motives behind 
poaching. First of all, there is hunting for 
meat or, occasionally, for trophy. Second, 
harvesting takes place to get rid of •'prob­
lem" animals that stray outside the wildlife 
habitat, destroying crops and agricultural 
products. This is the nuisance motive (Marks 
1984).4 
These two motives are included in equa­
tion [l] which gives the total benefits of the 
local people at a given point of time (the time 
index is omiued). The first term Grepresents 
the benefit due to agricultural production, 
while the term bf represents the harvesting 
benefit. The benefit functions are fixed 
through time. 
u = G(N, X; a) + hJ(L, X). [1] 
We assurne that G is an increasing func­
tion of effort used in agriculture N, but at a 
decreasing rate, so that aG/aN = GN > oand 
GNN < Oholds. The stock of wildlife is repre­
sented by X and gives the nuisance effect on 
the agricultural production. More wildlife 
means more damage and shifts the benefit 
and marginal benefit down, Gx < O and 
GNX < O. Conversely, a higher price a of the 
agricultural products shifts the function up, 
Ga > O and GNa > O. 
In the second term of equation [l],f repre­
sents the illegal offtake with b as the fixed 
marginal valuation of the offtake. f is an in­
creasing function of the harvesting effort L, 
but at a decreasing rate, fL > O, fu s; O. 
Moreover, for a given effort, a higher stock 
of the wildlife means a higher offtake, fx > 
O, and the marginal productivity of the har­
vesting effort increases with a higher stock, 
fLX> O. We will also obviously have thatf(O, 
X) = j(L, O) = O. It is seen that if fu = O, 
these assumptions are in line with the 
Schaefer harvesting function. 
Equation [2] gives the resource constraint 
ofthe local people. That is to say, the totallabor 
effort T, which also can be interpreted as the 
total human population living in the vicinity of 
the wildlife habitat, is the sum ofthe effort used 
in the two production activities. 
N+L=T. [2] 
J Il is therefore assumed thal there are no eonfiieling 
inlerests among them. Henee, prevalenee of individual 
eonformity lo group norms is assumed to be present. In 
line with tradilional reasoning, il is assumed lhal the 
elders are in charge of the group' s activities (Marks 
1984). 
4 These are lhe direet mOlives for lheir illegal aeliv­
ily. However, as already indieated, there are some more 
fundamental eauses of their disposition to aet illegally. 
Taking South-Sahelian Afriean eountries as an exam­
ple. today's conflicting interests have a long history. 
Earlier days' balaneed resouree management sehemes. 
often under highly informal loeal eommunily institu­
tions, have ehanged in a dramatie way. Nationalization 
and ptivatizalion of wildlife habitats have alienated the 
loeal people from the wildlife. Today, local people of­
ten tind only problems in having an abundant wildlife 
community in their neighborhood. Traditional harvesl­
ing has been subjeet lo severe restrietions, and anli­
poaehing laws have tumed the old praetiee of subsis­
tenee hunting into a erime. Moreover, people are often 
prevented from eliminating "problem" animals lo pro­
teet their erops and their livestock. This proeess has 
generally evolved without regard lo the soeial. eultural. 
and eeonomic eonsequences imposed on rural people. 
They have seldom received any compensation for their 
loss of aeeess to land and natura! resourees on whieh 
their subsistenee onee relied. All these factors have 
worked loward destroying the ineentives of the loeal 
people lo eare for the wildlife and obey wildlife laws 
(Marks 1984; Kiss 1990). 
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Equations [I] and [2] give a well-defined 
allocation problem. However, the allocation 
of effort between the two production activi­
ties will also be influenced by the fact that 
the harvesting is illegal according to the 
property rights scherne. The offtake of wild­
life will therefore also be affected by the 
leveI of antipoaching effort, E, put in force 
by the resource owner. This effect works, 
first of all, through the probability of being 
detected when hunting illegally and, sec­
ondly, through the imposed fine when de­
tected.5 The fine is supposed to be fixed, 
while the probability of being detected, 8, is 
given by equation [3]. 8 is assumed to be an 
increasing function of the level of amipoach­
ing effort (the level of law enforcement) and 
the time (effort) spent on the illegal activity 
so that 8E > Oand 8L > O. In addition, it will 
also be assumed that the marginal probability 
of being detected increases with the leve! of 
antipoaching effort; that is, 8LE > O. Finally, 
we obviously also have that 8(0, L) = O and 
8(E, O) = O must hold.6 
e = eCE, L). [3] 
If the fine is denoted by Q, the expected 
benefit at time t will be (l - e)U + ecu ­
Q). The allocation of labor between the two 
activities and, thus, the illegal harvesting 
function, can then be found. As already men­
tioned, it will be assumed that the behavior 
of the local people is based on short-run 
maximization of the expected benefit. A my­
opic behavior seems reasonable for them be­
cause they obtain no legal benefits from the 
wildlife. For them, it therefore makes sense 
to harvest as much as possible this year, be­
cause next year they may be effectively pre­
vented from harvesting due to more efficient 
law enforcement. Consequently, the lacal 
people have few, if any, incentives to base 
their harvesting aetivity on intertemporai 
considerations. In addition to the leve! of the 
antipoaching effort E, they therefore also 
take the stock of wildlife X as given when 
deciding their offtake. Assuming risk 
neutrality, the allocation of effort following 
from maximizing (l - e)U + ecu - Q) = 
G(N, X; a) + bf(L, X) - Q8(E, L) subject 
to constraint [2] is then given by equation [4] 
when agricultural production always takes 
place. 
GI/(N, X; a) 2 bjL(L. X) - QeL(E, L). [4] 
The optimal effort used on. harvesting is 
labeled L*. If L* > O, equation [4] holds as 
an equality and if L* = O, [4] holds as an 
inequality. So when L * > O, the harvesting 
effort will be a function of the stock size X 
and the antipoaching effort E, together with 
the parameters reflecting the economic envi­
ronment of the peasants, L* = L*(X, E; a, b, 
Q, n. Substituted into the harvesting func­
tion f(L, X), the reduced-form illegal har­
vesting function is therefore obtained as in 
equation [5]. 
OWhenL* = O 
(5]Il = f(L*(X. E; li. b. Q. Do X){ 
= h(X. E: (I. b. Q. n > Owhen L* > O. 
Figure I depicts the illegal harvesting 
function. Toere will be no harvesting up to a 
certain level Xa of the stock. This stock size 
reflects the maximum leve! of the stock that 
keeps the local people away from poaching 
for a given level of the antipoaching effort 
and the economic environment. Xa can be 
seen as a measure of the poaching pressure. 
When the stock is equal to or below this· 
level, it is therefore unprofitable for the loeal 
people to use labor effort on hunting, 50 
L * = O. On the other hand, a stock size 
above Xa means L* > Oand h > Oaccompa­
nied by hx > O. hx will be positive because 
a higher stock size will shift the marginal 
benefit curve of agricultural production GN 
downwards through the nuisance effect, 
while the marginal net benefit curve of har­
vesting (bfL - Qed will shift upwards for 
obvious reasons (for detaiIs, see Appendix 
~ In other words, while the poachers are assumed to 
be detected by the legal resource owner. they are pun­
ished by a govemmental authority. 
6 The present formulation builds, to some extent, on 
the fishery madel of Sutinen and Anderson (1985). 
However, contrary to our modet, Sutinen and Anderson 
assume that the amount of labor used in illegal harvest­
ing is affecting the leve\ of the fille if detected rather 
than the probabiliT)' of being derected. We feel that our 
formulation betler fits the present problem. 
20 
103 
h 
Land Economics February 1998 
hIX,E =O;a,b,a,T) 
h(X,E > O;a,b,a,Tl 
x 
FIGURE l 
THE REDUCED FORM ILLEGAL HARVESTING FUNCTION. THERE WILL BE No HARVESTING Up TO THE
 
STOCK LEVEL Ka FOR THE GIVEN EcONOMlC ENVIRONMENT WHEN E > O.
 
1). Thus, more effort will be allocated to the 
harvesting activity for a higher size of the 
wildlife stock. In addition, a higher stock size 
will by itself increase the harvesting activity. 
More antipoaching effort increases the 
possibility of being detected, so as E in­
creases aL will increase and shift the (bIL ­
Q8L) schedule downwards. Less labor will 
therefore be used on harvesting. Conse­
quently, the poaching function as depicted in 
Figure 1, shifts outwards when E increases 
so hE < O when X > Xo• li there is no anti­
poaching effort at all, the second term of the 
right-hand side of equation [4] vanishes. So 
for a given economic environment, Xowill be 
at its lowest level. As will become clear be­
low, a crucial question is how the slope of 
the reduced·form illegal harvesting function 
changes as the antipoaching effort changes. 
It can be demonstrated (see Appendix 1) that 
the sign of hXE in general will be arnbiguous 
when X > Xo. However, as argued, it seems 
reasonable to study two situations. First of 
all, we have the case when hXE as an approxi­
mation is equal to zero, and, secondly, when 
the effect is negative, but small in magnitude 
(see also Appendix 2). 
In addition to the stock size and the en­
forcement activity, the economic environ­
ment will also affect the reduced-form har­
vesting function. An increased fine induces a 
negative shift in the marginal expected bene­
fit of the harvesting activity and will there­
fore work in the direction of reducing the op­
timal illegal hunting effort. h will therefore 
shift outwards, so Xo increases and hQ < O 
for X > Xo. An increased valuation of the ag­
ricultural products will shift the curve GN up­
wards. Consequently, we will also have that 
ha < O. The effect of an increased marginal 
valuation of the offtake will be of the oppo­
site; hb > O holds therefore for X > Xo• Pi­
nally, we have the effect of an increased ef­
fort constraint which, as already noted, can 
be interpreted as an increased human popula­
tion pressure. The result will be more effort 
used in both production activities, so the re­
duced-form illegal harvesting function shifts 
upwards, hr > O. 
Summing up, we have demonstrated that 
below a "small" stock size, there will be no 
illegal harvesting and no poaching pressure 
because there is a positive alternative cost of 
poaching. The opportunity cost depends, in 
general, on the antipoaching effort and on the 
economic environment. Improved economic 
conditions relating to agricultural production 
will increase the opportunity cost and. hence, 
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reduce the poaching pressure, while an in­
creased marginal valuation of the wildlife 
and increasing population pressure (more to­
tal effort) will cause an opposite effect. 
Ill. THE BENEFITS OF THE LEGAL
 
RESOURCE OWNER
 
Having established the reduced-form 
poaching function of the local people, we are 
now ready to introduce the harvesting activ­
ity of the resource owner, that is, the agency 
having the legal rights to the benefits of the 
wildlife and its habitat. It will generally be 
assumed that the agency reaps the legal and 
economic benefits from the wildlife through 
two channeis, namely, through harvesting 
and through a non-consumptive use of the re­
source. On the other hand, the resource 
owner must control and secure his benefits 
by using antipoaching efforts. Equation [6] 
represents profit per unit of time. 
Tt = py + W(X) - qE. [6] 
The first tenn py is the harvesting profit. 
For simplicity, it is assumed that the stock 
does not affect the harvesting costs. It is also 
assumed that the costs are linear in the off­
take y. Analytically, these two assumptions 
come down to the same as assuming that 
there is costless harvesting, so p can be inter­
preted as the market price of the offtake. 
Moreover, also for simplicity, the market 
price is assumed to be fixed and independent 
of the offtake. The justification for these as­
sumptions can be that the resource owner is 
seiling hunting licenses of a fixed price. 
The second tenn gives the non-consump­
tive profit from the wildlife related to the 
stock size. W(X) can typically reflect benefits 
from wildlife tourism (traditional wildlife 
viewing and safari tourism). Generally, this 
non-consumptive value of the stock is 
assumed to be positive and coneave with 
W(O) = O, Wx > Oand Wxx ::::; O. This means 
that the present stock effect is quite parallei 
to the so-called "wealth effect" in models of 
optimal growth (Kurz 1968). 
As already noted, the resouree owner 
holds the legal rights to totally prevent the 
local people from harvesting the wildlife. 
However, he is offered no physical or eco­
nomic proteetion by the government and has 
to fund the enforcement effort himself (usu­
ally resulting in imperfeet and eostly law en­
foreement). The term qE represents this cost, 
where q is the fixed unit effort (say person­
nei) cost. 
Both the offtake y of the resource owner 
and the illegal offtake h of the loeal people 
are constrained by the population dynamics 
of the wildlife as given by equation [7]. As 
already indieated, we let one stoek of wildlife 
represent the whole game population and 
F(X) is the natural growth function related to 
the fixed size of the habitat. It is a humped 
curve increasing to a peak value for an inter­
mediate value of the stoek. In the following 
we will think of F(X) as a logistic funetion 
with F(O) = F(K) = O and F(X) > O in the 
domain (O, K), where K is the carrying ea­
pacity, so that Fxx < O. 
dXldt = F(X) - (y + h). [7] 
IV. THE DEGREE OF 
EXPLOITATION UNDER IMPERFECT 
PROTECTION 
Equations [5]-[7] are the basic equations 
of the model which we now are ready to ana­
Iyze. In contrast to the group of loeal people, 
the harvesting aetivity of the resource owner 
will be steered by long-term considerations 
because he has the legal right to exploit the 
wildlife. Under such a scherne, there is a stra­
tegic interdependency between the agents. 
The interdependeney is, however, of the 
asymmetric type because the loeal people 
have to adjust their aetivity to the enforce­
ment use of the resouree owner. In a first 
stage, the resource owner maximizes present­
value profit, taking into account the illegal 
harvesting funetion of the loeal people. In the 
next stage, the illegal hunting activity fol­
lows from the optimal ehoice of E and y. 
Technically, when the resource owner en­
forces an optimal antipoaching control, the 
solution is found by maximizing of equation 
[8], where 8 > O is the resource owner's rate 
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of discount, subject to the population dynam­ Equation [9] says that the resource owner 
ics [7] and equation [5].	 sh?uld use antipoaching efforts up to the 
pomt where the marginal cost of the anti­
poaching effort q is equal to the marginal 
PV = r[py + W(X) - qE]e-S'dt. [8] benefi~ of the. antipoaching effort -phE• 
EquatlOn [10] IS the present version of the 
Clark-Munro rule (Clark and Munro 1975),The current value Hamiltonian of the prob­
where hx reftects the marginal external stock lem is H = py + W(X) - qE + Il[F(X) ­
effect, that is, the marginal cost of increasingy - heX, E; a, b, Q, D] with y and E as the 
the stock due to the poaching activity.control variables, Xas the state variable, and 
Wx(X)lp is the marginal non-consumptive Il as the shadow price of the wildlife. When 
value of the wildlife evaluated at the market an interior solution is assumed to be present, 
price of the legal offtake. The left-hand side the first-order conditions will be dH/dy = O, 
of [10] is therefore the resource owner's mar­dH/dE = Oand dll/dt = 811 - dH/dX. This ginal benefit of increasing the stock while the yields p - Il = O, -q - Ilh E = O and dill 
right-hand side is the marginal cost of doingdl ~ 811 - Wx - IlFx + Ilhx, respectively. 
An mterior solution implies a strictly positive so. 
Generally, equations [9] and [10] deter­stock size together with a strictly positive le­
mine simultaneously the equilibrium stock gal offtake and effort use at the steady-state. 
X* and the antipoaching E* (superscript * A positive antipoaching activity also implies denotes the general case, that is, where there a positive illegal offtake. lf not, the anti­ is an interior solution). The equilibrium ille­poaching activity would have been wasted gal offtake follows then as h* = h(X*, E*; effort. Equations [9] and [10] give the re­
a, b, Q, D. In the next stage, when dXldt == duced-fonn long-tenn equilibrium. O, equation [7] determines the equilibrium 
offtake of the resource owner, y * = F(X)q = -phE(X, E; a, b, Q, n [9] 
-h*. Figure 2 depicts the solution. We can 
Fx(X) + Wx(X)lp = O+ hx(X. E; a, b, Q, n. see that the stock will be more heavily ex­
[10] ploited as compared to a situation with le-
F 
h 
hIX,E';a,b,O,T) 
K x 
FlGURE 2
 
THE LaNG-TERM EQUILlBRIUM SOLUTION WHEN THERE Is AN INTERIOR SOLUTION
 
(THE GENERAL CASE).
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gally defined ownership and perfect state 
protection (i.e., the Clark 1973 mode\) be­
cause of the presence of the stock externality 
hx > Oin equation [10]. This implies that the 
resource conftict itself depresses the stock 
size. Moreover, the optimal stock will be 10­
cated to the left of the biomass representing 
the maximum sustainable yield (X"In) if hx, 
together with o, dominates W/p. Conse­
quently, when the illegal harvesting function 
is quite responsive to an increased stock size 
so that the marginal stock externality is 
strong and the marginal benefit ratio of the 
resource owner is low, the stock will be well 
below what corresponds to XIII,". In what fol­
lows, this "threat-of-extinction case" is gen­
erally assumed to be present. 
Raving seen the basic mechanism de­
termining the long-run equilibrium when 
there are strictly positive offtake rates and 
enforcement use, we now proceed to study 
how permanent changes in the economic en­
vironment inftuence the degree of stock ex­
ploitation. In what follows, it will be useful 
to distinguish between two cases. First of all, 
we have the case where the cross effect in the 
poaching function is weak and negligible so 
that h XE = O when h > O (see Section Il and 
Appendix l). The steady-state conditions [9] 
and [10] are then two independent equations 
where [9] determines E * and [10] determines 
X*. As a consequence, B and the marginal 
stock-value Wx have no inftuence on the opti­
mal antipoaching effort, while q has no effect 
on the stock size. Secondly, we have the case 
where hXE is negative. Equations [9] and [10] 
then simultaneously determine the stock size 
and the enforcernent use. 
When hXE = O as an approximation holds, 
it can be shown that a permanently higher 
market price of the offtake will result in a 
sma1ler long-run stock, ax*/ap < O(see Ap­
pendix 2). The effect is therefore just as in 
the traditional Clark (1973) model, but in the 
present setup it works through lowering the 
marginal benefits of the non-consumptive 
value of the wildlife. Moreover, an increased 
p will increase the antipoaching effort, aE*/ 
ap > O. This result follows intuitive reason­
ing as it lowers the price ratio q/p. As a con­
sequence, the reduced-form illegal harvest­
ing function will shift to the right meaning 
that the offtake of the resource owner will in­
crease, ay*/ap > O, while the illegal offtake 
will decrease, ah*/ap < O. The effect of a 
permanent shift in the non-consumptive 
stock value Wx, say, as a result of an increase 
in the demand for tourism services, will have 
an opposite stock effect to that of p. In addi­
tion, because the optimal antipoaching effort 
is unaffected, there wiII also be a redistribu­
tion of the offtake in favor of the local 
people. 
As already noted, ax*/aq = O will hold 
when hXE == O. Rowever, in line with intuitive 
reasoning, the optimal antipoaching effort 
will decrease, aE*/aq < O. As a conse­
quence, the reduced-form illegal harvesting 
function will shift inward so that ah*/aq > 
O, while the offtake of the resource owner 
will decrease by the same amount ay */'dq = 
-ah*/aq. The above stock effect is quite in­
teresting in that it constrasts with intuitive 
reasoning. In view of this effect, govemmen­
tal intervention designed to both secure the 
resource owner's property and safeguard a 
threatened wildlife stock by reducing q 
through a subsidy will not increase the long­
term wildlife stock. There will only be a re­
distribution of the offtake between the re­
source owner and the local people. Notice 
also that the result ax*/aq = O a1so implies 
that the wildlife population will stay at the 
same size whether or not the resource owner 
uses antipoaching efforts, suggesting that y* 
> O still holds. 
A permanent increase in the rate of dis­
counting by the resource owner (perhaps as 
a result of a more myopic view of the future) 
will reduce the relative difference of dis­
counting between the local people and the re­
source owner and will decrease the equilib­
rium stock, ax*/ao < O. Because the 
antipoaching effort will be unaffected by this 
change, aE*/aB = O, the poaching function 
will not change; the result will also be ah*/ 
ao < O. Again, referring to Appendix 2, the 
opposite will happen for the long-term legal 
offtake, ay */øB > O. Because this result 
holds also when X* is located to the lefi of 
X""" the effect generally contrasts with the 
Clark (1973) model. 
Changes in the economic environment un­
derlying the illegal harvesting activity will 
•
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TABLE 1 
COMPARATlVE STATICS OF THE STEADy-STATE WHEN THERE IS AN 
INTERIOR SOLUTlON (THE GENERAL CASE) (No BRACKETS, hXE = O; 
IN BRACKETS, hXE < O WHEN THE RESULTS DIFFER) 
p q a Q T b li 'Y 
X" - 0(-) + + +
 
E* + 0(+) 0(+) 0(-) 0(-) 0(-) 0(+)
 
y" + - (?) ? ? ? ? + (?) - (?)
 
h* + (?) ? ? ? ? - (?) + (?)
 
(h * + y*) - 0(-) + + +
 
No/es: The effects on the total harvest (h· + y.) are calculated when the slock is below 
that of the X~. y is a shift-factor representing the marginal stock value. Wx. 
also infiuence the stock size and the harvest­
ing activity. Appendix l shows that penna­
nent improvement in the profitabil ity of ag­
ricultural production wil1 not infiuence the 
effect of enforcement efforts on the poaching 
activity so hu = O. Under this assumption, it 
should be clear that aE*/aa = O when hXE = 
O. The same happens when b, Q, and T shift. 
Consequently, the reduced-fonn illegal har­
vesting function shifts only as a result of di­
rect effects, that is to say, changes in the pa­
rameters, a, b, Q, and T, and not through 
changes in E. 
Appendix l also indicates that the effects 
of these parameters on hx will be different 
from zero. More specifically, the slope of the 
poaching function shifts downward when the 
marginal valuation of the agricultural prod­
ucts increases; that is, hXa < O when there is 
a positive offtake. The same happens when 
the imposed fine of detection Q increases, 
while the effect of an increased marginal val­
uation of the offtake b and an increased hu­
man population pressure T (increased total 
effort) will be the opposite. As a conse­
quence, a permanent increase in profitability 
of agricultural production (triggered by per­
haps a subsidy on agricultural products or 
through less protectionism in agricultural 
trade, shifting the producer prices of agricul­
tural products up) will work in the direction 
of reducing the exploitation pressure on the 
wildlife stock, ax*/aa > O. This result is in 
line with the reasoning of Brown et al. 
(1993), but opposite to that of Schulz and 
Skonhoft (1996). The mechanism here is 
quite different from the Schulz-Skonhoft 
model because the possibility of land-use 
conversion and reduced habitat size is as­
sumed away. We obtain also a positive effect 
on the stock as a result of a changing fine so 
ax*/aQ > O, while the effects of an in­
creased population pressure and marginal 
valuation of the offtake by the laeal people 
will be of the opposite sign so aX*/aT < O 
and aX*/ab < O, respectively. The effects on 
the offtake rates of these changes will in gen­
eral be unclear (again, see Appendix 2). The 
results are summarized in Table 1. 
Table l also summarizes the results for the 
case when hXE < O holds. As already noted, 
equations [9] and [10] simultaneously deter­
mine X* and E* when this cross effect is 
present so there will be some differences 
compared to the above results (for details, 
see Appendix 2). Most notable is that higher 
unit enforcement costs will tend to reduce 
the equilibrium stock size, ax*/aq < O. 
Under the present assumption, the effect of 
reduced antipoaching activity therefore spills 
over to the stock size. Moreover, changes 
in the economic environment affecting the 
production activities of the 10cal people will 
now infiuence the optimal use of antipoach­
ing efforts. 
V. RELATIVE DOMINANCE: 
PERFECT PROTECTION AND OPEN 
ACCESS 
We now look at special cases where the 
economic and ecological environment is 
such that there is no longer any ful1y interior 
solution of the model. When harvesting takes 
place by only one of the agents, the concept 
of relative harvesting dominance becomes 
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THE SOLUTIONS WHEN THERE Is A RELATIVE HARVESTING DOMJNANCE OF THE LOCAL PEOPLE.
 
SUPERSCRIPT J WHEN THERE Is A POSITIVE ANTIPOACHING EFFORT. SUPERSCRIPT 00 WHEN THERE Is
 
No ANTIPOACHING EFFORT ("OPEN Ar-CESS").
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crucial. Moreover, it will be shown that both 
the regime of open access and that of exc1u­
sive rights and perfect protection (the Clark 
1973 model) can be identified under the sub­
sequent scenarios of relative harvesting dom­
inance. That is to say. the functioning of the 
property rights regime shifts according to 
varying economic and ecological conditions. 
Illegal Dominance and Open Access 
We start by considering the case where il­
legal hunting by the local people dominates 
completely so there is no legal offtake. When 
y = O holds at the steady-state, but there is 
antipoaching activity so that E > O. equation 
[IOJ changes to [1O'J as the Clark-Munro 
necessary condition for maximum, while 
equation [9] still holds.7 
Fx(X) + Wx(X)/p > 1) 
+ hx(X, E; a, b, Q, T). [10'] 
The present situation of a dominant 
poaching pressure is illustrated in Figure 3 
with Xl as the equilibrium stock, E1 as the 
antipoaching activity, h I as the illegal offtake 
and y I = O as the legal offtake (superscript l 
h(X,E =O;a,b,O,Tl 
K x 
denotes the presence of illegal dominance). 
This scenario will take place if there is a high 
poaching pressure. A high poaching pressure 
is prevalent when the opportunity cost of 
poaching is low, that is, the poaching activity 
starts to become positive for a small stock 
size. Moreover, equation [l O'J shows that 
this effect occurs if the marginal non­
consumptive/consumptive benefit ratio Wxlp 
of the resource owner is high. A small mag­
nitude of the stock externality hx works in the 
same direction, that is, when the illegal off­
take function is quite irresponsive to an in­
creased stock size. While this contrasts with 
intuitive reasoning, it will occur because, for 
the resource owner. a small stock extemality 
with respect to the poaching activity makes 
consurnptive use of the wildlife less profit­
able compared to non-consumptive use. 
Therefore, the present notion of harvest­
ing dominance of the local people is a rela­
tive concept because of the effect of Wxlp. 
This will also be so for the rate of discount 
'The necessary conditions for maximum will now 
be aH/a.,· = fl - I.l < oand aH/aE = -q - I-I.he = O. 
logelher with dl.lldl = 1.1(0 - Fx + 11,)- Wx. Combin­
ing yields 110'1 al the steady-state. 
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() of the resource owner. Consequently, a 
higher marginal benefit ratio Wx/p and a 
lower Owork in the direction of yl = Oas an 
optimal solution. Moreover, Figure 3 demon­
stratesthat (Fx - hx) < O will hold at the 
present steady-state. In view of equation 
[lO'], (Wx/p - O) > O must therefore hold 
when there is no offtake by the resource 
owner. Consequently, the price of the offtake 
cannot be "too high" and the marginal non­
consumptive benefit cannot be "too low" to 
obtain the solution depicted in Figure 3. 
So when the poaching is dominant and the 
harvesting activity of the resource owner is 
no longer economically viable, the stock size 
is determined only by the poaching activity 
of the laeal people together with the resource 
owner's incentives to use enforcement to 
protect the non-consumptive exploitation of 
the resource. In contrast to what was shown 
in Section IV, a govemmental intervention to 
secure the resource owner's property by 
granting a subsidy on the antipoaching effort, 
will now work unambiguously in the direc­
tion of safeguarding the wildlife stock. It 
should also be clear that a marginal shift in 
the willingness to pay for hunting licenses or 
in policies attempting to reduce the market 
price of the legal offtake to safeguard the 
wildlife will no longer have any stock ef­
fects. However, as above, improving the eco· 
nomic conditions in the agriculture sector 
will shift the poaching function to the right 
and will therefore tend to increase the long­
run stock size. 
Under this scenario of relative harvesting 
dominance of the local people, the economic 
environment can also be such that the re­
source owner will get no benefit from using 
antipoaching efforts. When E =Oin the long 
term, equation [9] must hold as an inequality 
at the steady state, q > - Jlh E, while equation 
[LO'] now holds with E = O as in [lO"]. 
Fx(X) + Wx(X)lp > O 
+ hx(X, E = O; a, b, Q, n. (IQ") 
Therefore, this special case of relative har­
vesting dominance of lhe local people can 
occur if the (market) cost to (shadow) price 
ratio q/Jl is relatively high and the illegal off­
take at the same time responds only slightly 
to the antipoaching effort so that hE is small 
in magnitude. This solution is also depicted 
in Figure 3 with x~ as the "open access" 
equilibrium stock and h~ as the illegal off· 
take. The solution of the model now coin­
cides with the "open access" case of the 
Skonhoft and Solstad (1996) model.8 For the 
present situation when there is no antipoach­
ing activity, the mode! implies that the strate­
gic interdependency between the two agents 
has changed. In a first stage, the equilibrium 
stock of wildlife is therefore determined by 
the local people through their unrestricted 
harvesting. In a subsequent stage, the re­
source owner passively adapts to that equilib­
rium stock. 
So even though the present management 
regime meets the condition of the legally de­
fined property rights, the regime functions as 
if it were absent because of the economic and 
ecological environment. In this case, the ex­
ploitation pressure of the wildlife is therefore 
totally determined by the myopic view of the 
local people, and as notoo, the local people 
have a myopic view because they have no le­
gal rights to wildlife resources. Under these 
conditions, the legally defined property rights 
therefore work to motivate short-term har­
vesting behavior by those who are actually 
steering the degree of resource utilization. 
Consequently, if a wildlife population is 
threatened under such a situation, policies 
should be directed toward the illegal harvest­
ing incentives of the local people. The most 
straightforward policy recornmendations are 
to improve the profitability conditions in the 
agricultural sector and to increase the penalty 
of poaching, that is, increase the fine. The 
former approach works as a conftict-reducing 
policy by redistributing income in favor of 
the local people, while the latter approach in­
tensifies the confiicts. A more dramatic pol­
8 The tenn "open access" as used here, is not re­
flecting the traditional use of the tenn-free entrance 
of an infinite number of harvesters. Rather. it is meant 
to reflect the unrestricted access of afixed arw homoge­
neous group of harvesters which base their degree of 
exploitation completely on short-tenn considerations. 
The essence of the tenn "open access" used here is in 
line with the definition of Bromley (1991) and is related 
to the absence or breakdown of a management system. 
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iey option would be to give the loeal people 
user or property rights to the wildlife, thereby 
motivating them to eonsider long-tenn in­
vestment in the resouree. This argument is 
eonsistent with that of Bromley (1991) and 
stresses the use of property rights as a poliey 
instrument in resouree management. For a 
more detailed anaJysis of user and property 
rights as poliey options in wildlife manage­
ment, see Skonhoft and Solstad (1996). 
Legal Dominance and Peifect Protection 
We now turn to the ease where the legal 
owner of the wildlife resourees dominates 
the harvesting and there is no illegal offtake 
by the loeal people. When y > Oand Iz = 0, 
there will be no antipoaehing aetivity so E = 
O will hold as well. Under this ease, the 
Clark-Munro neeessary eondition reduees to 
[10"'] . 
Fx(X) + WAX)/p = b. [10"'] 
The solution is depieted in Figure 4 with 
XII as the equilibrium stoek and )'/1 the legal 
offtake. This speeial ease of harvesting domi­
nanee by the legal resouree owner oeeurs if 
there is a low marginal non-eonsumptive to 
X" K x 
FIGURE4 
THE SOLUTION WHEN THERE lS RELATIVE HARVESTING DOMINANCE OF THE LEGAL RESOURCE 
OWNER. 
hIX,E =O;a,b,Q,T) 
eonsumptive benefit ratio Wx/p and a high 
rate of discount. Moreover, it takes plaee if 
there is a low poaehing pressure due to a high 
opportunity eost of poaehing. The nation of 
harvesting dominanee is therefore still a rela­
tive coneept. The solution is obviously in line 
with the traditional Clark (1973) model of 
exc!usive rights and perfect law enforcement. 
So if the wildlife is threatened, the traditional 
Clark forces leading toward extinction are 
operating (see Section I). 
In this scenario there is no apen eonfronta­
tion between the two agents and apparent/y 
no confliet. However, the interest c!aims of 
the local people are still present. but no 
longer transfonn into illegal activity because 
of the relatively heavy exploitation pressure 
of the legal resource owner. Since in the ab­
sence of the legal resource owner, the loeal 
people would have harvested (see Figure 4), 
the exploitation of the resource owner consti­
tutes foregone benefits of the local people. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we have, from a theoretical 
point of view, studied the conflicting inter­
ests of an ageney managing and owning 
wildlife resourees and the loeal people living 
•
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close to the wildlife. The wildlife habitat is 
assumed to be of fixed size, and the agricul­
tural produetion of the loeal people is as­
sumed to take plaee outside the habitat area. 
We have analyzed how the conflicting inter­
ests translate into illegal hunting. The prop­
erty-rights regime in our study has been of 
the type where the ownership of the re­
sourees is legally well defined but not well 
proteeted by the state. The resouree owner 
obtains legal and economie benefits from the 
wildlife through harvesting and non-eon­
sumptive profit, but must fund his own pro­
teetion of those legal rights; the loeal people 
obtain no legal benefits. The illegal offtake 
of the loeal people is based on short-term 
eonsiderations, while the resouree owner has 
ineentive to invest in the stoek. 
The eonsequenees for the utilization of the 
wildlife and harvesting are studied in three 
steps. First, we analyze the general ease 
where the eeonomie and eeologieal eondi­
tions are sueh that both agents harvest and 
the resource owner imposes an optimal anti­
poaching aetivity. Under sueh a scenario, it 
is shown that the stock will be more heavily 
exploited than in a situation where there is 
well-defined legal ownership and perfect 
state protection. This will hold either the 
property rights are in the hands of the legal 
resource owner or the local people. The ef­
fects of pennanent changes in the eeonomic 
environment are shown to be much the same 
as in the traditional Clark (1973) model. 
However, other factors infiuencing the de­
gree of illegal harvesting are working. Thus, 
among others, an inereased profitability in 
the agricultural sector (triggered by a subsidy 
or as as a result of less protection in agricul­
tural trade shifting the producer priee of 
agricultural products up) tends to reduce ex­
ploitation pressure and increase the steady­
state stoek size. A govemmental intervention 
to reduce the cost of the antipoaching effort 
will not automatically increase the long-term 
wildlife population. 
We then analyze twa speeial cases of the 
model where the concept of relative harvest­
ing dominanee is introduced. We first study 
the ease where the economic environment is 
sueh that the harvesting of the resouree 
owner is no longer economieally viable. Un­
der sueh a scenario, the stock size is basieally 
delermined by the poaching aClivity of the 
local people. The wildlife populalion will 
therefore be delcrl11incd li,\' it" the property 
rights seheme was of lhe open-aceess type. 
Thus, only hlelors direclly affeeting the liv­
ing conditions of Ihe local people will influ­
ence the wildlife slock. So if the wildlife 
population is threalencd under sueh a situa­
tion, policies sholild bc dirceled lowards the 
illegal harvesling inccnlives of the loeal peo­
ple. The most slraighlforward policy recom­
mendation is lo imposc lhe conflicl-redueing 
policy of improving Ihe proliwhilily condi­
tions in the agricllltliral seclor. A more dra­
matic policy option woulu hc lo give the 10­
cal people liser or properly righls lo the 
wildlife, therehy ntolivaling Ihem lo consider 
long-tenn inveslment in the resourcc. 
Finally, we SlllUY lhe case where Ihe har­
vesting activilY or lhc legili owner of the 
wildlife dominalCs lhe solulion so Ihere is no 
illegal offLake. This will take plaee il' Ihe le­
gal resource owner faccs a low murginal non­
eonsumplive lo col1sumplive benelil nllio of 
the wildlife, while al Ihe same lime the 
poaehing pressure is low due to a high oppor­
tunity eost. This case is shown to lit an insti­
tutional arrangemenl liS if exciusive rights 
and perfecl law cnrorcemenl were present. 
So, under this scenario, there are apparently 
no eonflicting inleresl elaims hecause lhe 10­
eal people do nol inlerfere wijh the manage­
menl of the resource. The solulion Ihen eoin­
cides with Ihe Clark (1973) Illodel and the 
traditional Clark forces delermine lhe size of 
the wildlife stock. SA also when there is a rel­
ative harvesling dominancc of Ihe legal re­
source owner, lhe actual properly rights 
relation differs because of the prevailing eeo­
nomic. soeia!. and ecological comJilions. 
APPENDIX I 
In this appendix we I'llrmally derive the basic 
properties of the reduced-J{Jrm illegal hunting 
function discussed in Section \I when effort is al­
located lo the harvesling activity. Maximization 
of total benefits yields equation [4], leading to an 
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THE ALLOCATION OF LABOR BETWEEN THE Two PRODUCTlON ACTIVITIES OF THE LOCAL PEOPLE.
 
THE SCHEDULE GNSHIFTS Up WHEN X DECREASES WHILE (bfL - Q8L) SHIFTS DOWN WHEN X
 
DECREASES. AT STOCK SIZES X :S Xo No LABOR WILL BE ALLOCATED
 
TO THE HARVESTING ACTlVITY.
 
[iii] source owner in Section III (see Appendix 2), 
optimal effon used on harvesting L* = L*(X. E; 
a, b, Q, n > Owhen an interior solution is pres­
ent. Figure 5 iIIustrates the solution. 
The propenies of L* can be derived by taking 
the total differential of [4] which yields (when 
only considering the effects of X and E) 
dL" =	 [(bfIX - GNx)/( -GNN - bfu + Q8u )]dX 
- [QaLEI(-GNN - bfll + QaLLlldE, [i] 
where ( - GNN - bfu + Qa LL) > O because of the 
second-order condition leading to equation [4]. So 
if au is negative, there must be a restriction in 
magnitude. L; = JL*/JX = [(bfLX - G",x)/(-GNN 
- bfu + Qau )] is therefore positive. while 
L'[ = -[QaLEI(-GNN - bfu + Qau )] < O. The 
differential of the reduced-fonn harvesting func­
tion h = f(L *(X. E; a, b, Q, n. X) > O from 
equation [5] is then 
[ii] 
and 
fLL :S O, fn > O and fL > O (see the main text). 
while the sign of LiE is unknown (as seen from 
[i], it will include third-order differentials of the 
benefit streams). The sign of [iv] is therefore in 
principle unknown. However, if LtE ,., O and a 
Schaefer harvesting function is present so that 
fLL = O. we obtain hXE < O. On the other hand, if 
Ltf = O, butfu < O, the sign of hXE is unclear. 
In the comparative statics discussed in Section 
IV, we take hXE = O as the staning point. How­
ever, we also discuss the case where it is negative, 
that is. the presence of a Schaefer harvesting 
function together with the assumption that a tenn 
including third-order differentials yanishes. 
Moreoyer. we obtain the second-order anti­
poaching effort effect as 
[y] 
The sign of hu is therefore also unclear. When 
assuming a Schaefer harvesting function. the sign 
of hEE rests only on LtE' From the second-order 
conditions of the optimization problem of the re­
Writing [iii] explicitly as a function of its basic 
arguments. hE = fL(U'(X, E; a, b, Q. T), X)L'l 
(X, E; a, b, Q, n, and differentiating with respect 
to X, we obtain the cross effect 
[iv] 
hEE 2: O must hold; that is, to fulfill this second­
order condition, the optimal effort used in the har­
vesting activity must be convex in the antipoach­
ing effort. 
The cross effects of hx and hE with respect to 
the economic parameters underlying the behavior 
of the local people are also of interest. Differenti­
•
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ating [ii] with respect to the price of the agricul­
tural products a, yields 
[vi] 
The sign of [vi] is also unc!ear. but when a 
Schaefer harvesting function is present and Lta = 
O, we obtain hXa = fxLL:. Differentiation of equa­
tion [4] easily reveals that L: < Owhen L * > O, 
hence hXa < O. In the main text, this is supposed 
to hold. Arguing along the same lines, we will 
also have that hXb > O, H XQ < Oand hxr > O. 
Finally, differentiating [iii] gives 
[vii] 
So when again assuming the presence of a 
Schaefer harvesting function and assuming that 
the term Lt, as an approximation vanishes (as 
above, this term also inc!udes third-order differ­
entials), we obtain he" = O. This is assumed to 
hold in the main text. Arguing along the same 
lines, we will also have that hEb = hEQ = hET = 
O. 
APPENDIX 2 
In this appendix, we formally derive the prop­
erties of the optimization problem of the legal re­
source owner in section IV, that is, the general 
case when there is an interior solution. The com­
parative statics are also examined. 
The second-order conditions require that the 
Hamiltonian should be concave in the state vari­
able X and the controls E and y. Concavity in the 
Hamiltonian means that the Hessematrix should 
be negative semidefinite in optimum. It can be 
shown that this implies p(Fxx - !t xx ) + Wxx :5 O 
and -phEdp(Fxx - hxx ) + Wxx] - (ph XE )2 ~ O. 
hu ~ O must therefore hold as weU. It is also 
shown that there must be a restriction on the mag­
nitude of phXE' 
The effect of an increased marginal valuation 
of the non-consumptive value of the stock, Wx, is 
introduced by adding a shift-factor y > Oto equa­
tion [10] as shown in [i]. The effect of increased 
marginal stock valuation is thus represented by 
aX/iJ'y. 
Fx(X) + Wx(X)/p + "{/p 
= il + hx(X, E; a, b, Q, T). [i] 
The comparative statics results can then be 
found by taking the total differential of equations 
[i] and [9]. [ii] gives the results. 
ph EX 
[ Ph
U ] [dX]
p(Fxx - hxx ) + Wxx -phXE dE 
-hE ] [-I]
=	 [ (o - F + hx) dp + O dq
x 
-Phe,,] [-Ph~]+ da + db[ phxa phXb 
-PhEQ] [-PhET]+ dQ + dT[ phxQ phrr 
[ii] 
The determinant of the matrix on the left-hand 
side of [ii], D = {-phEdp(Fxx - hxx ) + Wxx] 
- (phxdJ, will be positive in optimum because 
of the second-order conditions for maximum, 
D > O. The system [ii] gives all the partial-deriva­
tives effects as shown in Table I. 
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The paper analyses economic and ecological mechanisms determining 
wildlife inveshnents in the context ofpastoral exploitation of the semi-arid 
African rangeland. We consider a group of pastoralists practising twa 
production activities, cattle herding and wildlife harvesting. Livestock and 
wildlife interact with each other as there is competition for grazing land. 
A bioeconomic model is formulated to analyse this interaction and the 
pastoralist's optimal degree of investments in livestock and wildlife. The 
factors working in the direction of threatening the wildlife are identijied. 
Next, the management problem is analysed in a conservation perspective 
where CITES-policies are imposed, and where there is international 
payment for conservation ofendangered species. 
1. Introduetion 
African wildlife is today threatened from a variety of sources. This 
threat is particularly severe in regions with dense and fast growing 
human populations, where expanding settlements, crops and livestock 
are displacing wildlife at an ever increasing rate. In the last decades, 
the observed decline in wildlife abundance has called for action to 
protect wildlife. Nationalisation and privatisation of local wildlife 
resources have become common, and traditional hunting practices 
have been subject to various regulations. To a large extent, wildlife has 
Corresponding author (e-mail: anders.skonhoft@sv.ntnu.no). Thanks to the 
Norwegian Research Council which supported this research through the 
Biological Diversity Programme. Thanks aIso to two anonymous referees for 
helpful comments and suggestions. 
© Centre for the Study of African Economies, 1998 
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been appropriated by the state through the establishment of national 
parks and protected areas (Marks, 1984). 
The above is a broad description of today/s situation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and reflects a land-use and wildlife management policy based 
on protection rather than on utilisation (for further details see 
Skonhoft, 1997). For local human populations formerly relying on 
natural resources for subsistence, this policy has often implied the 
criminalisation of their traditional rights to harvest as well as loss of 
land for cultivation and pasture. Prevented from utilising the wildlife 
as well as eliminating 'problem' animals to protect their crops and 
livestock, the Iocal people often bears the costs of conservation without 
obtaining any benefits from it. A rather negative attitude towards 
wildlife conservation has therefore emerged, and resentment of legal 
regulations is frequent (Marks, 1984; Swanson and Barbier, 1992; Wells, 
1992).2 Combined with limited capability of the governments to 
finance their large protected areas and enforce wildlife laws, the 
expediency of the present conservation policy is therefore seriously 
questioned (Marks, 1984; Kiss, 1990; Swanson and Barbier, 1992; 
Martin/1993).3 
When considering the problem of wildlife conservation in wildlife 
areas not already under protection, the importance of analysing 
alternative conservation policies therefore emerges. Land areas not 
under crops or permanent human settlement and not protected 
constitute about 85% of the African continent (Martin, 1993). These 
areas of arid and semi-arid land are habitats for a great variety of 
wildlife and plant species, but here the humans also constitute an 
increasing threat to the wildlife. Land tenure is mostly communal. 
Access to land is therefore generally determined by presence and 
traditional rights, and the rural people are constantly bringing their 
production activities, basically domestic livestock, deeper and deeper 
2 African rural people also lack knowledge of the legal system, and those familiar 
with it often disregard it (Martin, 1993). 
3 Martin (1993/ p. 6) writes that /Africa may have already made the mistake of 
accepting a conservation legacy bequeathed to it by its former colonial 
governments: it has too many and too large a system of protected areas to be able 
to meet their minimum levels of operating costs ... In the case of African 
conservation areas, more and bigger is not necessarily better: less and fewer 
would result in better conservation by the state./ 
• 
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into these wildlife habitats (Martin, 1993). The productivity of 
livestock production here is generally low, but the process of rapid 
human population growth gives rise to shortages of high-productive 
land and thereby forces humans to bring their specialised production 
activities into ever more marginal areas (Eltringham, 1987).4 For 
Sub-Saharan African wildlife, the process of land-use conversion is 
devastating. First, it directly degrades wildlife in these areas without 
any status of protection. Secondly, it threatens wildlife even in the 
protected areas because buffer stocks degrade. 
In these vast areas of low-productivity arid and semi-arid communal 
land, it is argued that wildlife has a significant potential as an 
alternative, or complementary, land-use option to domesticated 
species. If this potential is realised, it is believed that wildlife 
utilisation could be a viable land-use option, thus creating incentives 
for humans to invest in wildlife and thus reversing the trend of 
land-use conversion and species dec1ine (Eltringham, 1987; Kiss, 1990; 
Holdgate, 1992; Swanson and Barbier, 1992; Brown et al., 1993; Martin, 
1993; Swanson, 1993, 1994; Barnes, 1996). This will be the perspective 
in the subsequent analysis of wildlife utilisation and conservation. The 
focus will be on the rural population's incentives to invest in wildlife 
compared with domestic livestock, and in particular, we will study 
factors affecting the choice of wildlife and cattle stocks made by a 
group of pastoralists having sole access to a fixed area of arid and 
semi-arid rangeland.s The land is supposed to be communal and there 
are no formal regulations of the pastoral activities. However, there will 
be informal structures present, regulating individual grazing and 
harvesting rights within the group of pastoralists. Hence, we are 
4 The extent and speed of this process of land-use conversion is well illustrated by 
the fact that between 1960 and 1980 the proportion of land areas dedicated to. 
specialised species in developing countries altogether increased by 37.5% (Brown 
et al., 1993). 
5 Pastoralism is widespread, and the pastoral economy is still dominant in large 
parts of Sub-Saharan Africa (Prins, 1992). About 25% of the region's human 
population relies on domestic livestock for their primary dietary and exchange 
needs (Smith, 1992). Moreover, pastoralism has its greatest economic significance 
for those living in the least developed areas of the region. In these areas livestock 
holding is the main production activity, and because the land is basically of the 
arid and semi-arid type, pastoralism is the principal mode of livestock production 
(Koncsacki, 1978). 
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looking away from any problems of the 'tragedy of the cornmon' type 
50 the pastoralists are treated as a homogeneous group managing 
pasture and animals in a controlled way.6 
As is well known, pastoralism takes severaI forms of econornic 
and social organisation. In what follows, we will think of pastoral 
nomadism in its pure form; that is, pastoral nomads not involved 
in agricultural production at aIf (Konczacki, 1978). Cattle herders are 
therefore the group of pastora1ists considered. In addition, they are 
involved in wildlife utilisation in the form of hunting.8 The livestock 
provides consumptive benefits in the form of meat and skins. But 
it also provides products such as milk when not slaughtered. The 
livestock, also the stock of wildlife, will be considered as assets for 
the pastoralists, where harvesting determines investment activity. 
However, investing in livestock will influence the wildlife stock and 
vice versa, because both species compete for the scarce fador grazing 
land. It is therefore an ecological interdependency between the stocks 
which also translates into an economic interdependency. 
We start in Section 2 to present this ecological system of livestock 
and wildlife. The benefit function of the pastoralists is also formulated 
here. In Section 3, we solve the model and find the pastoralist' s 
optimal investment in livestock and wildlife. Factors working in the 
direction of threatening a viable wildlife population are also analysed. 
In Section 4, we discuss some policy implications and study the model 
in a conservation perspective by attaching a positive stock value to the 
wildlife as representing a public good value in the form of existence 
value, biodiversity and 50 forth. Some policy implications are 
6 This means that we have a setting in which individual conformity to group 
norms prevails among them. In line with traditional reasoning, it is supposea that 
the elders are in charge of their activities (Marks, 1984). 
7 Relaxing this assumption wiU not chan~e the basic results of the present mode!. 
If, say, the pastoralists were engaged In agricultural production as weU, the 
extension of the model would be to add an additional nuisance effect of wildlife 
because roaming wild animals are destraying craps. The obvious result would 
have been a reduction of the optimal size of the wildlife stock (see below). For an 
explicit analysis of the conflicts between wildlife and agricultural production, see 
Schulz and Skonhoft (1996). 
8 Various forms of hunting can be considered, but we will basicaUy think of 
traditional subsistence hunting and commerciaIised hunting for meat and 
trophies. In addition, it can be sports and safari hunting in whid1 the pastoralists 
are seIling hunting Iicences to outsiders (EItringham, 1994; Roth and Merz, 1997). 
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discussed, and the effects of the policy recommendations of the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES; 
Swanson and Barbier, 1992) are also analysed. 
2. Population Dynamics and the Benefit Function of the Pastoralists 
As already noted, there are two production activities practised by the 
group of pastoralists, namely cattle herdiD.g and harvesting of wildlife. 
Both activities are constrained by the population dynamics of the 
livestock and wildlife, where one stock is assumed to represent the 
whole wildlife population. The dynamics are given by equations (1) 
and (2), where (1) is for wildlife and (2) is for cattle. X (wildlife) and Y 
(cattle) are the biomasses at a given point of time (the time index is 
omitt~d), F(X, Y) and G(Y,X) are their accompan§'ing natural growth 
functIons, and f and g are the rates of harvestmg. Natural growth are 
assumed to be density dependent following humped curves 
increasing to peak values for intermediate values of the own stock size; 
8F/8X == Fx > Ofor X < Xmsy, Fx ~ Ofor X ~ Xmsy' Fxx < Oand Gy > Ofor 
y < y msy' Gy ~ Ofor ~ Ymsy and Gyy < O. In addition, the stock growth, 
as well as the marginal stock growth, decreases with the size of the 
other stock, Fy < O, Gx < O, Fxy < Oand GyX < O. These assumptions 
obey the properties of logistic growth. To obtain more dear-cut results, 
the specific functional forms as given by equations (1') and (2') will 
also be used in part of the analysis. Here K and L are the carrying 
capacities in absence of the other stock, rand 5 are the maximum 
specific growth rates, and n and ~ are the interaction coefficients. Thus, 
nXY represents the biomass of wildlife lost per unit of time because of 
the competition from the livestock while ~ YX gives the biomass of 
livestock lost because of the competition from the wildlife. When using 
the specific natural growth functions (1') and (2') , we will therefore 
also have that Fyy = Gxx = O, F(O, Y) = F(K, O) = Oand G(O, X) = G(L, O) 
= Ohold. 
(1) dX/dt = F(X,Y) - f 
(1') F(X, Y) = rX(l - XI K) - aXY 
9 It is therefore assumed that the pastoralists do not infiuence the natural growth 
of their cattle, say, through selective harvesting. 
122 
242 Anders Skonlwft and Jan Tore Solstad 
(2) dY/dt =G(Y,X) - g 
(2') G(Y,X) =sY(l - Y/L) - ~ YX. 
The ecological system with the specific functional forms (1') and (2') 
represents therefore the Gause model of interspecific cornpetition (see 
e.g., Maynard Smith, 1974). It can be confirmed that the model without 
harvesting if = g = O) does not cause oscillations. The equilibrium is 
either of the unstable saddle-point type or it is a stable one. That is to 
say, if the system is perturbed away from equilibrium, an equilibrium 
with both species present or an equilibrium with just one of the species 
surviving will be the outcome. The actual outcome depends on the 
degree of cornpetition between the two populations, and it can be 
shown that the interaction coefficients a and ~ have to be constrained 
in magnitude to obtain a stable equilibrium with both stocks present. 
The degree of ecological cornpetition will also be crucial for obtaining 
arneaningful economic solution of the model (see below). 
The current benefits of the pastoralists are given by equation (3). The 
first term represents the harvesting benefits related to the wildlife with 
p as the fixed price net of harvesting costs. Generally, it will be 
assumed that p > O, but we will also briefly analyse the special case 
where p < O50 that the wildlife is merelya nuisance to the pastoralists. 
The second term gives the harvesting benefits of the livestock where q 
> Ois also the net of harvesting costs off-take price.10 In addition, there 
will be stock benefits from the cattle as given by W(Y). As already 
noted, it can represent various animal products (e.g., milk). In 
addition, it can represent a measure of status as well as an insurance 
motive (Konczacki, 1978; Collett, 1987; Livingstone, 1991; Smith, 1992; 
Perrings, 1993; Walker, 1993; Dasgupta and Maler, 1995). It will 
therefore be assumed that more cattle means more benefits, so Wy > O 
holds. Furthermore we assurne that W(O) ~ Oand Wyy'-;; O, so the stock 
effect has strong similarities to the so-called 'wealth effects' in models 
of optimal growth (Kurz, 1968). To shed some further light on the 
10 P (and q) can also represent the marginal valuation of the off-take when not sold 
for a market (see footnote 8). When interpreted as prices, it is therefore supposed 
that the stock sizes do not affect the harvesting costs, that the costs are linear in 
the off-take, and that the prices are not influenced by the off-take . 
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results, the linear functional form W(Y) =wY will be applied in parts 
of the analysis. 
(3)	 u = pf+ qg + W(Y). 
Equations (1)-(3) are the basic equations of the model which we are 
now ready to analyse. We start by analysing what will be termed the 
market solution of the model. In Section 4 we add a public good effect 
to the benefits of the wildlife and analyse overall optimality. 
3. Optimal Produetion and Stock Sizes of the Pastoralists 
Due to the biological competition between the two populations, the 
pastoralists face a trade-off between keeping livestock and wildlife as 
assets. In what follows, we assume that the behaviour of the 
pastoralists is steered by long-term considerations and that they seek 
to maximise the present-value benefit stream.ll The optimal stock 
investments are then found by maximising equation (4) where 8 is the 
rate of discount, subject to the ecological constraints (1) and (2). 
(4)	 Pv* =f<Xl (pf + qg + W(Y))e-otdt. 
o 
The current-value Hamiltonian of this problem is H =pf + qg + W(Y) + 
Il (F(X, Y) - fl + A(G(Y,X) - g), withfand g as control variables, X and Y 
as state variables, and Il and Aas the shadow prices (costate variables) 
of wildlife and livestock, respectively. Equations (5) and (6) yield the 
reduced form necessary conditions for maximum when an interior 
solution is supposed to be present (positive stock sizes, and positive 
harvesting rates at the steady state, see also Appendix 1). These 
equations represent a 'double singular' jointly determining the long­
11 Instead of long-term utility maximisation, Walker (1993, p. 80), among others, 
argues that the behaviour of pastoralists in semi-arid regions is directed to 
'maintain the maximum number of animals which satisfies a number of 
subsidiary aims, such as drought and status in the community'. This is a 
rule-of-thumb-type of behaviour where the size of the livestock plays a crueial 
role. Because a stock effect also is included in the present benefit function, parts 
of Walker's argument are captured in our made!. 
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Figure 1: Lang-tenn Stock Equi/ibrium under tlle Market Solution (X·, Y·) and Overall 
Optimalihj (XS, yS) 
term equilibrium stocks as X* and Y*. In addition, the steady-state 
off-take rates follow from equations (1) and (2) as f = F(X*,Y*) and g* 
= G (Y*,X*) when dX/dt =Oand dY/ dt = O, respectively.l2 The stock 
equilibrium is depicted in Figure 1. As indicated, equation (5) will 
intersect with equation (6) from above when X is measured along the 
horizontal axis. This will be so because of the second order conditions 
for maximum (again, see Appendix 1). 
(5) Fx(X,Y) = 0- (q/p)Gx(Y,X) 
(6) Gy(Y,X) + Wy(Y)/q = o- (p / q)Fy(X,Y). 
12 Contrary to a one speeies model, it seems difficult to find the optimal 
trajectories of the stoeks when originally being outside equilibrium. The so-called 
Most Rapid Approach Path (the MRAP-strategy) does not generally apply to a 
'double singular'. But as Clark (1990, Ch. 10.3) notes, the MRAP-strategy will be 
the 'practically acceptable approach' in a two species mode!. Basically, the 
MRAP-strategy says that one should harvest as much as possible when the initial 
stock sizes are above that of the long-term optimum, whereas one should stop 
harvesting when initially below. 
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Equations (5) and (6) are the present versions of the Clark-Munro rule. 
The equilibrium condition of an optimal harvesting strategy of the 
livestock in equation (6) is extended with the marginal non­
consumptive benefit component Wy / q > O, which partially works in 
the direction of driving up the size of the livestock. In addition, there 
is the competition effect (p / q)Fy < Oimposed on the wildlife working 
in the opposite direction. A competition term is present in the 
long-term equilibrium condition for the wildlife (5) as weU, (q/p) Gx < 
O, and works partially in the direction of driving down the wildlife 
stock size. Because of the absence of a non-consumptive benefit 
component here, the wildlife stock size will always be at a point where 
(o - Fx) < Oholds. On the other hand, we will have that (o - Gy) > O 
holds if Wy/q dominates (p / q )Fy, while the opposite will be true if the 
marginal non-consumptive benefit effect is small and the marginal 
value of the biomass loss imposed on the wildlife at the same time is 
large. 
By taking the total differential of equations (5) and (6), we can 
demonstrate the effects of permanent changes in the economic 
environment and see what factors are working in the direction of 
threatening the wildlife (Appendix 1). An increased price of the 
wildlife off-take has unambiguous effects, and contrary to the 
standard one-species harvesting model (Clark, 1990), we will have that 
the wildlife stock will increase when the off-take price increases, 
ax*/ ap > o. This discrepancy can be related to two distinet features of 
our model compared with the Clark model. The first has to do with the 
mechanisms of a one-species model and concerns the different 
assumptions about the stock effects of the wildlife. The only stock 
effect in the Clark model is positive since it originates from the 
assumption of a negative relationship between harvesting costs and 
the stock size. The presenee of a positive stock effect obviously means 
a higher optimal stock size than when there is no stock effect. 
However, an increased off-take price will reduce this impact since the 
relative importance of the stock effect will be lower when the 
profitability of harvesting increases. Hence, a higher off-take price 
reduces the stock. On the contrary, the only stock effect present in our 
model originates from the assumption of wildlife representing a 
nuisance for cattle herding and is thus negative. The presence of a 
negative stock effect means a lower optimal stock size compared with 
a situation without it, and, as above, this impact is reduced by an 
increased off-take price. Hence, a higher off-take price increases the 
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stock in this case. The second discrepancy compared with the Clark 
model is related to the two-species nature of our madel. A more 
valuable wildlife implies additional costs of keeping cattle because the 
value of the lost wildlife biomass due to the competing cattle increases. 
Obviously, this works partially in the direction of a smaller optimal 
cattle stack size and, because of reduced competition, it reinforces the 
first effect so the result will be a larger stack of wildlifeP Because 
of the increased competition for grazing land due to more wildlife, 
and the increased costs of keeping cattle, the effect on the cattle stock 
size of a permanent shift in the off-take price of the wildlife is 
unambiguously negative, ay*/ ap < O. 
The above result holds when p > O. As already mentioned, however, 
we will also consider the case when the wild species are only a 
nuisance so that the harvesting price falls short of harvesting costs. 
When p is negative, the pastoralists have to weigh the benefits of a 
smaller wildlife stock against the net cost of harvesting. In such a case, 
it can be demonstrated that the most likely result of an increase in the 
price, i.e., a reduction of net harvesting costs, will be a smaller wildlife 
stock. Hence, the result will be in accordance with the standard 
one-species harvesting model (see Appendix 2). This is also in 
accordance with intuitive reasoning; a price increase lowers the costs 
of getting rid of 'problem' animals relative to the negative stock effect 
of the wildlife. It will therefore be optimal for the pastoralists to reduce 
the wildlife stock through an increased harvesting activity.14 
The long-term effects of a permanent shift in the off-take price of 
cattle are generally unclear. Compared with the wildlife case above, 
the difference lies in the fact that it has attached a positive stock effect 
on cattle, the non-consumptive benefit term W(Y), in addition to the 
negative competition effect. This term represents a stock effect similar 
to the one of the Clark model (see above). Hence, if the marginal 
nan-consumptive benefit effect dominates the marginal effects 
13 If we relax the assumption of stock-independent harvesting costs of wildlife, 
allowing eosts to decrease with the stock size as in the Clark model, this result will 
still hola as long as the marginal effeet of the imposed eost does not dominate the 
marginal effects originating from the nuisanee term and the partial reduetion of 
the stoek of cattle. However, jf it does, we will arrive at the Clark result. 
14 The point of including a negative harvesting value 50 that wildlife is merelya 
nuisance was suggested by an anonymous referee. 
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originating from the competition, we will arrive at the Clark result 
ar/aq < O. In such a case the effect on the wildlife stock will be 
ambiguous. This will be so because two partial effects are working in 
opposite directions; the reduced competition due to less cattle 
increases the wildlife stock while a more valuable cattle stock 
motivates for shrinking the wildlife. On the other hand, if the marginal 
competition effects dominate the non-consumptive benefit effect, we 
obtain ar/aq > O. Because more cattle means more competition for the 
wildlife, in addition to the fact that a more valuable cattle stock 
motivates for less wildlife, we arrive at ax*/ aq < O. The general 
conclusion is therefore that at least one of the stocks must decrease 
when q increases. For a related discussion, in a somewhat other 
context, see Flaaten (1991). 
A permanent increase of the rate of discount 8 also has unclear stock 
effects. The reason is first of all that it motivates for stock disinvest­
ments due to an increased opportunity cost of the biological capita!. 
Second, the grazing land competition for both stocks will be reduced 
as a result of this first round effect. It can, however, be demonstrated 
that at least one of the stocks will decrease when the rate of discount 
increases. This result can be proved by showing that the assumption 
of larger populations of both species when 8 shifts up will contradict 
the second order condition for maximum. Hence, the first round effect 
motivating for stock disinvestments when the opportunity costs of the 
biological capital increases must therefore dominate at least for one of 
the stocks. The valuation of the non-eonsumptive livestock benefits 
can change as weU. This can be analysed by adding a shift parameter 
r > Oon the left-hand side of equation (6) (see Appendix 1). The effect 
on the livestock is obviously ay*/ ar > O, while ax*/ ar < owill hold 
because of more competition for grazing land. To the extent that 
modernisation reduces the non-consumptive livestock valuation, this 
will therefore tend to motivate for an increased size of the wildlife 
stock. 
While the general functional forms of the population growth and the 
benefit functions have given some insight on the economic forces 
determining the long-term stock sizes, more clear-eut results can be 
obtained, at the cost of generality, by using the specific functional 
forms. When introducing F(X, Y) and G(Y,X) from equations (1') and 
(2') together with the benefit function W(Y) = wY (see also Section 2), 
the long-term stock equilibrium conditions (5) and (6) change to (7) 
and (8) after a few rearrangements. 
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(7) (2r/K)X + (a + (q/p)~)Y = r - 8 
(8) (~+ (P/q)a)X + (25/L)Y =5 - 8 + w/q. 
These equations represent straight lines in the XY-plane and both lines 
have negative slopes. The second order condition requiring that D = 
(4rs/ KL) - ((q/p)~2 + 2a.~ + (P/ q)a2) > O(see Appendix 3) also means 
that the determinant of the left-hand side of equations (7) and (8) must 
be positive since it is equal to D. Hence, equation (7) should be more 
negatively sloped than equation (8) (see also the slope of the above 
equations (5) and (6) in Figure 1). The interpretation of this condition 
for obtaining arneaningful economic solution to the maximisation 
problem is that there must be a restriction on the degree of cornpetition 
between the two stocks. This is just as in the general model (see 
Appendix l), but now the condition has a very simple parametric 
representation. As can be seen, the interaction coefficients a and ~ 
must be constrained in magnitude. Moreover, there must be 
restrictions on the relative price of the off-takes if the degree of 
competition is biased. Jf, say, the interspecific competition is largely 
biased in favour of the wildlife so that ~ » a holds, the off-take price 
ratio q/p must be constrained in magnitude.15 5ee also Figure 2. 
In what follows, it is assumed that both r - 8 and s - 8 + w/q are 
positive. 50 if the maximum specific growth rates are above that of the 
rate of discount, which is quite reasonable for large African mammals 
(see e.g., Caughley and Sinc1air, 1995), it is seen from Figure 2 that the 
condition for obtaining an interior solution, X* > Oand Y* > O, will be 
fulfilled it the interaction between the stocks is not toa heavy, i.e., just 
as in the ecological model without harvesting. It will therefore be no 
wildlife in the long term if the stock equilibrium condition for cattle (8) 
intersects with the Y-axis outside that of the stock equilibrium 
condition for wildlife (7). (5 - 8 + w/q)/(2s/L) >(r - 8)/(a + (q/p)f3) 
must then hold. The condition for having a positive stock of wildlife is 
therefore also captured by a very simple parametric representation 
under the given specific functional forms. Hence, if the competition 
between the species is fierce (a and ~ large), the off-take price of 
wildlife compared with cattle is low (q/p large), the marginal 
15 In the linear model p > Omust always hold to fulfil the second order conditions 
(see also Appendix 2). 
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non-consumptive benefit ratio of cattle is large (w/q large) and the 
wildlife is slow-growing (r low), the pastoralists will keep only 
livestock in the lang term. The presence of fast-growing cattle (5 high), 
however, does not necessarily work in the same direction. The 
symmetric representation of the competition coefficient should also be 
noticed; it is a general high degree of competition that can make 
extermination of the wildlife an optimal policy, not only a high degree 
of nuisance from wildlife to cattle. When equation (7) intersects at the 
X-axis outside that of equation (8) so that (r - 'b)/(2r/K) > (5 - 'b + 
w/q)/(~ + (p/q)a) holds, there will be no cattle in the long run. Hence, 
if the competition between the species is fierce, q/p and w/q are small 
and cattle is slow-growing (s low), keeping only wildlife can be an 
optimal policy. 
4. The Conservation Perspective 
Summing up the above results when only the cost and the benefits of 
the pastoralists influence the stock sizes, i.e., the market solution, we 
can conclude that a low positive price of the wildlife off-take will 
always be a threat to wildlife in the present setting. In the linearised 
s-C5+(l/q)w X 
jJ+(p/q)a 
Wildlife 
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model this threat is also identified as a high off-take price ratio q/p. 
When the value of the non-consumptive benefit of the livestock is high 
there will be strong incentives to shrink the wildlife stock in the 
long-term as well. In the linearised model this threat is also identified 
as a high marginal benefit ratio w/ q. Ecological factors also playarale. 
Consequently, the wildlife will be threatened if there is a high degree 
of grazing competition among the two stocks and the wildlife is 
slow-grawing. On the other hand, the pastoralists will favour wildlife 
at the expense of cattle if the off-take price ratio q/p is low and the 
marginal benefit ratio w / q is low. The possibility of a complete 
abandoning of cattle herding increases if the interspecific competition 
is fierce and the cattle is slow-growing. 
The stock sizes and off-take rates in the market solution will, 
however, differ compared with what is socially optimal because there 
generally will be present a stock value of the wildlife as existence 
value, biodiversity and so forth, not taken care of by the pastoralists. 
In particular, this will be 50 if the wildlife belongs to a relatively rare 
and threatened species (Krutilla, 1967). We therefore now introduce 
a public good value of the wildlife as given by equation (9). B(X) is 
also assumed to be non-negative and concave, B(O) ~ O, Bx > O and 
Bxx:::; O. The public good value can be recognised through national and 
international conservation groups etc., or it can be recognised by the 
government. 
(9)	 B= B(X). 
Current overall benefits are therefore given by pf + qg + W(Y) + B(X}. 
Overall optimal stock investments are then found by maximisation 
of equation (10), again subject to the ecological constraints (l) and 
(2).16 
(10)	 PV5 =f00 (pf + qg + W(Y) + B(X»e-iS!dt. 
o 
16 It is usually argued (see e.g., Markandya and Pearce, 1988) that the rate of 
discount of peopfe living in semi-arid regions in Africa will be high and weU 
above that of the socia! rate. In what follows, however, this discrepancy is 
disregarded. 
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It can be checked that equations (6) and (11) give the reduced 
form long-term necessary conditions for maximum. These two 
equations therefore determine the long-term overall optimal stock 
sizes as XS and ys (superscript '5' denotes social or overall optimal­
ity). It can be confirmed that we will now have XS > X*. 
Moreover, because of increased competition for the livestock as a 
result of more wildlife, it also follows that ys < Y* will hold in the 
long term. See also Figure 1. The general conc1usion when intro­
ducing a non-consumptive good of the wildlife is therefore that the 
market solution, i.e., the situation when the public good nature of 
the wildlife is disregarded, will give toa 1ittle wildlife and toa 
much livestock. 
(11) Fx(X, Y)+ Bx(X)/p = li - (qjp)Gx(Y,X). 
There is therefore room for economic policy and interventions to move 
the outcome of the market solution in direction of the social optimal 
stock sizes. Generally, there will be two types of policy options: direct 
regulation of the off-take and indirect regulations through economic 
incentives, i.e., internalising the public good value of the wildlife 
through the market mechanism. In what follows, it will be assumed 
that the pastoralists feel no obligation to behave according to 
regulations through the legal system, and that there is no law 
enforcement to ensure that they do (see Section 1). The only way 
considered to direct the investment decisions of the pastoralists will 
therefore be through economic incentives. The economic incentives 
may come from foreign policy interventions like eITES or other trade 
interventions, or by international conservation efforts taking place 
through direct payment for conservation. As already mentioned, the 
government may also pursue policy interventions. However, it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss how taxes and payment 
transfers actually should be collected and distributed. 
The first policy option to be considered is a tax-cum-subsidy to 
wildlife products, giving a permanent shift in the producer price of the 
off-take of wildlife. This may be implemented nationally or by 
international regulation of wildlife trade, both aiming to adjust the 
misallocation of the market solution. Because an increased off-take 
price shifts the wildlife stock up, a subsidy which increases the 
producer price on harvesting will therefore work in the right 
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direction. l7 It is also c1ear that the recommendation of the CITES 
convention to impose restrictions on trade with wildlife products in 
order to reduce the profitability of wildlife harvesting and reduce the 
off-take price will work counterproductively in the present setting. 
The outcome will namely be less wildlife and more livestock compared 
with the rnarket solution, and therefore stock sizes that are even 
further away from what is socially optimal. 
To some extent, this conc1usion rests on our assumption of no 
stock-independent harvesting costs of the wildlife. Jf stock-dependent 
costs are inc1uded, however, the opposite conc1usion can be reached 
only if this component is sufficiently large to dominate the marginal 
effects originating from the nuisance term and the partial reduction of 
the cattle stock (see footnote 13). But in such a case, the size of the 
wildlife stock would have been larger than without stock-dependent 
costs. The presence of a negative price effect would therefore have 
been associated with a more viable and less endangered wildlife 
population compared with our scenario of no stock-dependent 
harvesting costs. When addressing the problem of endangered wild 
species, the stock-dependent harvesting costs, il present, are therefore 
likely to be small. Consequently, for endangered species managed in a 
controlled way, i.e., when disregarding any 'open-access' problems as 
in the present context, i.t is most likely that the price effect is positive 
and working in the opposite direction of the assumed ClTES-policy.l8 
As demonstrated, we can also reach the conc1usion of a negative price 
effect if the wildlife essentially is a nuisance. However, for such 
low-valued species the relevance of elTES-policy is limited because 
CITES is basically dealing with species of a high commercial 
harvesting value. 
Another policy option is to change the price of the off-take of the 
livestock. As the analysis in Section 3 demonstrates, such a policy has 
unclear stock effects. However, if the marginal non-consumptive 
benefit effect is small, a tax which shifts the producer price on the 
livestock off-take down will work in the right direction as the size of 
17 However, it should be noted that il the right wildlife stock level is reached, it is 
not generally possible to reach the social optimal size of the livestock. There are 
namely two targets and only one policy variable. 
18 However, this does not mean that the CITES-polic)' caJUlOt work under other 
circumstances. For example, it may work if there are open-access' problems. 
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the livestock will shrink and the wildlife population will increase. li 
the marginal non-consumptive stock effect is sufficiently large, how­
ever, the effect will be ambiguous. Irrespective of the consequences for 
the stoek sizes, such a policy will, however, have quite different 
welfare effects for the loeal people compared with the above case of 
subsidy of the price of the wildlife. Namely, a subsidy giving a 
marginal positive shift in the off-take price of the wildlife will change 
the present-value benefit stream positively according to . 
ex> 
apv * jap =Jfe,sldt 
o 
where f is evaluated along the optimal path (see e.g., Kamien and 
Schwartz, 1991, Ch. IlB). On the other hand, a tax shifting the 
harvesting price of the cattle marginally down reduces the 
present-value benefit according to 
<Xl 
åPV* jåq= Jge-Sldt. 
o 
Here, again, the harvesting rate is evaluated along the optimal path. 
A third poliey option to achieve overall optimality is to impose a 
subsidy related to the stock of wildlife, and we will basically think of 
this as an international transfer reflecting a direct payment for 
conservation.19 When the public good value of the wildlife is reflected 
through a stock transfer related to the stock size as T = T(X), the 
objective function of the pastoralists then changes from (4) to (12). The 
long-run stock equilibrium conditions will now therefore be equations 
(6) and (13). 
(12)	 PVT =
<XlJ(pf + qg + W(Y) + T(X))e'Oldt 
o 
19 See Simpson and Sedjo (1996) for a general discussion. They make a distinetion 
between direct and indirect payment for conservation. Indirect payment is efforts 
intended to commereialise natural products. 
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(13) Fx(X,Y) + Tx(X)jp =8 - (qjp)Gx(Y,X). 
By comparing the conditions (6) and (11) with overall optimality, it is 
seen that the international transfer rate Tx = Bx (XS) ($ per wildlife 
animal per unit of time), and hence a total transfer of T =Bx (XS) XS ($ 
per unit of time), will bring the market solution in accordance with 
overall optimality.20 50, using a stock related transfer, it is therefore 
possible to safeguard the wildlife and reach overall optimality.21 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have, from a theoretical point of view, analysed eco­
nomic and ecological mechanisms determining wildlife investments in 
the context of pastoral exploitation of the semi-arid African rangeland. 
The pastoralists, treated as a homogeneous group having sole access to 
a fixed area of pasture, are practising two production activities: cattle 
herding and wildlife harvesting. The livestock provides consumptive 
benefits when being slaughtered (meat, skins etc.) and non­
consumptive benefits (miIk, status, insurance etc.). Wildlife represents 
only consumptive benefits for the pastoralists. Livestock and wildlife 
interact with each other as there is competition for grazing land. It is 
assumed that the pastoralist's livestock and wildlife investments are 
steered by long-term considerations and that they seek to maximise 
present-value benefit. Because of the ecological interdependency, there 
will also be an economic interdependency. 
In this setting, factors working in the direction of threatening the 
wildlife are identified. It is demonstrated that, unlike the result of 
the standard harvesting model (Clark, 1990), a low positive price of 
20 This reasoning can also be interpreted in light of the Coase theorem (Coase, 
1960) given that the property rights to the wildlife and its habitat are recognised 
as belonging to the pastoralists.ln the present context, this implies that the most 
efficient way to reach overall optimality is that the conservationists should 
compensate the pastoralists not to deplete the wildlife stock below X*. 
21 Consequently, when introducing only one stock related transfer it is possible 
to reach two targets. This result hinges on the structure of the equations 
characterising the market solution and the social solution. It is namely only one 
discrepancy which is linked to the size of the wildlife stock. In Figure 1 this is 
identified as the same long-term stock equilibrium condition for the livestock (6), 
while the stock equilibrium condition for the wildlife (5) shifts according to the 
size of the non-consumptive stock effect. 
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wildlife products will be a threat to the wildlife. When the value of the 
non-consumptive benefit of the livestock is high there will also be 
problems for the wildlife to pay its way so there will be strong 
incentives for the pastoralists to shrink the wildlife stock. This result 
clearly fits intuitive reasoning, and to the extent that cultural changes 
and modernisation reduce the non-consumptive livestock valuation, 
the threat is therefore reduced. The consumptive value of the livestock 
has an ambiguous effect, but under certain conditions a high 
consumptive value will motivate for reducing the wildlife population. 
This will be so if the non-consumptive benefit of the livestock is small 
and of minor irnportance, i.e., we have a modernised type of 
pastoralism where the livestock benefit is primarily attached to the 
value of slaughtered animals (see e.g., Konczacki, 1978). Under such a 
scenario, our model contrasts the recommendation of Brown et al. 
(1993) of increasing the profitability in agropastoral and pastoral 
activities to safeguard wildlife populations. The result is therefore in 
line with the model of Schulz and Skonhoft (1996), which finds that 
improved profitability in agropastoral activities is always a threat 
to wildlife as it triggers land conversion. However, when the non­
consumptive benefit of livestock is large, i.e., with the more traditional 
mode of pastoralism, the effects of a more valuable cattle off-take is 
ambiguous. 
In a next step, we consider the social optimal stock investments 
when adding a public good value to the wildlife, asrepresenting 
existence value, biodiversity and so forth, not taken care of by the 
pastoralists. The public good value can be recognised through 
international conservation groups or by the government. The result 
will be more wildlife and less livestock compared with the situation 
when only the benefits of the pastoralists influence the stock sizes, i.e., 
the market solution. Policies to change the market solution in the 
direction of overall optimality are then analysed. It is shown that 
giving values to wildlife products will work in the direction of 
safeguarding the wildlife. Hence, policy interventions like elTES 
will in our setting of a controlled management regime work counter­
productively as reduced profitability in wildlife harvesting will give 
less wildlife in the long-term. A policy option to increase the off-take 
price through subsidies of the livestock can also work counter­
productively, while an international payment for conservation linked 
to the stock size of the wildlife will give the pastoralists incentives to 
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increase the wildlife stock and therefore bring the market solution 
more in accordance to what is socially optimal. 
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Appendix 1 
Necessary conditions for maximum of the problem in Section 3 are oH/of= O, 
oH/og = O, dJl/dt =8Jl - oH/oX and dA/dt =8A - oH/oY. When eliminating 
the shadow prices, we arrive at equations (5) and (6), which represent a 
singular system. 
The second-order conditions require that the Hamiltonian should be jointly 
concave in the state and control variables. Concavity of the Hamiltonian 
means that the Hesse matrix should be negative semi-definite in optimum. It 
can be demonstrated that this requires Fxx + (q/p) Gxx $ O, (Fxx + (q/p)Gxx) 
(Gyy + (p Iq) Fyy + (l/q)Wyy) - (Fxy + (q/p) GXY) (GyX + (P/q) Fyx);::: Oand 
Gyy + (P/ q)Fyy + (1/q) Wyy ~ O. The second of these conditions implies that 
eguation (5) will be steeper than (6). Hence, at the optimum (5) will intersect 
with (6) from above (see Figure 1). lncreased marginal valuation of the 
non-consumptive benefits of the livestock is introduced by adding a 
shift-factor y > O to (6) as in (Al). The effect of increased marginal 
stock-valuation is then demonstrated as oX·/ Oy. 
(Al) Gy(Y,X) +Wy(y)/ q+y / q=8- (p/ q)Fy(X, Y). 
The comparative static results are found by taking the total differential of (5) 
and (Al). (A2) shows the result. 
FXX + (q / p)Gxx FXY + (q / p)GXY ] 
[ Gyx + (p/ q)Fyx Gyy + (p / q)JYy + (1/ q)Wyy [:~]= 
(A2) (q / p2)GX -(1/ p)Gx lO] l::][ d8 .-(I/q)Fy (1/q2)(pFy+Wy +y) 1 -l/q dy 
The determinant of the left-hand side of (A2), 
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N = (Fxx + (q I p)Gxx)(Gyy +(pl q)Fyy + (11 q)V\Yy)­
(Fxy + (q I p)GXY)(Gyx + (p I q)Fvx), 
will be strictly positive in optimum due to the second order conditions for 
maximum, N > O. We then obtain 
q 1
zGx(Gyy + (p I q)Fyy + Wyy I q) + - Fy(FXY + (q I p)GXY )
ax* = p q > O, 
ap N 
1 q 
- - Fy(Fxx + (q I p)Gxx )- zGx(Gyx + (p I q)Fyx )ay* q P <O 
ap N ' 
1 1 
"2 (pFy + Wy +y)(Fxx + (ql p)Gxx )+ -Gx(Gyx + (pl q)Fyx )
_ay_* = q p = ?, 
aq N 
_'!'Gx(Gyy + (p I q)Fyy +Wyy Iq) - 12 (pFy + Wy + y)(FXY + (q I p)GXY )
ax* = p q _?
 
oq N - "'
 
ax* (Gyy +(pl q)Fyy + Wyy I q)- (FXY +(ql p)GXY ) _? 
-= -.,
ao N 
ay* _ (Fxx + (ql p)Gxx )- (Gyx + (p I q)Fyx ) _? 
-- -'f 
ao N 
1
-(FXY +(ql p)GXY )ax* q
- = .2.- < O, 
Oy N 
-~(Fxx +(ql p)Gxx )ay* q
- = ---!..----- > o. 
ay N 
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Appendix 2 
When there is attached a net negative harvesting value to the wildlife, i.e., the 
wildlife is essentially representing a nuisance, we can replace p by -c, where 
c > Ois the net harvesting east. The reduced form necessary conditions for 
maximum when an interior solution is supposed to be present are then given 
by (A3) and (A4): 
(A3) Fx(X, Y) =() + (ql c)Gx(Y'X), 
(A4) Gy(Y,X) +Wy(Y) Iq = () + (c I q)Fy(X, Y). 
The second order conditions for maximum, requiring joint concavity of the 
Hamiltonian in the state and control variables, are now Fxx - (q/c)Gxx? O, (Fxx 
- (ql c) Gxx) (Gyy - (cl q) Fyy + (Il q) Wyy) - (Fxv - (ql c) GXY) (GyX - (cl q)Fyx) 
:s; Oand Gyy - (cl q) Fyy + (Il q) Wyy:S; O. Hence, to obtain an interior optimal 
solution, Gxx has to be negative and less than (cl q)Fxx, while Fyy cannot, if 
negative, be less than (q/c)Gyy + WyyI c. 
The effect of an increase in the price, i.e., a decrease in c, is found by taking 
the total differential of (A3) and (A4) with respect to X, Yand c. (AS) shows 
the result. 
Fxx-(qIC)Gxx Fxy-(qlc)Gxy 2 )Gx]][dX] [-(qI C(AS) = de.[ GyX - (cl q)FyX Gyy - (cl q)Fyy +(1/ q)Wyy dY (Il q)Fy 
The determinant of the left-hand side of (AS), M = (Fxx - (q/c) Gxx) (Gyy - (cIq) 
Fyy + (Il q) Wyy) - (Fxy - (q/c) GXY) (GyX - (clq) Fyx), will be strictly negative 
in optimum due to the second order conditions for maximum, M < O. We then 
obtain 
- ~ Gx(Gyy - (c I q)Fyy +Wyy I q) _.!. Fy (Fn - (q / c)GXY )ax* c q
-- =-------------'-------­
oc M 
The sign ofax*1 ac is generally ambiguous. But aX*1ac will be positive it (Fxv 
- (q/c)GXY) is negative. It not, ax*I ac will still be positive if the positive value 
of (Fxv - (q/c) GXY) is not too large. Recalling that (Fxy - (q/c) GXY) is 
constrained in magnitude (due to the second order conditions), we will most 
likely have that aX*lac is positive. Hence, an increase in the price (reduced c) 
will most likely lead to a reduction of the wildlife stock in the case when there 
are net costs attached to harvesting. 
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Appendix 3 
For the specific functional forms of equations (1') and (2') and W(Y) = wY, it 
can be verified that the second order conditions now will be -2r/K $; O, (4rs/KL) 
- «q/p) 13 2 + 20.13 + (P/q) 0.2) ~ Oand -25/L $; O. 
The comparative static results of the linearised model are found by taking 
the total differential of equations (7) and (8). (A6) gives the result. 
-2r / K -(o. + (q / P)I3)][dX] = 
[
-(13 + (p / q)o.) -25 / L dY 
dP 
(A6) 
-(q / p2)l3 Y (1/ p)13 y 1 O dq 
[ (1/ q)o.X -(1/ q')(paX -IV) l -1/ q] d~ .[
dw 
The determinant of the left-hand side of (A6), O = (4r5/ KL) - «q/ p)13 2 + 20.13 + 
(p/q)0.2), will be strictly positive in optimum due to the second order 
conditions for maximum, O > O. We then obtain 
2sQ13 Y+ o. X(o. + q/ p)l3) 
ax * L 2 q
- '" ----'-P__-'-- > O, 
op O 
2ro. ql3
--X - 2"Y(13 + (p / q)a)
ay* Kq p <O,
-= 
op O 
2sp y (paX - 10) ( (/ )A)-~ - - 2 0.+ q P l-' 
ax* ~ q D -? -"I 
aq 
2r2 (paX -w) +~ Y(13 +(p / q)o.) 
aY* = Kq P _? 
aq O - "I 
25 
ax* -L+(a+(q/p)!3) 
-== =?,
08 D 
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-!(a + (q/ p)l3)
ax*
>-= q <O, 
aw O 
2r 
8Y* = Kq >0. 
ow D 
